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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is not structured as a conventional empirical study (theoretical 
background, method, results, discussion), but instead consists of an iterative series 
of attempts at making sense of same-race prejudice – hopefully systematically 
homing in on a richer and more acute understanding of the phenomenon.  
The chapters are grouped together in pairs or triplets – each grouping addressing 
different but related perspectives on the problem. Chapters 1 and 2 are contextual, 
setting the scene historically and conceptually. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 introduce three 
different perspectives on using phenomenology as a means of approaching the issue 
of same-race prejudice. Chapters 6 and 7 are dedicated to looking at the themes of 
same-race prejudice, a critical interrogation of the themes from the interview 
discussions, the literature and how same-race prejudice is experienced, played out 
and sustained. Chapter 8 links back to Chapter 1 by casting another look at 
sensitivity and responsiveness to same-race prejudice by organisations whose work 
is supposedly on prejudice eradication. The chapter further links with both Chapters 
3 and 4 by calling upon a phenomenological understanding to humanity as what can 
bring a liveable change to humanity regarding same-race prejudice. Chapter 9 
serves as a summary of all the chapters, what each individually and collectively 
hoped to achieve, and the general findings and statements about same-race 
prejudice from the chapters’ theoretical discussions, research interviews, and critical 
interrogation of both the mundane and theoretical understanding. 
Keywords: authenticity, black, blackness, categorisation, critical race theory, 
essentialism, intolerance, naturalism, naturalist attitude, normativity, 
phenomenology, prejudice, prototypicality, race, racial identity, racial identification, 
stereotypes, white, whiteness.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 PREJUDICE AND INTOLERANCE: REFLECTIONS ON APARTHEID 
AND POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I sketch the broad conceptual, historical and socio-political context 
within which acts of racial prejudice generally, and of same-race prejudice 
specifically, can be understood. Conceptually, I primarily consider definitions of, and 
theoretical work on, the concepts of tolerance and intolerance (further conceptual 
unpacking follows in Chapter 2) as well as the criteria and features that are 
commonly understood to define ‘intolerance’ and its consequences. Historically, I 
provide an overview of the various apartheid laws and practices that shaped the 
racial landscape of present-day South Africa. I pay particular attention to a variety of 
signifiers that lent credence to apartheid semiotics – including territorial, ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic demarcations. With regard to the institutional and 
legislative context, I review the various post-apartheid institutions (including the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Commission) and laws that 
have been put in place to combat prejudice and how these have been hijacked by 
appeals to essentialist cultural and racial identities. The chapter makes use of 
various illustrative examples, such as the infamous ‘spear of the nation’ case,  media 
depictions of ‘poor whites’, and reports of xenophobic incidents, to show how neat 
conceptual categories, clear-cut historical trajectories, and carefully-considered legal 
frameworks are disrupted by the visceral realities of actual instances of inter-race 
and same-race prejudice. 
The chapter serves, firstly, to raise and answer the question: “What is the relevance 
of the topic of race and prejudice, generally, and of same-race prejudice in South 
Africa, specifically?” This is done by considering the definition of prejudice (Akhtar, 
2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 2007) and the consequences thereof on people’s lives 
(Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Ingram, 1999; Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b; Sabourin, 
2001; Sampson, 1999).  
To enable further understanding of the effects of prejudice on people’s lives, the 
discussion explores the definition of intolerance (Guindon, Green & Hanna, 2003; 
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Matsuura, 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011) and considers the relationship between 
prejudice and intolerance (O’Bryan, Fishbein & Ritchey, 2004). The chapter also 
explores the various theoretical understandings that explain precursors and defining 
criteria of intolerance as a contributor to prejudice (Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & 
Walker, 2011). Later in the chapter, the confluence of race, intolerance and prejudice 
in apartheid South Africa is illustrated through a chronicle of the human rights 
violations and abuses enabled by stereotypes of identity and identification 
(Pucherova, 2011), limitation and denial of services and privileges (Budlender & 
Lund, 2011; Higgs & Evans, 2008), and the restriction of people’s lives and 
movement to poor and unliveable conditions (Breetzke, 2012), as sustained through 
official laws. The discussion is juxtaposed with a look at the legal efforts instituted in 
post-apartheid South Africa to ameliorate the effects of racial intolerance and 
stereotypes, and to eradicate prejudice in general.  
The second aim of the chapter is to bring up the following assertions, which are 
debated throughout the thesis:   
1. Efforts meant to eradicate prejudice and intolerance between the races, and to 
promote racial unity, are eclipsed by tendencies to essentialise and polarise 
racial identities and forms of racial identification within the races (Bonilla-Silva & 
Embrick, 2001; Sunday Times, 2012b; Sunday World, 2012).  
2. Constitutionally supported pursuits of racial diversity may accentuate the 
differences between the races as distinctively real, pure and authentically 
existing definitions of identity and identification (Wilkinson & Unwin, 1999) by 
deliberately prescribing and encouraging racially defined modes of identity and 
identification while frowning upon practices that fall outside of these (Espiritu, 
2004; Mahon, 2004; O’Connor, Fernández & Girard, 2007; Ross, 2007; Tate, 
2005).  
3. Pressure to conform to essentialised (Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 
2011; Wagner, Kronberger, Nagata, Sen, Holtz & Palacios, 2010), prototypical, 
normative (Hornsey, Majkut, Terry & McKimmie, 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; 
Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008) 
and authentic (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004; O’Connor et al., 2007; Ross, 2007; 
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Tate, 2005) racial definitions of identity and identification sustains stereotypes 
(Aspinall & Song, 2013; Eyben, 2007; Hooks, 2009; Mallon, 2013; Sampson, 
1999) that lead to intolerance of and prejudice against difference within races 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). 
1.2 PREJUDICE EXPLAINED 
Prejudice is defined briefly as being displayed through ingrained discrimination and 
intolerance in attitude and behaviour towards others, based on their distinctive 
attributes of, for example, religion, sexuality, race and gender, that serve to 
accentuate their differentness from us. As either negative or positive value-laden 
preconceived ideas, prejudice ignores any new information that runs contrary to it 
(Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 2007). 
It is human to have prejudice. We inescapably hold stereotypes, the mental maps 
about life that are invariably inaccurate, leading us to be prejudiced and 
discriminatory. It is therefore an unfortunate fallacy to assume that one can be 
immune to prejudice and that prejudice is only in others, especially in the presumed 
other. We all judge and discriminate in our value-laden interactions with others 
(Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Sampson, 1999). Even philanthropic gestures to 
help the needy can serve to patronise and leave them with an indelible sense of 
worthlessness and victimhood, as we inadvertently label them as incapable and us 
as capable (Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b). 
Decried and declared by the United Nations to be a scourge of nations and 
individuals, inflicting untold suffering on other nations and individuals based on their 
accentuated differentness (Sabourin, 2001), prejudice was always the bedfellow of 
race relations in apartheid South Africa, leading to the commission of various human 
rights atrocities across all political organisations and against people of different races 
(Ingram, 1999). Laws passed in support of apartheid ensured that people of the 
black race endured the brunt of inferior life services, as well as exposure to various 
forms of suffering, ranging from disruption of family life, displacement, receiving poor 
education and unemployment, to vulnerability, unremitting disease and crime 
(Breetzke, 2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011). 
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1.3 WHY SAME-RACE PREJUDICE? 
South Africa has evidently designed mechanisms to bridge the rift that came with 
apartheid’s interracial prejudice, making it reasonable to query the relevance of the 
subject of race and prejudice in South Africa now. One may even ask what all the 
fuss with race and prejudice is about, what has not been done or achieved through 
racial unity? Is this a new focus or is it just an area that has been there but 
overlooked? 
An answer to these questions is provided first through an illustration of reactions and 
counter-reactions to a painting, which should highlight how racially polarised the 
nation is, as well as the extent of the unwillingness to cross the racial bar so 
significantly venerated during apartheid with steadfastly defended race taboos and 
barriers (Pucherova, 2011). The illustration should expose debates of how each race 
is defended as existing as purely and essentially unique, as well as how we 
deliberately and unwittingly perpetuate stereotypes about the race of the self and 
that of the other while being intolerant to race disloyalty, dissent and slurs, thereby 
objectifying our racial identities as naturally given. Even appeals for cultural identity 
may suggest identities that are essentially existing and not needing further 
interrogation.  
Questions can be asked about how possible it is to incorporate those of the other 
race if even those of one’s own race are not tolerated. It can also be asked how the 
tendency to regroup, reclassify and suppress same-race difference leads to 
intolerance and prejudice within races, against the rainbow nation appeals of 
national unity as enshrined in the Constitution and pursued through institutions such 
as the South African Human Rights Commission. 
The biological difference between races has been proven a fallacy with no scientific 
foundation, only supported for political reasons (Arudou, 2013; Baker, 2010; Sarich & 
Miele, 2004; Tochluk, 2010; Weber, 2013). The essentialist distinctiveness of races 
has been proven to be a socially constructed reality. The exhortation for individuals 
to adhere to strict and distinct racial and cultural identities may ignore that these are 
lived concepts masked in stereotypes of being that signal intolerance to alternatives 
contrary to their identity definitions. Prejudice, intolerance and suppression of 
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difference within the races, while insisting on the races’ pure nature, may put the 
country on a road to which post-apartheid South Africa is not seeking to return.    
1.4 THE CASE OF DEFENDED RACES 
In 2012, the Sunday Times (2012b) and Sunday World (2012) newspapers carried 
various pieces regarding a painting at the Goodman Gallery by Brett Murray, a South 
African artist, depicting Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa, fully clad but with his 
genitals exposed. This drew attention, increasing visits to the gallery and causing 
public debates, with the picture appearing in the majority of the media publications 
with equal reactions of both applause and disdain. The portrait (Jacob Zuma) and 
the painter (Brett Murray) assumed personified race, colour and cultural status. 
Suddenly, South Africa reverted to an apartheid era existence based on the 
demarcation of us and them, we and they, ours and theirs, to which Blade 
Nzimande, the secretary general of the South African Communist Party (as quoted 
by Meintjies, 2012, p. 2), responded by saying that “we have been insulted, our 
dignity has been assaulted and violated, and we have been made to feel naked”. 
The “us”, “ours” and “we” are used to represent those categorised as black and that 
which belongs to them, while white people and that which is assumed to belong to 
them are defined in “they”, “them” and “theirs”. 
Prejudice-free South Africa, a sleepy, raceless, multiracial and multicultural rainbow 
nation, tripped into an obsession with its races and colour differences, each 
defended to be oblivious of its flaws, and each huddled in and rooted to its corner, 
with race consciousness becoming an amplified lived reality. In lament and defence 
of the portrait and its intended message, appeals for definitions of culture and race 
were bandied about, showing general ideals like “the rainbow nation” as mere hollow 
rhetoric untenable in the present. The reactions showed how tenuous the societal 
unity aspired to remains with respect to matters of affirmative action, as well as 
school and residential segregation (Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 2001). 
Retorts by Gwede Mantashe, secretary general of the African National Congress, 
(quoted by Meintjies, 2012, p. 2) that “this is not about the painting, it is about 
domination and subjugation. Our culture is not inferior…. We have to fight to protect 
our Africanness,” and by Jacob Zuma’s daughter (quoted by Malefane, 2012, p. 5), 
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that “the straw that broke the camel’s back is the notion that a black man who is 
associated with African culture and tradition and who does not fit the ‘perfect’ mould 
of western values and beliefs is less human than the next person,” show how 
diversity, as used to take pride in uniqueness, leads to a pursuit for exclusive rights 
and to intolerance of others (Wilkinson & Unwin, 1999). In this, one can see the 
edifice of the racial segregation of apartheid South Africa that relied on natural 
differentiation, although this time it leans more on culture. This is seen as masking, 
rationalising and retaining the old segregation of nature and biology with culture, not 
discarding it (Baker, 2010; Forrest & Dunn, 2006; Lee & Rice, 2007; Williams, 2006).    
1.5 RACE DEFINITION LIVED AND NOT MERELY GIVEN 
Racial definitions are couched in lived cultural conceptions that hide away deeply 
embedded negative stereotypes that go unchecked and are not scrutinised, helped 
by a perception that they are static, naturally given and unquestionably pure. 
Because racial identity is considered as naturally given and its stereotypes are never 
explored or questioned, it becomes an objectified existence, never given a reflective 
thought when in contentious comparison with the other. It is made into a pure 
existence, given life of its own outside of the process of experiencing itself. It 
becomes a solidified existence of categories whose hypnotic power denies 
interrogation. 
With the nuanced social and political ramifications within each race ignored, we live 
a robotic essentialist existence whose cultures and races are untouchable taboos, 
their marked boundaries are not to be crossed (Makhanya, 2012; Pucherova, 2011), 
while conformity and veneration are defended, and dissenters are swiftly shut down. 
Muted dialogue and encouraged silence about race scrutiny are only lifted when we 
talk about its goodness. Mboweni (2012) expresses an agreement with the view of 
Mondli Makhanya, editor of the Sunday Times newspaper, that culture is sometimes 
used to buttress dialogue, and to blackmail and whitewash people into a sterile and 
muted existence of dogmatic followers. I consider this as causing our race to be 
insulated from itself. 
That racial identity is not merely given is shown through the emergence of the Latin-
American phenomenon of honorary white race identity. Through it, people refuse to 
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fall into the two-tier classification of white and non-white by dissociating from the 
collective black (Forman, Goar & Lewis, 2002), motivated mainly by a need to reap 
benefits associated with their one-side white lineage (Rockquemore, 1998). 
Sibanda (2012) gives an account of white people in post-apartheid South Africa who 
are relegated to living on the fringes and are stigmatised by fellow white people for 
their poor living conditions, rejected for tainting whiteness’s attributes of wealth, 
comfort and privilege. Authors outside of South Africa (Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; 
Wray, 2006) have looked at how economically disadvantaged white people are 
undermined and excluded by other white people for their differing appearance to 
other white people while being comparably likened to black people.  
Called “Oreos” and considered to be not black enough, black people that follow 
schooling and the education system are sidelined by other black people (Galletta & 
Cross, 2007) and marked as race traitors with lifestyles that betray black values. 
We are not a nation that seems to see anything wrong in having its races glaringly 
differentiated. Arguing for the non-existence of these differences would be 
suggesting a stop to a discussion about the topic of race altogether (Tochluk, 2010). 
It is tantamount to Peters’ (2012, p. 2) view that “we should not let everything be 
about race as we are past this,”  denying the racial polarisation of the country only to 
be awakened by slurs similar to those emanating from reactions and counter-
reactions to Brett Murray’s painting (Sunday Times, 2012b; Sunday World, 2012). 
However, we run the risk of intolerance to those who do not fit our racial identity 
prescripts and to diversified expressions countering racial allegiance between and 
within the races. 
In profiling who is authentically black or authentically white, with African cultural 
belief systems or European cultural belief systems respectively, we also practise the 
exclusion of those we profile and consider as not black or not white, within the 
respective race categories. Prejudice of the dissimilar self or the race noncompliant 
within the race and the other outside the race prevails. 
Like those who do not fit neatly into the race identity, those who do not subscribe to 
cultural prescripts are not only seen as tainting and betraying the culture, but also 
considered to have crossed race and cultural barriers and taboos (Pucherova, 2011). 
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This perception is facilitated by a failure to acknowledge that racial identity is a 
socially constructed reality made fixed to benefit those who do the defining politically 
and socially, in interracial contexts (Bailey, Loveman & Muniz, 2013; Mallon, 2013; 
Steck, Heckert & Heckert, 2003). 
In South African Sepedi culture, a childless woman, degraded for not bearing 
children and considered a less complete woman, faces the scorn of being called 
various ghastly names until, in wedlock, another female relative is found to bear 
children in her name to lay claim to the cultural prescripts of a woman meriting 
marriage. Laced with patriarchal cultural definitions, a woman is fully considered a 
woman only when she can meet certain tradition-determined conditions, for example 
bearing children and graduating from a traditional circumcision ritual. Some lesbians 
subscribe to society’s definition of womanhood that is conflated with motherhood, 
insisting to have children so as to prove society that they are complete women 
(Potgieter, 2003). 
The nature of prejudice is further unravelled through a consideration of intolerance 
generally in the following section, to help understand what impact it may have on 
same-race prejudice specifically. 
1.6 PREJUDICE AND INTOLERANCE 
Described as an unwillingness to accept and respect others with values, beliefs and 
cultural practices that are different from ours (Moore & Walker, 2011), intolerance is 
seen as being responsible for untold suffering among nations and individuals across 
societies and the world, whose despicable results on humanity leave a lasting 
negative impact (Guindon et al., 2003).  
Once you speak their language they immediately know you are one of 
them. Once I was drinking in a bar and this South African man was 
speaking in Zulu to me. I felt so bad because I could not reply in Zulu, 
when he noticed that I am not South African his reaction towards me 
changed. He was no longer friendly as he initially seemed (a Nigerian 
foreign national living in South Africa, quoted by Matsinhe, 2011, pp. 304-
305). 
The above quotation shows how prejudice embodies intolerance (O’Bryan et al., 
2004), which is further displayed through hatred, distrust, dislike (Ahluwalia, 2013; 
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“As racism and intolerance linger...”, 1997; Cox, Abramson, Devine & Hollon, 2012; 
Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011), ill-treatment and labelling, competition and 
stigmatisation (Kessler et al., 2010; Kosic, Phalet & Mannetti, 2012; Matsinhe, 2011; 
Nonchev, Encheva & Atanassov, 2012) against those marked as different from the 
self.  
Intolerance is viewed as the cause of incalculable exclusion of others due to beliefs, 
perspectives and practices that mark them as different from us and our ideals 
(Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011). A refusal, denial and disregard of 
human diversity (Guindon et al., 2003; Matsuura, 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011), it is 
represented in an atavistic attitude towards and treatment of others. Intolerance is a 
ravage to human coexistence and cooperation (Matsuura, 2003), serving as a 
plague to individuals within societies, societies within nations and, on international 
level, between nations, wiping off any inkling of unity. 
As prejudice in action, intolerance helps to bring an understanding and appreciation 
of the pervasive nature and legion of unfortunate discriminatory practices of 
prejudice. Prejudice’s set of attitudes and behaviours are easily comprehended 
through enactment of intolerance, which leads to disharmony and disunity with, and 
misunderstanding and constricted perspective of, others (Moore & Walker, 2011).  
1.7 DEFINING CRITERIA OF INTOLERANCE 
Guindon et al. (2003) and Moore and Walker (2011) stipulate the following defining 
criteria for intolerance, which Guindon et al. (2003) advance as useful for 
establishing a clinical diagnosis of an intolerant personality disorder for  inclusion in 
the classification system of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM): 
1. Lack of diminished response. Intolerance is displayed in a lack of restraint 
against a proclivity to judge and inability to remain neutral, as in the case of a 
foreign national respondent who mentioned in an interview with Matsinhe (2011, 
p. 304) that “they took one look at me and said I was too dark to be South 
African.” This is further shown in overt and covert antagonism towards foreign 
nationals in South Africa, in which inconsistent and discriminatory measures may 
be used to deport them (Matsinhe, 2011). 
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2. Exclusion and lack of acceptance. Mistrust of the other leads to their exclusion 
from and lack of acceptance in the community, as well as denial of access to life 
amenities as a result of believing in one’s immanent superiority that subjects 
them to inferior existence. The use of violence and physical and political power 
against non-Setswana speaking residents in Bophuthatswana homeland (Higgs 
& Evans, 2008) meant that such residents were targeted and denied entitlement 
to receive life amenities such as pensions, schools and water. 
3. Lack of empathy. The outright rejection of foreign nationals in South Africa, 
their expedited deportation because of such signifiers as body odour and dark 
skin (Matsinhe, 2011), and the suspicion and fear of manner of dress of Sikh 
men in the United States (US), resulting in them being murdered (Ahluwalia, 
2013), show a pattern of lack of empathy and a disregard for the uniqueness of 
the other and his/her dignified distinction. 
4. Lack of respect. A belief in the superiority of the self and own culture may lead 
to a lack of respect for the other’s uniqueness, the use of violence and a lack of 
remorse for the pain and suffering meted out to the other.    
1.8 PRECURSORS TO INTOLERANCE 
The defining criteria can be both causes for one to be intolerant, and identifiers of 
who is tolerant or intolerant. An intolerant person embodying certain criteria can be 
so because of the precursors to be discussed here, or the precursors can lead 
him/her to cherish certain defining criteria. A distinction between precursors and 
defining criteria is only made for purposes of discussion. Both can act and serve the 
same purpose and explanation. Various precursors are discussed here. 
1.8.1 Self-righteousness 
Self-righteousness is defined as the dogmatic adherence to the usual, while showing 
intolerance to ambiguity (Falbo & Belk, 1985). Obsessed with the self that is viewed 
as right and superior, the other is categorised as unusual and unfit. Its unusualness 
brings a discomfort that cannot be tolerated. With the self being viewed as the only 
correct way of being, alternatives to it are looked at with suspicion, denigration and 
rejection.  
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Poor white people of West Bank in East London, South Africa, are isolated because 
of their diffusion of the assumed white normativity of affluence and privilege, with 
their poverty seen as an assumed signifier of blackness (Sibanda, 2012). Their 
alternative existence of destitution contradicts the esteemed definition of being white, 
causing them to endure the brunt of intolerance from other white people. 
1.8.2 Prototypicality 
Prototypicality is a term used by Kessler et al. (2010) to refer to a tendency to judge 
others and their group in terms of how similar or dissimilar they are to the 
superordinate group.  
Physical body features, dress style, language usage and style, body odour, et cetera 
are used by South Africans as signifiers of who is a South African or a foreign 
national. The distinction extends to the attitudes and treatment that is afforded to 
people in terms of how typical they are of a South African identity, and therefore not 
of a foreign identity (Matsinhe, 2011). Those less typical of the South African identity 
evoke fear and images of threat and competition to the South African identity, 
thereby being seen to deserve exclusion and mistreatment (Kessler et al., 2010). 
Sikh males in the US are subjected to mistreatment that is justified on the basis of 
their dress style, which is deviant and contrary to American dress norms (Ahluwalia, 
2013).     
1.8.3 Fundamentalism 
Cunningham and Melton (2013), and Woodford, Levy and Walls (2013) define 
fundamentalism as the belief that there is a single set of prescripts and 
characteristics that define personality and the nature of being. Using religion as an 
example, Cunningham and Melton (2012, p. 287) quote Altemeyer and Hunsberger 
as saying that religious fundamentalism is: 
the belief that there is one set of religious teaching that clearly contains 
the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential inerrant truth about humanity 
and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of 
evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today 
according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and 
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that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a 
special relationship with the deity. 
Anything contrary to the fundamental beliefs is considered inferior, undermined and 
not allowed expression. The alternative is considered deviant and often subject to 
being converted.  
In a Sunday Times newspaper (2012a) conversation of condemnation for the 
assault, rape and killing of gays and lesbians, the president of the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa, Patekile Holomisa, mentioned that, while these 
practices are not condoned, lesbians and gays practise their lifestyle in contravention 
of their African culture (Baron, 2012). He expressed mixed sentiments in not 
condoning the assault practices that are not sanctioned by law, yet pouring scorn on 
gay and lesbian practices that are a contravention of the fundamental prescripts of 
African culture.  
1.8.4 Right-wing authoritarianism 
Right-wing authoritarianism is a social attitude of strict and unwavering adherence to 
conventional norms and values. It entails compliance with authoritatively held beliefs, 
with a propensity to seek punishment for violators of conventional norms that are 
uncritically adhered to (Aosved, Long & Voller, 2009; Cramer, Miller, Amacker & 
Burks, 2013; Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2010). With a veneration and 
expectation of conformity to conventionality from others, the lack of empathic 
understanding by people with a right-wing authoritative attitude makes them given to 
intolerance and prone to aggression towards those they consider violators of 
convention (Duriez, 2011).  
The aggressive attack on black males in the US whose wearing of a hoodie or a 
turban is seen as a deliberate flaunting of their differentness in violation of and 
refusal to conform to mainstream US dress code (Ahluwalia, 2013), as well as the 
physical attack, rape and killing of lesbians and gays in South Africa (Baron, 2012) 
who are seen as violating African cultural norms, show the extent to which non-
conformity to conventionality is rendered a punishable act. 
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1.8.5 Socialisation and value orientation 
The types of values inculcated in children by agents of socialisation determine the 
nature of attitudes that the children will adopt and whether they will be tolerant or 
intolerant of others (Duriez, 2011). Duriez (2011) and Van Hiel et al. (2010) 
distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic goal orientation and their relation to social 
dominance attitude as implicated in intolerance. Here, social dominance orientation 
is defined as a social attitude of preferring hierarchical dominance.  
Socialisation that promotes extrinsic goal pursuit entails defining self-worth in terms 
of external appearance and the impression one makes on others, leading to 
competitiveness within one’s living surroundings, as opposed to the intrinsic goal 
pursuit whose direction is focused on developing one’s talents to meaningfully 
contribute to uplifting others rather than competing with them (Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel 
et al., 2010). Extrinsic goal orientation is further linked to materialism, which is 
defined as the pursuit of the accumulation and possession of material goods and the 
importance that people attached to it as a sign of advancement in life (Van Hiel et al., 
2010). Inspired by extrinsic goal orientation, people would want to accumulate more 
material possessions as a personal achievement that defines their worth, rather than 
be driven by the satisfaction of innate psychological needs of the intrinsic goal 
orientation (Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel et al., 2010). Their materialist ambition causes 
them to view others as threats and competitors to their goal of accumulating more. 
To them, other people are interchangeable as objects they may require to get ahead 
in life (Duriez, 2011). 
The need to always get ahead of others as a competitive spirit of extrinsic goal 
pursuit contributes to diminished empathy for differentness in social circles and the 
intolerance of others. It causes people to always want to acquire a dominant social 
position in relation to others, which further helps them to get ahead (Duriez, 2011). 
The high value put on materialism and the pursuit of extrinsic goals makes life a 
contested battle and cause immigrants to be less tolerated by locals who regard 
them as competitors over dwindling occupational chances and income (Kosic et al., 
2012; Nonchev et al., 2012). German immigrants are seen as less prototypical of 
German identity and therefore as competitors over scarce resources (Kessler et al., 
2010). 
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Social dominance orientation attitudes and the striving for extrinsic goals negatively 
impact on people and life chances. Foreign nationals in South Africa endure various 
types of intolerance as a result of being seen as the cause of dwindling employment 
opportunities in the country (Matsinhe, 2011). Haight (2013) notes that intolerance 
can cause and sustain inequality, while inequality encourages people to be intolerant 
of each other, blaming each other for their unsatisfying life circumstances of scarce 
amenities. Based on a study in Bulgaria, Nonchev et al. (2012) stipulate several 
variables linking intolerance to social inequality. These are low education, 
occupational insecurity and poverty of the older generation that make them feel 
threatened by immigrants resulting in the presence of the latter not being tolerated.  
1.8.6 Stigmatisation 
Stigmatisation is evidenced in the negative internalised perceptions about others 
who are labelled as different, deviant and non-conforming to the ideals of being. 
Displayed in devaluing perceptions of others who are subjected to negative regard 
and allocation to an inferior status (Cunningham & Melton, 2012), stigmatisation 
sentiments are often enacted through avoidance and exclusion of others (Hansson, 
Karnehed, Tynelius & Rasmussen, 2009; Pescosolido, Medina, Martin & Long, 
2013), and the denial of service (Cunningham & Melton, 2012). 
The devaluing perception of others negatively impacts on their life chances. It leads 
to unequal access to and denial of opportunities to others when they are seen as 
competitors for and a threat over ailing and scarce material resources and life 
opportunities (Nonchev et al., 2012), and as based on their differentness that does 
not comply with the ideal (Aosved et al., 2009).  
The choices that individuals can make are limited by the general perceptions held in 
their communities. The overwhelming conception by black people in the US that 
homosexuality is only a white phenomenon, causes black people not only to 
stigmatise fellow black homosexuals, but to also be intolerant towards homosexual 
sportsmen of a black race (Southall, Anderson, Nagel, Polite & Southall, 2011). 
People suffering from mental illness have their employability curtailed due to the 
stigma attached to their illness. They suffer dented self-esteem and are robbed of a 
chance to a fulfilling quality of life relative to others who do not suffer the same 
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condition as them (Russinova, Griffin, Bloch, Wewiorski & Rosoklija, 2011). This 
makes stigmatisation a cause of inequality. 
The intolerance of interfaith relationships mainly by white people in the Bible Belt 
region of the US leaves individuals in those communities with impeded choice for 
who to be intimate with (Sahl & Batson, 2011).  
1.9 RACE AND PREJUDICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The relevance of the foregoing discussion to race and prejudice in South Africa may 
be questioned. Can one extrapolate convincing details for an understanding of race 
and prejudice in South Africa from the discussion? As a link to that, the following is 
meant to begin charting the outline of a debate of the racial prejudice scenario in 
South Africa, to indicate how intolerance has been a pivotal signifier of South African 
interracial prejudice regarding the inherent superiority of one race against the innate 
inferiority of another, marked by constant labelling and othering of the self and the 
other.  
This is done by drawing a distinction between interracial lives during and after 
apartheid. The first part of the debate is dedicated to expatiating on what apartheid 
South Africa looked like and how it operated, and the impact this had on race and 
prejudice. In the second part, I expand on post-apartheid South Africa, its nature and 
its impact on race and prejudice. 
1.9.1 Race and prejudice in apartheid South Africa 
Marx and Milton (2011, p. 743) draw a distinction between apartheid and post-
apartheid South Africa. They define apartheid South Africa as being distinguished 
by: 
a system of formal racial segregation, repression and subjugation in which 
white South Africa had both political and socio-economic hegemony. 
People of colour had no voting rights, were allowed to reside in 
government allocated ‘locations’, could only study at certain institutions 
and were not allowed to study towards certain advanced science degrees.  
Commencing in 1948 (Higgs & Evans, 2008; Mattes, 2012) and lasting until 1994, 
apartheid was a form of government based on a philosophy of white dominance and 
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superiority over a subjugated and inferior black population as sanctioned by law 
(Biko, 1978; Marx & Milton, 2011). Its primary aim was the segregation of the races 
from each other, establishing and sustaining a hierarchical ordering where the white 
race shall enjoy dominance over the black race, giving it privileged access to wealth, 
power and comfort (Pillay & Karlsson, 2013; Seekings, 2008; Sibanda, 2012). 
When Rodney (1995) notes the evil nature of white American society towards its 
African American population, there is a parallel to South Africa as Biko (1978) 
recounts the racist nature of white South Africa and the apartheid government 
towards its indigenous black population, describing apartheid South Africa as 
strange, abnormal and immoral. 
1.9.1.1 Apartheid laws 
The apartheid government instituted various laws to pursue the goals that apartheid 
philosophy sought to achieve, among which the following are examples. 
1.  Population Registration Act 
Put in place in 1950 (Christopher, 1989; Higgs & Evans, 2008; Seekings, 2008), the 
Population Registration Act defined people’s identities in terms of physical  attributes 
to differentiate a black race from a white race as being biologically dissimilar 
(Christopher, 1989; Lee & Rice, 2007; Seekings, 2008). The biological 
distinctiveness of the indigenous black race was contrasted with a white race with 
whom intermingling could not be allowed to go on unchecked.  
Members of the inferior black race were meant to be confined to allocated areas 
whose movement and participation in South Africa’s political, economic and social 
spheres were monitored and restricted, literally making them foreigners in South 
Africa (Biko, 1978; Christopher, 1989). Further divided into various distinct ethnic 
and linguistic groups, the black race was subjected to life confined to homelands with 
high rates of uncontrolled and poorly reported crime, malnutrition and ill-health 
(Breetzke, 2012), whose survival against daily adversity and exposure to calamity 
was through sheer luck (Biko, 1978).  
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The law essentialised people’s existential identities in terms of biological race, 
language and ethnicity as justification for their grouping and attendant value attached 
to each identity. The purpose of the law was to ensure and protect separate and 
unequal development of white control and privilege, while controlling the freedom 
accorded to those of the black race. It served to sustain the wealth disparity between 
the races with inferior living standards reserved for and maintained in black 
homelands (Biko, 1978; Christopher, 1989; Sibanda, 2012).  
2. Bantu Education Act 
Instituted in 1953 (Higgs & Evans, 2008), the Bantu Education Act ensured that 
wealth and power remained in the hands of the white race. The black race, with the 
accompanying linguistic and ethnic classification groups of the African indigenous 
group, was predestined to inferiority by receiving education substandard to that 
received by the white race. 
While those of the white race had access to almost all institutions of higher learning 
in the country, black people had a choice restricted mainly to those in their allocated 
homelands, which had far less resources and funding than those in the main South 
Africa. The premise of this was an envisaged white race ownership of the high 
quality of academic and scientific knowledge to keep it in a superior hierarchical 
order, with black people forever remaining wanting and subservient to white people 
(Pillay & Karlsson, 2013).  
3. Group Areas Act 
A 1950 law (Higgs & Evans, 2008), the Group Areas Act had a direct impact on the 
quality of life of individuals within their designated race groups. While life in white 
designated areas was mainly urban, that in black designated areas was rural, 
underdeveloped and less maintained. Biko (1978) notes that, in the latter, the land 
was too arid to be suitable for pastoral and cultivation farming. Higgs and Evans 
(2008) show that, even when given independence, Bophuthatswana was drawn 
outside the fertile land borders of South Africa, making it infinitely bound to depend 
on South Africa, with most of its people continuing to seek employment there.  
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Assisted by the introduction of the pass law, free movement of black people to urban 
white areas was curbed, resulting in high population density and competition over 
inadequate and unavailable resources in their localities (Budlender & Lund, 2011; 
Pillay & Karlsson, 2013). Budlender and Lund (2011) attribute the calamities of 
fractured families, violence and extramarital sex to the curtailing of black people’s 
movement and restriction of access to a city life that was exclusively reserved for 
white people. Those in the black designated residential areas had less and close to 
nothing to compete for, and could not materially afford what was available, resulting 
in a dull existence with a proclivity for dangerous tendencies (Biko, 1978; Morgan, 
2012). 
The Act succeeded in entrenching black subjugation to white supremacy by ensuring 
a life of densely populated dwelling, infestation with crime and poverty, and 
restriction to a generally uninhabitable areas with impoverished security systems and 
high rates of unemployment (Breetzke, 2012). 
4. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 
Promulgated in 1949 (Higgs & Evans, 2008), the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 
prohibited marriage across the race divide. It ensured the racial purity of whiteness 
by protecting it from dilution with blackness, rendering such transgressions unlawful 
and punishable through enforcement and confluence with another Act, the 
Immorality Act of 1950 (Higgs & Evans, 2008). Marriage across the race divide was 
seen as a violation of the rigidly-held essentialist race belief resulting in ostracism 
meted out to those who fail to observe the rule (Pucherova, 2011). 
Pucherova (2011) argues that the abhorrence towards interracial mingling was a 
belief held and practised by both black people and white people. She argues that not 
only white people saw it as a taboo for black people to be romantically engaged with 
white people, but that black people, too, subscribed to such a belief, indicating the 
premise of Black Consciousness that sought the strength of black liberation by 
breaking away from intermingling with whiteness, as well as African poetry that 
evoked shame and doubt in those who engage in mixed-race relationships. She 
gives the example of Bessie Head, whose muddled sense of belonging and racial 
identity was instigated by mistreatment by both blackness and whiteness, shutting 
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her out and locking her up in racial ambiguity. The same call for black self-reliance is 
made by Biko (1978), insisting that the battle for black liberation needed a black 
person standing on his/her own. It was therefore argued that marriage across the 
race divide betrayed the mission of black liberation. 
Although the disgust of blackness with interracial marriage is premised on a different 
understanding from that which is advanced by whiteness – the latter’s is based on a 
belief in innate superiority and inferiority of the white and black races respectively, 
while the former’s is hinged on a belief that blackness that stands on its own is well 
suited to liberate itself – both positions reek of prejudiced stereotypes about one’s 
own race and the other’s race. Pucherova (2011) finds black imagination equally 
guilty for unwittingly upholding apartheid stereotypes of monopoly over individual 
rights of free choice regarding belonging and defining normativity of existence in 
racial exclusivity. Implicated here, she sees the black male gender stereotype of 
seeing women as objects of men’s sexual desires, to be devoured at the latter’s 
wish, in discouraging black women to engage in mixed-race relationships by evoking 
feelings of betrayal.  
5. Immorality Act 
Apartheid South Africa not only had the power to instil racial dominance of white over 
black, it also accorded status of normativity to sexuality and gender by sowing the 
seeds of gender and sexuality prejudice (Shefer, 2010) of male over female and 
heterosexuality over homosexuality, through designation of homosexuality as 
immoral (Stobie, 2003). 
1.9.1.2 Use of territorial signifiers 
The success of racial prejudice rests on constant and efficient defence of its 
philosophy, and the ability of its strategy to resiliently stay afloat. With this, Lee and 
Rice (2007) consider how the insidious nature of racial prejudice based on biology 
hibernates to find expression through cultural explanations. They see this as not 
necessarily giving away its emphasis on innate biological superiority and inferiority of 
races, but as another form of subjugation of the other that subtly subverts attention 
from its main goal to appearances that look less damaging. 
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Resolute in its mission of segregating black people from white people, apartheid 
used various and changing signifiers of difference between the races, marking their 
boundaries and signifying their territories as irreconcilably dissimilar. Changing 
moments and times put paid to the successful usage of the various racially 
discriminatory Acts that could not always strengthen the logic of superior race 
domination. It needed to change face while the core was maintained, using other 
signifiers. 
1.9.1.3 Signifiers of ethnicity and language 
Neither the Group Areas Act nor the Population Registration Act could always deal 
with the influx of black people from and within their impoverished homelands. 
Considering the case of Bophuthatswana (Higgs & Evans, 2008), right-wing-
authoritarian attitudes of violence were used against residents who were considered 
foreigners in that locality. Setswana language and ethnicity were used as signifiers of 
belonging, acceptance and exclusion of black people by other black people. 
Setswana language and ethnicity were used as boundary markers of existential 
normativity. 
Not only were the non-Setswana speaking black people othered as not being 
prototypical of the homeland’s ethnicity and language, they were also made to 
endure the brunt of stigmatisation that resulted in refusal to give them services such 
as water (Higgs & Evans, 2008). 
1.9.1.4 Signifiers of culture and religion 
When a hierarchical order of races could not be sustained through scientific 
evidence of superiority and inferiority in the physical body (Baker, 2010; Williams, 
2006), evidence had to be sought elsewhere, using cultural and religious lifestyles. 
Fundamentalist ideas about culture and religion could not cope with the idea of 
uniqueness in blackness with which whiteness was not familiar.  
That which did not conform to white conceptions of normative culture and religion 
was called barbaric, unscientific and superstitious (Biko, 1978; Hountondji, 1997; 
Musopole, 1994). Indigenous black people were persuaded to be ashamed of and 
shun their religious beliefs and practices, devalue their ancestral heroes, who were 
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deemed perennial troublemakers, and discard their culture for the forward-looking 
western culture (Biko, 1978). According to Biko (1978), this served to inculcate a 
sense of self-stigmatising doubt and shame that assisted apartheid’s mission of 
black race subjugation. 
With their cultures and religions stigmatised, black people were bound to be obedient 
to whiteness’s representations and signifiers of normativity. Representations that 
portrayed whiteness as better did not need much cajoling pressure through 
oppressive regulatory Acts to have people accede timidly to them. Whiteness just 
needed to be made appealing while blackness was made to look hideous. 
1.9.1.5 Fear, anger and hate between the races  
If the philosophy of apartheid could be carried through politically and economically, it 
was because of its hold on the psyche of the individual. Its stranglehold on people of 
both black and white races reduced individuals into objects possessed by fear and 
hate, and driven by anger. Fear, anger and hate managed to keep the races apart. 
The use of restrictive laws ensured that the black psyche was infused with white 
images of terror, intimidation and unrelenting harassment, while being cowed into 
sheepish veneration and submission to white representations. However, as Biko 
(1978) argues, this was not an ordinary fear. It was a fear matched with hate and 
anger. Underneath the veneer of sheepish submission, those of the black race 
harboured an impulse to annihilate whiteness. The prevailing life of restrictive 
bondage did not allow a free display of anger and hate emotions. Further Acts, such 
as the Terrorism Act, added extended layers of fear with the result that routes of 
compromise had to be found to expel it. Unable to quench his/her anger and hate 
onto a white person, a black person resorted to stinging his/her anger and hate onto 
another white cowed black person of a compromised psyche. Restricted by the 
omnipresent intimidating whiteness that hindered his peaceful independence, black 
people went on to harass, steal from and annihilated their fellow black people (Biko, 
1978). Black people went on to hate their fellow black people, their culture, religion 
and language, ingratiating themselves to whiteness and sulking in peaceful 
agreement with apartheid’s oppressive makeup (Biko, 1978). 
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The white race psyche was never immune from encapsulation by fear of the other 
race. Consumed by stereotypes of black prejudice, its fear was conspicuously made 
evident through the explicit employ of hateful laws and practical strategies that 
angrily suppressed any single black voice. In support of this, Biko (1978, p. 80) terms 
white people’s behaviour as bordering on a wanton irrationality whose paranoia 
would dictate that “if they knew there are three missionaries who are dangerous to 
their interest but whose identity is unknown, they would rather deport 80 
missionaries and hope that the three are among them than use some brain and find 
out who the three are.” 
Biko (1978) argues that, as with their black counterparts, the simplicity of white 
people’ anger masked the extent of hate and fear they had towards black people. 
However, their anger was not a misdirected one, but was a legally licensed practice 
of anti-black right-wing-authoritarian attitudes meant to secure a lopsided white race 
privilege and mistreatment of black people. 
1.9.2 Race and prejudice in post-apartheid South Africa 
A period in South Africa following its April 1994 democratic elections, post-apartheid 
South Africa is differentiated from apartheid South Africa for its characteristic 
political, economic and social inclusivity of race relations (Marx & Milton, 2011). 
Whereas apartheid South Africa sought racial segregation as its goal and white 
supremacy as its mission, post-apartheid South Africa tasks itself with unifying the 
races. Whereas apartheid South Africa was a society founded on stereotypes of 
hierarchical organisation of the races, resulting in their conflictual prejudice of one 
another, post-apartheid South Africa seeks to mend the rift caused by interracial 
prejudice. 
Enshrined in the prejudiced philosophy of racial hierarchy and practised in law that 
discriminated against the black race, apartheid inflicted untold harm on those who 
practised it and on those upon whom it was practised, leading to a declaration by the 
United Nations that it should be considered as being “abhorrent to the conscience 
and dignity of humankind” (Sabourin, 2001, p. 66).   
The efforts that helped to usher in post-apartheid South Africa are situated within a 
broader mission defined by the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights that is highlighted by Sabourin (2001, p. 65) as echoing that “everyone, 
regardless of colour, sex, language or religion, was entitled to enjoy all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.” Sabourin (2001) also mentions that the United Nations 
laments the spectrum of human atrocities and violations due to prejudice that has 
resulted in nations’ dispersal and genocide, adding to people’s suffering the world 
over. With its racial stereotypes and prejudice, apartheid violated people’s right to 
human dignity through the restriction of movement and right of association, and the 
denial of services (Malherbe, 2011), contributing to compromised quality of life 
(Breetzke, 2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011) based primarily on race and secondarily 
on language, ethnicity, religion and sexuality, with the black indigenous population 
enduring most of its blatant disregard due to its differentness from the white 
population. 
1.10 TASKS OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
In its train, post-apartheid South Africa came up with measures to curb and make up 
for the human injustices of apartheid. It is seeking to build a nation based on trust, 
tolerance, less prejudice and unity among its individuals and races, and to 
acknowledge and respect their diversified formations (Malherbe, 2011; Small & 
Grant, 2005). Its tasks are upheld by and substantially find concrete meaning 
through the implementation of the Constitution, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, and the Human Rights Commission. 
1.10.1 The South African Constitution 
The Constitution, a supreme law of the country enforceable through the courts 
whose drawing culminated in 1996, was incepted with a vision to eliminate the 
discrimination, inequality and injustice of the apartheid government’s laws regarding 
race, religion, sexuality, gender, ethnicity, etc., while ensuring that justice and human 
dignity prevail (Malherbe, 2011). The Constitution’s overriding aim of healing the 
apartheid divisions is principled on the values of respect, inclusivity and equality for 
human dignity (Jones, 2006; Malherbe, 2011; Small & Grant, 2005). As a direct 
response to apartheid’s law-enforced prejudice that saw human beings’ existence 
being hierarchically organised into dichotomies of superiority versus inferiority, white 
versus black, science against atavism, sacredness versus depravity, the Constitution 
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seeks to return human dignity for a just and equal society (Malherbe, 2011; Small & 
Grant, 2005) beyond the sectarian allocation of rights and freedoms to a select few 
(Amoah & Bennett, 2008; Potgieter, 2003).  
Applauded for its strength of collective inclusivity grounded in Ubuntu before 
individualism (Du Toit, 2006; Jones, 2006; Van Zyl, 2011), the Constitution 
recognises equality in diversity in gender, age, ethnicity, sexuality, language, class, 
marital status, etc. Ubuntu is defined as an African philosophy and value orientation 
of connectedness, compassion, caring, interdependence and reciprocal sharing of 
obligation and responsibility, enabling coexistence (Jones, 2006; Mbigi, 1997; Van 
Zyl, 2011).  
1.10.2 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa  
“Within weeks at least 62 people were killed and hundreds injured. Houses and 
businesses belonging to immigrants were destroyed or looted” (Steenkamp, 2009, p. 
439). 
Intolerance of the differentially marked other due to prejudice leads to the justification 
and support of violence and other atrocious injustices against them. As in the 
example by Steenkamp (2009), those executing the acts see a need to continue 
unhindered to hurt the different other. 
South African life under apartheid was rife with instances of privately and publicly 
executed atrocities committed against others primarily of a different race (Breetzke, 
2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011; Pucherova, 2011) and secondarily of a different 
religion, language, sexuality, gender (Stobie, 2003) and ethnicity (Higgs & Evans, 
2008). These atrocities were sanctioned by law, unrecorded, and poorly and 
disproportionately documented (Breetzke, 2012; Ingram, 1999). The prevalence and 
extent of horrendous acts are indicative of the diminished value for the life and 
dignity of the other.  
Merely papering over the appalling acts stemming from apartheid’s divisive prejudice 
practices would not suffice for healing from these acts as earmarked by the post-
apartheid Constitution. Despicable crimes committed against humanity during 
apartheid had to be acknowledged and explored before the wounds could heal. 
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Subsumed under the Constitution’s mission of according people dignity, the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (1996-1998) was guided by a broad goal of national 
unity through establishing a detailed record of the gross human rights violations, and 
the restoration of dignity, fate or whereabouts of victims while ensuring commiserate 
reparations (Gready, 2009). An institution given investigative powers by the 
Constitution, it was established to adjudicate the process from apartheid to the 
present political setup (Jones, 2006). 
1.10.3 The Human Rights Commission 
If apartheid South Africa destroyed people’ dignity and pride, the post-apartheid 
government system is geared towards reversing this, through the reparation effort of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Hamber, 2000; Marschall, 2012). 
However, one needs to note that the reparative gesture by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission had a limited lifespan (1996 to 1998) and focused on 
past human rights violations. Recommendations for symbolic, psychological and 
tangible reparations focused on finding value in what was previously destroyed while 
helping the victims to come to terms with their grief in a humanly dignified manner 
(Hamber, 2000; Marschall, 2012).  
The new Constitution needed another mechanism to enshrine human dignity and 
pride in continuous relevance beyond time-limited gestures offered through 
reparations extended throughout people’s lifetime. Guided by the United Nations’ 
Commission on Human Rights that raises awareness about human rights abuse and 
violation globally (Sabourin, 2001), the South African Human Rights Commission 
was established under the new Constitution. A body with a constitutional mandate, 
the Human Rights Commission is tasked with investigating and monitoring present 
and future human rights abuse and violation in the country to ensure human dignity 
and equality (Berger, 2001; Durrheim, Quayle, Whitehead & Kriel, 2005; Malherbe, 
2011).  
However, this is not the only constitutionally established body doing this – the 
Commission for Gender Equality, the Public Protector, and the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities 
are some of the other structures that strive to pursue the Constitution’s agenda 
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(Malherbe, 2011), although they lack the adjudicative powers to enforce their 
findings like the courts (Berger, 2001; Malherbe, 2011). The Human Rights 
Commission can be seen as an implementer of the United Nations’ and South 
African Constitution’s Human Rights Charter.  
1.11 GAINS OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
When I first broached the subject of race and prejudice, I was told to be careful not to 
“drag us back into a space that would undermine the progress made so far and 
reverse the gains made in the country” and further reminded that the categorisation 
of people into black and white does not exist anymore as the government has made 
these racial titles irrelevant and obsolete.  
Post-apartheid South Africa has repealed the laws that inhibited racial mixing, 
encouraging and enforcing racial tolerance, while intolerance and prejudice have 
become punishable by law. With the apartheid racial taboos (Pucherova, 2011) 
dismantled, one can begin to ask whether a topic on race and prejudice is still 
relevant and why it should even be considered, considering that the pejorative legal 
hierarchical ordering of races has been done away with and toleration of diversified 
expressions of being means that each is accorded a space to exist in dignity.  
There are encouraging stories of post-apartheid South Africa’s progress. Anderson 
(2012) relates a story of Grade 12 learners at Hudson Park School whose 
experiences depict an epitome of the ideal society of people no longer racially 
differentiated, making racial differentiation an unworthy criterion of social belonging. 
In the story, the teacher presents a picture of a multiracial school setting rarely found 
in apartheid South Africa, where pupils of different races interact harmoniously and 
tolerate their differentness to a point where one may easily forget his/her racial 
identity. However, South Africa remains racially profiled and obsessed with its 
distinctively labelled races, as shown in the next section. 
1.12 STILL RACIALLY PROFILED 
If apartheid South Africa suppressed equal assertion of dignity to all the races, 
hierarchically pitting them against each other, restricted and denied others human 
rights, post-apartheid South Africa has corrected this by ensuring respect for all 
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races, while acknowledging differences of races that are distinctively unique. 
Whether harmonious coexistence and equal dignity among the races has been 
achieved as a national aspiration remains a contentious issue. Racial identification 
and labelling have not been eradicated (Hammett, 2010; Seekings, 2008). Although 
racial identification seems to be in line with the Constitution’s objective of ensuring 
diversity, it may lead to increased distance and intolerance where identified groups 
insist on exclusivity that may mask avoidance of the other.  
With racial intolerance of hierarchically superior and inferior races based on biology 
no longer supported by law or science, people may find new ways of masking their 
prejudice of the other. As the less insidious means, it is easy to resort to cultural 
difference to pursue separatist agendas (Forrest & Dunn, 2006; Lee & Rice, 2007).  
Shiao, Tuan and Rienzi (2004, p. 2) show how, in 1972, the National Association of 
Black Social Workers in the USA resisted the interracial adoption of black children by 
white parents, calling such efforts “cultural genocide” and equating them to “colonial 
exploitation”. They did this in a bid to retain pure black-American culture and pride. 
Wanting to assert their blackness away from whiteness as the reference, black 
journalists under the banners of the Forum of Black Journalists organised a meeting 
in February 2008 to be addressed by Jacob Zuma, the president of the African 
National Congress, barring attendance by white journalists with an insistence that 
they have a “right to organise, assemble and associate with a guest of their choice” 
(Sesanti, 2008, p. 35). 
Proof of present South African’ obsession with racial identification is succinctly stated 
in the following quotation of Maré by Seekings (2008, p. 8): 
to meet with the requirements of the Employment Equity Act, to gain 
admission to universities, to claim travel allowances, to play in sport 
teams, to provide information for tax purposes, to ask the National 
Research Foundation for funding, to register birth and so on, each 
requires a statement of race belonging…. There is no opportunity in these 
forms to avoid the issue. At every level there is an official, from the 
government minister responsible to the company personnel officer or 
employment equity manager, to monitor adherence or compliance or 
progress. No provision is made for alternatives to the basic ‘four races’ of 
apartheid South Africa, or to reject such classification. Leaving the space 
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blank, which remarkably few seem to do, means that someone is required 
to complete it to balance the books. 
As is the case with contemporary European-American cultures’ racial thinking 
(Mallon, 2013), it would be naive to assume that present-day South Africa has gone 
beyond viewing its people as distinct racial kinds. Schultz (2013) acknowledges that, 
in releasing its 2011 national census results, Statistics South Africa’s report was 
informed by demographics based on race indicators of Indian/Asian, black, white and 
coloured, as are affirmative action programme headlines whose purpose is to redraw 
the racialised privilege imbalances incurred from the apartheid era (Adam, 2000; 
Guillebeau, 1999; Thompson, 2006).  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW OF TERMS 
2.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW 
Having sketched, in Chapter 1, the conceptual, historical and socio-political context 
in which acts of racial (and same-race) prejudice emerge, in Chapter 2, I ask what 
exactly the object is toward which these acts are directed. The term ‘race’ (the 
ostensible target of racial prejudice) is freely used in popular and academic 
discourse, but what exactly is the term supposed to refer to?  
In addition to unpacking the target of racial prejudice (i.e., those thought to belong to 
a particular ‘race’), the chapter also seeks to unpack what the enactment of racial 
prejudice actually entails. How is the act of being racially prejudiced (or of showing or 
verbalising racial prejudice) distinct from other, presumably less problematic, forms 
of human interaction? 
In the chapter, I illustrate, by means of examples and with reference to the academic 
literature, how any particular racial category is not a thing-in-itself, but exists in 
counterpoint to its perceived opposite. Racial categories are routinely asserted as 
real, objective entities, but in practice are held in place not by some authentic 
essence, but by individuals continually constructing themselves and others as having 
(or failing to have) a particular racial identity and identification as opposed to some 
other identity and identification. In negotiating racial identity and identification, people 
inscribe themselves (and are inscribed by others) as occupying varying degrees of 
prototypicality by drawing on class and gender stereotypes to appropriate or reject 
an imagined racial essence that is immutable and clearly distinct from its opposite. 
Racial positioning is only secondarily concerned with the (positive or negative) 
characteristics of any particular race (and with attempts to, for example, affirm the 
value of blackness in the face of a history of white domination), but rather functions, 
in the first place, to solidify the notion of a racial essence and to re-inscribe the 
imperative of conforming to it. Thus, race can be seen as a kind of skilled 
performance, with those (black or white) who are lacking in the skill somehow being 
deserving of having same-race prejudice visited upon them. 
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The chapter seeks to ask and respond to the following questions: What is a race and 
how is it defined? What is the definition of the race of black? What is the definition of 
the race of white? 
The task is carried out through a literature review of the following terms:  
• categorisation (Baker, 2004; Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Fiske, 2005; 
Tochluk, 2010);  
• labelling (Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b); 
• stereotypes (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Eyben, 2007; Hansson et al., 2009; Hooks, 
2009; Mallon, 2013; Sampson, 1999);  
• prejudice (Brown, 1995; Eyben, 2007; Sampson, 1999); and 
• essentialism (Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 2011; Wagner et al., 
2010).  
The abovementioned questions are also pursued through several tenets raised in the 
chapter and upheld throughout the thesis. These tenets are introduced by another 
question that asks whether it is possible to provide an answer to the questions in any 
way that is not essentialist, and are as follows:  
• A definition of a race is made through categorisation-based thinking embedded 
in labelling stereotypes of what it is and what it is not to be outside and within the 
particular defined race.  
• A definition of a race is made in a manner that is prototypical (Hornsey et al., 
2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; 
Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), authentic (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004; O’Connor et 
al., 2007; Ross, 2007; Tate, 2005), and compliant with norms and values, as 
opposed to a manner that is non-prototypical, inauthentic and noncompliant with 
norms and values.  
• A race definition is made in comparison to its opposite. A race is not its opposite. 
It is what it is not; for instance black in comparison to and as not white, its 
opposite in terms of culture and life philosophy (Anderson, 1995; Baloyi, 2008; 
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Hountondji, 1997; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994; Musopople, 1994), sexuality 
(Ross, 2007), and family life morals and values (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004).  
• In distinction and opposition to the inferior and historically oppressed black, the 
white race signifies an embodiment of privilege (Brooks & Rada, 2002; Hartigan, 
2010; Hooks, 2009; Lipsitz, 2006; Yancy, 2004).  
The limited focus on the race of black and white, as adopted in this thesis, is made 
for the purpose of illustrating the existence of same-race prejudice, and not to 
undermine other racial identities whose names are not mentioned, and experiences 
are not explored, here, or to suggest that black and white are the only categories of 
racial identity and identification recognisable in the world (Degenaar, 1978; Forman 
et al., 2002; James, 2001; Rockquemore, 1998; Shiao et al., 2004). The binary black 
and white race distinction is limited by an obscured view to consider the varied 
prevailing other races that are the subjects of identity and identification. 
2.2 CATEGORISATION AND LABELLING 
As human beings, we are given to grouping ourselves and others into categories that 
are purported to be distinct from each other (Fiske, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2007a). As we 
do that, we also put labels that serve to mark the boundaries of our identity, separate 
from the distinctively different other. As we label them as other, we also label 
ourselves as unique from them. This is illustrated in the following quotation: 
I want my daughters to be Filipino especially on sex. I always emphasise 
to them that they should not participate in sex if they are not married. We 
are also Catholic. We are raised so that we don’t engage in going out with 
men while we are not married. And I don’t like it to happen to my 
daughters as if they have no values. I do not like them to grow up that 
way, like the American girls (Filipino migrant worker, as quoted by Espiritu, 
2004, p. 197). 
Although the above quotation is about the aspirations a Filipino migrant worker holds 
regarding ideals for his daughters about being Filipino girls, it is also about what it is 
not to be a model Filipino girl. It indicates that, in defining who we are, we are forever 
trapped in the dichotomous dilemma of who we are not, as it leaves us being who we 
are not, the opposite of us. A race begins by being defined from its opposite, the 
other race. A race gains its identity from its opposite (Brooks & Rada, 2002; Hooks, 
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2009; Tate, 2005; Yancy, 2004). When we know how the other race looks, smells 
and acts, we can tell what the self is like.  
However, this is not good enough. That which is not self-enough within the race and 
does not conform to the prescripts of the ideal race needs to be differentiated and 
discarded to arrive at a fine-tuned authentic (Ross, 2007), prototypical and normative 
race (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey 
& Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Examples to the concept of the black-
sheep effect and its resultant devaluation and rejection of those not conforming to 
norms (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) are the rejection of whites (Sibanda, 2012) 
whose poverty status marks them as deviant from conceptions of white economic 
privilege and self-sufficiency (Hartigan, 2010; Hooks, 2009; Lipsitz, 2006), the 
discriminative labelling of blacks who submit to education (Galletta & Cross, 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 2007), and perceptions by Filipinos of those who follow the culture 
of white America (Espiritu, 2004). 
The process of labelling (Moncrieffe, 2007a) helps to facilitate the smooth handling 
of the inordinate amount of information that people have to deal with in order to 
regulate uncertainty in social interactions. To avoid being saturated with information, 
human beings resort to clustering information about themselves and others into 
groups, a process Fiske (2005) calls categorisation. 
Fiske (2005, p. 37) quotes Gordon Allport as listing some of the following reasons 
why categorisation is an essential tool for orderliness in a life of discomfort caused 
by a large quantity of information that may be ambiguous: 
1. It enables people to function in the world by using prior experiences to avoid 
treating each new person or experience as unique. 
2. It allows for less effort in processing information efficiently. Broader categories 
are preferred over those that are finely grained, as broad categories take in more 
information and requires less effort than smaller categories would. 
3. New information can be easily slotted into what is already known. Such a linking 
of information to what is already there means that categorisation aids in 
identification. 
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People may be seen as collectively sharing physically observable characteristics and 
identities, making them one of a kind with other assumed inherent properties which 
result from these (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Mallon, 2013). Although the study by 
Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2001) on the racial views of black Detroiters is geared 
towards demystifying the held perspective of black people and white people holding 
different views on several life matters, it does carry the unintended message that 
black people’s views on racial matters are qualitatively different, making them one of 
a categorised unique kind. 
A challenge ensues from the above, as noted by James’ (2001) differentiation of 
investigations that study race as a socially constructed phenomenon, compared to 
those that view race as fixed in their investigations. Bonilla-Silva and Embrick’s 
(2001) research uses race as fixed by setting as its premise an investigation into the 
changing or constant distinctive racial views of black people in Detroit, as opposed to 
those of white people. 
Although categorisation helps to reduce chaos and inefficiency (Moncrieffe, 2007a), 
it reduces people to being cognitive misers guided only by the mental maps held in 
their heads (Sampson, 1999). It leads to “miscategorisation” as a result of 
“overinclusion” (including an item that is not a member of a given category) and 
“overexclusion” (wrongly excluding an item from its category) (Kosic et al., 2012). It 
facilitates easy generalisation of information rather than focusing on each piece of 
information individually (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998), which Eagly and Diekman 
(2005) consider to be neglecting individuals for the broader category to which they 
are seen to belong. 
2.3 STEREOTYPES AS MENTAL MAPS  
Categorisation is aided by the thinking that certain people, things and events share 
more similar characteristics than others. These pictures that we carry in our heads 
about things, people and events are cognitive representations or mental maps that 
are not in conformity with the factual reality of the things as they are (Sampson, 
1999). 
Hooks (2009, p. 96) says the following about stereotypes: 
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Stereotypes, however inaccurate, are one form of representation. Like 
fictions, they are created to serve as substitutions, standing in for what is 
real. They are not there to tell it like it is but to invite and encourage 
pretense. They are a fantasy, a projection onto the other that makes them 
less threatening. Stereotypes abound when there is distance. They are an 
invention, a pretense that one knows when the steps that would make real 
knowing possible cannot be taken or are not allowed. 
Unaided by stereotypes, we would not be able to place any new information in an 
orderly manner. Stereotypes are like the “mind-sets/frameworks which inform how 
we interpret and work within different contexts” (Eyben, 2007, p. 84). They are the 
assumptions that help us to categorise our living circumstances. 
Having met one Filipino girl, one is likely to build in one’s mind a representation of 
the way other Filipino girls are likely to look and behave. This would reduce the risk 
and effort of painstakingly getting to know each Filipino girl as a unique individual, 
because one’s framework has already set the boundaries of what being a Filipino girl 
is and what it is not. It offers the comfort of knowing almost all the Filipino girls one 
can possibly meet before actually getting to meet and know them. It offers 
conceptions prior to confronting the actual reality; hence it is a preconception that is 
bound to be faulty and incongruent with the facts. This stereotype is based on the 
assumption that being a Filipino girl implies abstinence from sexual intercourse 
before marriage, as well as being a Catholic who lives by the prescribed and 
proscribed ideals. It also leads to holding the assumption that living a life deviant 
from such ideals means not being a Filipino girl. 
2.4 FROM STEREOTYPES TO PREJUDICE 
If human interaction could simply be reduced to the packaging of information into 
categories and attaching labels to the mental frameworks that we have, such an 
effortless activity would be applauded for its effectiveness in helping us expedite the 
process of managing ourselves and others. This may lead to easy counting in and 
counting out, and including and excluding as we categorise. Tying in with the 
example in the previous section of counting in and counting out to categorise what it 
is to be a Filipino girl and what it is not to be, the following quotation shows how 
stereotypes can complicate and not merely smooth human interaction: “People of 
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African descent are simply not capable of producing works of philosophy comparable 
to those of the European tradition” (Hord & Lee, 1995, p. 2). 
As in the quotation about being a Filipino girl (see section 2.2), the above quotation 
carries with it an indication of how stereotypes are a foundational basis not only for 
categorisation and labelling, but also for prejudice, which, according to Gordon 
Allport (as cited by Sampson, 1999, p. 4), entails an “unjustified, usually negative 
attitude directed towards others because of their social category or group 
membership”, and a positive judgement or evaluation arrived at prior to accumulating 
sufficient information to factually test what we purport to know. 
Prejudice is a stereotype reflected in both cognitive and behavioural attitudes, and a 
resistance to being reflective of the self in order not to objectify our perception of the 
world (Brown, 1995; Eyben, 2007). As “the holding of derogatory social attitudes or 
cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or 
discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their 
membership of that group” (Brown, 1995, p. 8), prejudice is something everybody is 
predisposed to as it serves a fundamental cognitive purpose (Bowman-Kruhm & 
Wirths, 1998; Fiske, 2005). 
Bowman-Kruhm and Wirths (1998) argue that it is not only obviously intolerant, 
unkind, unaccepting and narrow-minded individuals who hold rigid beliefs and 
assumptions about themselves and others, but even the supposedly well-meaning. 
We all prejudge, hold biases, and knowingly and unknowingly make sweeping 
statements and have opinions and attitudes toward ourselves and others, classing 
them and ourselves into categories of similarity and difference, while not allowing our 
judgement to be subjected to the test of factual verification. We make conclusive 
distinctions between ourselves and others, and form judgemental attitudes based on 
these distinctions prior to considering pertinent facts, or simply based on ignoring 
and distorting available facts (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 2007). 
Prejudice is more than the mere holding of stereotypes or mental frameworks, 
categorisation and labelling. It also includes a performance component in addition to 
cognitive and affective components. It is present in the preferential judgements we 
make. Although prejudice is not only malignant in nature, the demeaning, devaluing 
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and derogatory attitudes and behaviours dished out to members of the other groups 
indicate that it mostly reeks of discrimination (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 
2007).  Because of the inherent human proclivity and need to categorise and hold 
stereotypes that support those categories, objectifying our experiences of the world 
while neglecting the individual for who he/she is and seeing him/her for the broader 
group category in which we place him/her, we demonise the other while sanctifying 
ourselves.  
In addition to the belief that people of an African descent are incapable of producing 
philosophical work of a quality comparable to that produced by of those of European 
descent, as quoted above, Lipsitz (2006) indicates that stigmatising labels will be 
attached to those of the former group by further subjecting them to exploitative and 
humiliating subordination of involuntary servitude, while reserving the glorified 
elevation of the latter, as was the case in the slave period.  
2.5 THE ENTRAPMENT OF CATEGORICAL ESSENTIALISM 
 What may be a superstition is paraded as ‘African religion’, and the white 
world is expected to endorse that it is indeed a religion but an African 
religion. What in all cases is a mythology is paraded as ‘African 
philosophy’, and again the white culture is expected to endorse that it is 
indeed a philosophy but an African philosophy. What is in all cases a 
dictatorship is paraded as ‘African democracy’, and the white culture is 
again expected to endorse that it is so. And what is clearly a de-
development or pseudo development is described as ‘development’, and 
again the white world is expected to endorse that it is development – but 
of course ‘African development’ (Hendry Odera, as quoted by Hountondji,  
1997, p. 384). 
Present in the above passage is the continued juxtaposing of the words white and 
white culture, and African and African culture, with African interchangeably replaced 
with black, as shown in the work of several authors (Adam, 2000; Anderson, 1995; 
Baloyi, 2008; Domínguez, 1986; Hord & Lee, 1995; Musopole, 1994; Teffo, 1999). 
One cannot read the above quotation without an overwhelming feeling of denying 
and mocking the categorisation of human existence while falling prey to categorising 
thinking at the same time. We need to acknowledge that this is both a gift and a 
curse. It is indicative of a need to unify and categorise simultaneously. A tendency of 
which one cannot rid oneself, categorisation has been and will remain a cognitive 
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skill that humans live by (Fiske, 2005; Sampson, 1999). We inevitably use it to name 
ourselves and others, and the experiences of both (Baker, 2004; Tochluk, 2010). 
One reads of the concepts of African psychology (Baloyi, 2008), black psychology 
(Jones, 1980) and African Christianity (Musopole, 1994), secretly abhorring the 
elevation of an undignified black and black experience to openly championing the 
reinstatement of a black and black experience of pride and standing equal to, if not 
higher than, the other races. In whatever form, dignified or undignified, elevated or 
downtrodden, oppressed or oppressing, one hears of an existence of human races in 
their authenticity (Baker, 2004; Mahon, 2004; Tate, 2005) and prototypicality, for 
example in terms of religion (Anderson, 1995). 
There seems to be a strongly held general perception that there is a pure way of 
being that is unique to black and blackness, which is juxtaposed to white and 
whiteness. For black and blackness, such a state of being is contaminated by 
western white influences of colonisation, slavery and capitalist thought. It carries with 
it a sense of self-sacrifice, togetherness and preservationist humility in coexistence 
with the other and the environment in which one takes abode.  
The distinctively essential black virtues in their pure form of knowing no prejudice 
and stereotype as maintained in a harmonious life, are succinctly described by Louw 
(1995) and Paris (2004), and set forth by John Mbiti’s seminal philosophical writings 
(Mbigi, 1997; Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980), as embodied in the widely cherished 
Ubuntu and African philosophy.  Pitted against this is the notion of pure white that is 
the norm (Tochluk, 2010), rational, superior, personally responsible, having a strong 
work ethic, having self-effacement, having mastery over nature (Perry, 2004) and 
being the opposite of the “idleness, stealing, lying, profanity, debauchery, nastiness 
and intemperance” (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 4) of black. Being materially 
privileged, clean, godly and superior are virtues ascribed to being white (Wray, 
2006). 
Categorisation is linked to thinking about humans as essentialist beings who have 
immutable characteristics that are not interchangeable. Mahalingam (2007, p. 46) 
describes essentialism as: 
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the psychological belief that there are essential and immutable differences 
between social groups such as race, class, gender, sexuality, etc. and that 
members of a group are believed to share the essential characteristics/ 
traits of the social group they belong to. 
Essentialism is based on the premise of seeing people and things as sharing 
immutable fundamental traits that define them as essentially existing and different. 
These fundamental traits are essences that bring a particular individual in affinity 
with others in possession of similar traits – others of his/her kind (Mallon, 2013). In 
affinity with one’s kind, the traits help to set one apart from those of the different kind. 
They are our fundamentally defining nature. 
This results in making sweeping statements about us and them, and about our group 
and their group, as shown in the following quotation by Thomas Jefferson (as cited 
by Sarich & Miele, 2004, p. 1): 
in memory they (black people) are equal to the white people; in reason 
much inferior, as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing 
and comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination 
they are dull, tasteless and anomalous.  
A stereotypical belief in the superiority of one’s group and the inferiority of the other’s  
group is a restricted view and belief in the shared essences or qualities that one‘s 
group has, different from those inheritable by the other group, to define our group 
and their group as distinct natural kinds (Morning, 2011). 
Reflecting on racial essentialism, Mallon (2013, p. 80) quotes Anthony Appiah as 
saying that it causes one to: 
divide human beings into a small number of groups, called ‘races’, in such 
a way that members of these groups share certain fundamental, heritable, 
physical, moral, intellectual and cultural characteristics with one another 
that they did not share with members of any other race. 
It is perception that fixes reality. The price paid for us categorically essentialising 
humans is that we reify our thoughts of them as objects outside of us, and thus 
experience them as such. This may lead to not only holding certain ideas or maps 
about them and us (stereotypes), but may cement the type of attitudes that we 
develop about the images we hold, further guiding how we actually relate to them 
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and ourselves (prejudice). These are the deadly social consequences that Lipsitz 
(2006) talks about when he cautions about the socially constructed living 
arrangements that we tend to regard as naturally given. 
We inadvertently imbue our culture with powerful magnetic influence and do not 
realise that, as a guide to how to conduct ourselves, it is also a tool created by us to 
serve particular time and history specific challenges and needs (Hartigan, 2010). The 
reified life becomes a rule-obeying reality seen as fixed and preexisting (James, 
2001), never subjected to scrutiny and renegotiation. 
Although Morning (2011) argues that social constructivism, that is, the belief in the 
purported immutable human traits that are a product of active social life, is seen from 
other quarters as the opposite of essentialism, I see it as serving to add a human 
performative element to that which would still be a stale existence. Because it 
believes in the existence of a differently constructed reality, however manmade, it 
may result in a reality that is also essentialised. Its defended difference from 
essentialism attests to its objectified nature. 
When being black used to be held as being begrimed and defective, and being 
representational of darkness, dread, death, terror, horror, wickedness, mourning and 
defilement (Hood, 1994), and as being inferior to associate with (Durrheim & Mtose, 
2006), one sees post-apartheid South Africa having ignited an interest in it as the 
arbiter of humane humanity (Teffo, 1999). The categories we hold cannot be 
ahistorical, as not to be reflective of the times and spaces we invade (Mahon, 2004; 
Morning, 2011). 
2.6 RACE AS PERFORMED OR CARRIED 
Human beings cannot evade being racially defined and racially defining. Even so, 
valued racial harmony and rainbow nation exhortations become hallowed appeals 
geared towards ridding society of racial definitions and categorisation. That we can 
be beyond racial classification is a myth (Potter, Conway & Bernard, 2010). Our 
racial sameness and differentness remain guiding boundary markers between us 
and them. We are given to thinking racially (Mallon, 2013) about ourselves as a 
racially similar kind, and them as a racially outwardly different, but similar within. 
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What is race? Is a person born with or within a particular race, as essentialist thought 
wants us to believe? Is it a socially lived experience as the social constructivist 
argues? The answer to these questions rests upon looking at race as a socially 
constructed or fixed reality. While I argue that seeing race as fixed ignores its 
socially constructed nature, as leaning on it being socially constructed ignores its 
fixed nature, both views are worth exploring here. The authors cited above and 
throughout do not subscribe to a singular descriptive view of race, mainly offering a 
balanced stance between the two contesting perspectives. 
In thinking about race, both scientists and laypersons differentiate people according 
to observable physical body characteristics. In both, people seek bodily evidence for 
real differences and similarities between human types. The tangible human body 
becomes an immutable fact of nature, serving as evidence for individuals to 
categorise themselves and to be categorised by others (Bailey et al., 2013; James, 
2001; Mayor, 2012; Neal & Wilson, 1989). This is the view that sees race as 
naturally fixed and biologically determined, shown by Rockquemore’s (1998) 
exploration of the biracial identity of those whose physical differentness thrusts them 
in a fluid and in-between racial identity to provide further evidence that the physical 
human body is looked at for race definition.  
 The scientific study on the racial views of black Detroiters by Bonilla-Sailva and 
Embrick (2001) hinges on research participants whose race is naturally defined as 
fixed, as does the study by Steck et al. (2003) on the salience of racial identity 
between African-American and white students.  
That race is socially constructed is shown in Shiao et al.’s (2004) example of white 
families who prefer adopting Korean children over black ones as a result of the slight 
visible physical resemblances between them and the Korean adoptees as opposed 
to the vast dissimilarities between them and the black children. In the same vein, the 
insistence by the National Association of Black Social Workers that transracial 
adoption of black children by white parents shall leave the former “in a cultural ‘no 
man’s land’” (Shiao et al., 2004, p. 2), speaks of the race identity ambivalence such 
children find themselves in. 
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Shifts in social status allow for proximity or distance to blackness or whiteness by 
either perceived or preferred difference or similarity. Bailey et al. (2013) talk of a 
“whitening” process, characterised by the accumulation of things high in monetary 
value, leading people to acquire status associated with whiteness, and distant from 
blackness. An example of this is Latin Americans who take on an identity of non-
white (Forman et al., 2002) and whose black identity is shunned, distanced from for 
a preferred proximity to whiteness. This springs from the racial identity of those who 
find themselves initially classified as black reclassifying themselves differently due to 
the obvious physical differences between them and those allocated to the black race 
category (Forman et al., 2002). 
The entrenched historical seat of United States black and white race classification 
(James, 2001) seems to be outwitted and contested against by emerging other 
classifications. The historical “one drop rule” (James, 2001; Rockquemore, 1998) is 
shaken by the emergence of alternative racial identities. The multi-racial category of 
mixed black and white parentage further defies the “one drop rule” with its resultant 
varied biracial identities (Rockquemore, 1998). Preference by the mothers of mixed-
race children for their children to keep close affinity with whiteness for possible 
benefits incurred as opposed to associating with blackness (Rockquemore, 1998), 
inadvertently turns the children not only non-white, but “honorary white” (Forman et 
al., 2002; Shiao et al., 2004), remaining neither black nor white.  
Distinctions between races or “kinds” is demeaning, inter alia because it is imprecise. 
It imputes far-reaching character differences based on the observable physical 
makeup of people and ignores the social foundations and political underpinnings of 
definitions of race, as argued in several critical race theory arguments (Bailey et al., 
2013; Closson, 2010; Hartigan, 2010; Hawkesworth, 2010; Odartey-Wellington, 
2011). The foundation of socially constructed race is thereby built upon. 
Morning’s (2011, p. 18) assertion that “individuals do not carry race within them; 
instead, race is a label that is imposed on them (or a container into which they are 
put) depending on the society in which they find themselves,” is unpersuasive as 
Tochluk’s (2010, pp. 9-10) quotation of the American Anthropological Association’ s 
statement on race reads as follows: 
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In the United States both scholars and the general public have been 
conditioned to viewing races as natural and separate divisions within the 
human species based on visible physical differences. With the vast 
expansion of scientific knowledge in this century, however it has become 
clear that human populations are not unambiguous, clearly demarcated, 
biologically distinct groups…. Historical research has shown that the idea 
of ‘race’ has always carried more meanings than mere physical 
differences; indeed, physical variations in the human species have no 
meaning except the social ones that humans put on them. 
As in the attempt to resolve the questions above, there seems to be another line of 
categorical thinking inherent in the above quotations that does not serve well to 
settle the impasse. Any essentialist explanation, as espoused by physical 
anthropology, can be summarily dismissed for being rigid and not taking into 
consideration the historical, social and political lived experiences of race. However, a 
social constructivist assertion that sees itself as better than an essentialist one runs 
the risk of equally reifying its own dichotomous opinion, becoming a social 
constructivist lens that is essentialist.  
Howard’s (1985, p. 418) stark criticism against the scale tilted in favour of the white 
race when he says that, “if anthropology has indeed been handmaiden to colonial 
oppression in the past, psychology has provided one of its pernicious tools”, appears 
to be objectifying a black race and its experience as not only of equal value and 
standing as the white race, but more pure. In exposing the historical inhumanity of 
the white race in the making of the black race, an ontologically redefined essential 
black race is put in place (Anderson, 1995). 
Morning (2011) intimates that race is performative when she indicates that it is a 
power instrument serving to classify people in terms of groups of superiority and 
inferiority (Yancy, 2004), with the former allocated more life resources than the latter. 
Regarded as inferior and equal in status only to animals with their less evolved 
cultures, those of the black race were made to be subordinate to the British and the 
French (white people) (Wright & Schuhmann, 2007). Racial classification was then 
performed for the purpose of exploitation and stigmatisation of black people while 
privileging the white people (Lipsitz, 2006). Laws and policies were drawn to the 
advantage of the superior race, as was the case in the apartheid South Africa 
(Durrheim, Mtose & Brown, 2011).  
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The anthropologist Franz Boas bemoaned the historical superiority and inferiority 
distinction of people wherein their grouping is determined through heredity, to 
highlight how bound by time and situation the race definitions are according to which 
we come to classify people (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006). This is with the realisation 
that skin pigmentation and other phenotype characteristics have been used to 
classify and rank-order people in societies (Wander, Martin & Nakayama, 1999), with 
consequences that have stayed detrimental  to humanity, and have been taken for 
granted as a force created by nature (Lipsitz, 2006). 
The insistence on a denouncement of the hereditary determinism of races was 
mounted against ideas that asserted race as a biological concept. People have 
always been predisposed to sorting each other. Illuminated physical differences 
between people have been used to categorise them into races. Their visible physical 
differences were regarded as essences immutably embodied in their biological 
makeup (Sarich & Miele, 2004). As an inborn human tendency that predates 
colonialism in the period from 700AD to 1400AD, Sarich and Miele (2004, pp. 1-2) 
note a comment by Thomas Jefferson that: 
There is a physical difference between the white and black races which I 
believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social 
and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do 
remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I 
as such as any other man am in favour of having the superior position 
assigned to the white race.  
People were seen as being naturally determined to be different and were further 
ascribed as being relatively superior or inferior to each other. Their identities were 
seen as naturally determined and no amount of social upliftment was seen as able to 
change this (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). An allusion to this is made by Howitt 
and Owusu-Bempah (1994, p. 6) from Arthur Jensen’s hypothesis that an attempt to 
improve the early school learning disadvantage of black children would amount to 
naught, that even the addition of resources would be a wasteful endeavour because 
it would ignore that “the problem lay in the inferiority of black genes which could not 
be dealt with by throwing money into their education”. 
Further compounding this, to the development of laws to engrave what is seen as 
biologically inscribed and naturally determined, Domínguez (1986) calls humanity the 
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foreman of a racial design whose architecture is put in place by nature. The design 
and implementation of apartheid South African laws, by humanity the foreman, 
served the political imperatives of that time (Degenaar, 1978).  
Racial classification based on physical distinction has been performed to advance 
and support social inequality (Hartigan, 2010), failing to realise that it is an invention 
based on the ideas we have about biologically assumed characteristics (Sarich & 
Miele, 2004).  
2.7 RACE AS CULTURAL DIFFERENCE 
I am convinced that there is a black and nonblack view of human 
behaviour, growth and potential for development. All theoretical 
orientations must be examined and made viable within the 
phenomenological fields of black people’s experiences (Jones, 1980, p. 
xi). 
“African religion” and not “superstition”, “African democracy” and not “dictatorship”, 
“African philosophy” and not "mythology”, “African development” and not “pseudo-
development” (Hendry Odera, quoted by Hountondji, 1997). “African psychology” 
and “African psychotherapy” in addition to “western psychology” and “western 
psychotherapy” (Baloyi, 2008). “African Christianity” in addition to “western 
Christianity” (Musopole, 1994). Added to these are the concepts of “African 
psychology” (Williams, 1981), “African philosophy” of John Mbiti (Mbigi, 1997; 
Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980), and “black psychology” (Jones, 1980).  
In these, I see a concerted exhortation for black people to find and reposition their 
Africanness from the throngs of marginalisation and insignificance into which they 
were rendered by westernisation and whiteness. I see an attempt to wrestle off the 
stereotypes of inferior subjugation that entrench blackness as being biologically 
inferior and hereditarily doomed to underdevelopment equal to animals (Wright & 
Schuhmann, 2007). I see an attempt to resist being classified as a depraved and 
atavist racial category that can only benefit from new cultural upliftment. I see a time-
specific effort to shed the old as defined by others and to affirm the self with labels 
devoid of the colonial ravaging that sought to rescue black from its savage lifestyle of 
“superstition”, “witchcraft”, “laziness”, “ignorance” and “promiscuity” (Baker, 2010). 
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Beckoning are calls for locating a pure Africanness uncontaminated by the West, an 
Africanness rooted in the experience of blackness and its culture.  
It is in this argument that the dregs of racial categorisation are laid bare. In it is a 
contemplation of finding an authentic African imbued with true black experience – an 
argument that drips with entrapments of racial essentialism, although a cultural one. 
In the spirit and times of racial emancipation of the race of black as opposed to its 
colonial white domination, it is a racial re-classification of a particular political 
moment with its own specific economic and social benefits.  
It is in this instance that I argue that the anthropologist Franz Boas’s (Baker, 2010; 
Williams, 2006) affirmation of the African or black culture, although it is a big shift 
from the epistemology of inferior heredity, slides further into the thinking of racial 
categorisation.  
This traps one in the paradoxical loop of definition. By trying to avoid the prejudice of 
identity in stereotypes by the other, one further stereotypes the self in a definition 
whose garb is in the opposite (positive and cultural), yet remains a stereotype. In 
resisting being defined by the other, one employs a definition that, although 
presumably affirming, is but its own opposite. We shall forever remain essentialised 
racial beings, in culture or biology. It is a view that stringently holds on to the belief in 
the existence of separate and uniquely distinctive human races of black and white.  
In its train emerges an argument for an alternative explanation of black behaviour 
away from the deficiency model which sees black behaviour and experience as 
inferior, to one that insists on distinct African values, attitudes and customs that have 
a black valour, and away from a white reference that demonises black people 
(Jones, 1980). In the new, one sees the old rearing its head by believing in the 
existence of the separate races, further separating them, positioning them in 
competition and not in complement or unity, believing in the authentic existence of 
each and emphasising the cultural distinctiveness of each, as Nobles (1980, p. 19) 
states that “insofar as the African (Black) ethos is distinct from that of the prevailing 
white ethos (upon which traditional psychology is found) then a Black Psychology 
based upon the black ethos must also be uniquely different from white psychology”.  
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Central to blackness are definable cultural characteristics importantly coined and 
encouraged by John Mbiti as referred to in Mbigi (1997) and Musopole (1994), while 
Nobles (1980, p. 19) defines them as underlined in “the understanding, attitude of 
mind, logic and perception behind the manner in which African people think, act or 
speak in different situations of life,” whose understanding would allow the easy 
grasping of black people’s essence of existence.  
2.8 BLACK AND BLACKNESS DEFINED 
As a race, like whiteness, blackness is described in terms of observable physical 
appearance (Forman et al., 2002; James, 2001; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Potter et al., 
2010; Rockquemore, 1998). Carried in the physical body text (James, 2001), it is 
identified by having a dark skin colour, broad nose, thick lips, kinky hair and all 
physical features identified as the opposite of being white (Forman et al., 2002; 
James, 2001; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Rockquemore, 1998). Black and blackness used 
to be vague descriptions of colour with fluid connotations whose mythical 
associations were at times interchangeable with those of white and whiteness. Some 
African societies would conduct sacrificial offerings to their gods by slaughtering a 
white coloured animal at certain times or for certain incidents, while at other times, a 
black coloured animal was suitable for a godly sacrifice (Hood, 1994). The meaning 
attached to both black and white was made significant, not by the fixed colour itself, 
but by the importance of the event to which it was attached.  
Mythical explanations about the colour black and white always held sway in different 
nature and proportions of imprecise form. These are given below by Hood (1994): 
• Roughness and hardiness were valued as indicators of male virility in Greek 
thought. A male’s darkened skin from working outside was preferred over a 
lighter or white skin which was considered a sign of vulnerability and femininity.  
• The courage and skill of Ethiopian warriors was assumed from their dark skin.  
• In classical Greek criminal trials, a white vote meant acquittal, while a black one 
meant a death sentence. A person’s inner feelings and traits could be imputed 
from their skin colour.  
• Having a black heart was used as a metaphor of having warmth, as opposed to 
having a white heart, which implied being insensitive and cold-hearted. 
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Whiteness of internal organs was considered an abnormality, as in the image of 
a person having a white liver that signified them as being cowardly. 
With the world inundated with sin, evil and famine, early Christian thought took hold 
by providing explanations for such calamities. Christianity provided the structural 
contours of black and blackness (Bennett, 2009). It sought to explain the occurrence 
of earthly suffering as the work of the personified devil that was presumed to be 
black (Hood, 1994). Black personified the devil with his evil and dark deeds, that 
were seen as working against God’s divine plan. To be white was seen as being 
pure and immune from the devil’s darkened deeds. Africa came to be viewed as the 
ancestral seat and progenitor of blackness, its people and cultures as predominantly 
black, held in the mythical connotations of darkness and evil (Hood, 1994). Its 
cultures and traditions were overlooked and at times scoffed at as substandard to 
the pure white creation God set forth. Africa came to represent black in the main, 
and therefore the devil’s creation. 
It followed that to be African was to be categorised as black, as being black was 
categorised as synonymous with being African. Those of African descent were 
categorised as being black (Hord & Lee, 1995). Considered to be substandard 
cultures practised by subhuman beings, Africa’s black world views were targeted as 
unworthy of comparison with those of the other human races. Western Christianity 
was introduced to Africa to rescue her from her wayward black self (Musopole, 
1994). Practice of and training in psychology and psychotherapy were conducted in 
such a way that the “essential” black and African experiences were erased and 
replaced with western experiences and world views (Baloyi, 2008; Williams, 1981). 
2.8.1 Blackness and performative stereotypes that devalue  
Steeped in perceptions entrenched in stereotypes about black and blackness, 
relations with black people were prejudiced, with their culture viewed as inferior, as 
indicated in the following statement by Nathan Southgate Shaler (as quoted by 
Baker, 2010, p. 21): 
the negro is not as yet intellectually so far up the scale of development as 
he appears to be; in him the great virtues of superior race, though 
implanted, have not yet taken root, and are in need of constant tillage, lest 
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the old savage weed overcome the tender shoots of new and unnatural 
culture.  
Such stereotypes describe being black and its culture as suspect and inferior. Its 
cultural lifestyle is seen as an impediment to Christian and western civilisation, 
entrapping its people as disgraced, dirty, wicked, ignorant and heathens (Baker, 
2010; Tochluk, 2010). Blackness is characterised by innate laziness, barbarism, 
ignorance about the self, lack of inner drive and motivation to improve one’s lot, 
suited to and content with a humiliating living standard of poor housing, disease and 
servitude (Durrheim et al., 2011; Hartigan, 2010; Lipsitz, 2006; Tochluk, 2010). 
2.8.2 Blackness and stereotypes that affirm 
Being black as being of African descent (Domínguez, 1986) is an existence 
described in physical terms of being dirty, soiled, ugly (Tochluk, 2010), having thick 
lips, tightly coiled woolly hair and broad noses (Sarich & Miele, 2004), and inspiring 
shame and dislike of the self (Durrheim & Mtose, 2006). It is on the basis of the 
abovementioned shame and dislike of the self that a deep-rooted exhortation is 
made enjoining those defined as black and of African descent to value that which 
has been scoffed at and ridiculed in their distinctive blackness. 
Black people are encouraged to identify with their distilled heritage of blackness. A 
heightened consciousness of distinctive blackness in both culture and phenotypical 
makeup is made. One’s culture and phenotype are used as identity markers of a 
boundary that sets the self and others apart. One overarching demarcation of the 
self and others is a belief in blackness being synonymous with and an embodiment 
of Ubuntu (Baloyi, 2008; Mbigi, 1997; Teffo, 1999).  
Although historical studies of race point to a black race defined in imprecise physical 
terms by the socially, economically and politically powerful white, black people use 
the same physical traits to describe and affirm their distinctive race. Neal and Wilson 
(1989) show how America’s civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s were 
characterised by slogans emphasising the liking, accentuation and adherence of 
beauty and self-identification according to hitherto despised black features. 
Espiritu (2004) describes black American families as culturally virtuous, 
uncharacteristic of United States families with their lack of collective identity, family 
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tie strength and husband-and-wife norms. United States families are viewed as being 
distant, uncaring and selfish. So identified, blackness is affirmed from what it is not. It 
perpetuates the comparative binary description of race that is produced and 
enhanced in a relational context with the other defined race.    
2.9 WHITENESS AS CARRIED 
Hooks (2009) defines whiteness as all that represents being white as embodied in 
manners of speech, walk, dress, skin colour, etc. It is clearly marked by and retains 
its distinctiveness from what is not white and therefore black (Brooks & Rada, 2002; 
Durrheim et al., 2011; Galletta & Cross, 2007; Hood, 1994; Wright & Schuhmann, 
2007). It is an identity and racial category carried in being of white European 
American descent (Degenaar, 1978; Hood, 1994; Sarich & Miele, 2004; Wander et 
al., 1999). It is an existential category whose contours are marked by 
representational images of being triumphant, innocent, joyful, pure, happy and 
beautiful (Hood, 1994), its boundary defended in images of what it is not, in other 
words, black. 
A tenuous white intellectual superiority hinged on tenuous intellectual inferiority of 
those of the named black race, described by Franz Boas as an unfortunate myth that 
masquerades as hereditary what is socially and politically sanctioned (Anderson, 
1995; Baker, 2010; Brooks & Rada, 2002; Williams, 2006). It is a myth that 
permeates both black and white thought, leading to an assumption that the big 
central nervous system of those of the fairer skin as compared to those of the darker 
skin is a justification of the former’s advanced and highly developed intellectual 
functioning compared to the latter’s primitive closer association to the lowest animals 
in advancement (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006; Wright & Schuhmann, 2007). 
Naturally given, socially and economically deserved superiority is exemplified in 
academia – a relational description that pits and derives essential identity from what 
it is not, in other words, black. Black children who excelled academically were 
defined as “acting white” and succumbing to a white American culture (O’Connor et 
al., 2007). White children were ordinarily assumed to be good students without 
having to prove it academically (Galletta & Cross, 2007; Morris, 2006). The criterion 
of differential valuation is applied to assess children’s scholastic performance at the 
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same school. Rooted in the myth of white intellectual superiority and black 
intellectual inferiority, black teachers at a school interpreted black children’s 
performance as average, while praising that of white children. White teachers at the 
same school disparaged white children’s satisfactory performance equal to that of 
black children as disappointing (Morris, 2006).   
In 1983, the crowning of the first black Miss America, Vanessa Williams, was 
chastised for subscribing to and upholding American white attributes of beauty (Neal 
& Wilson, 1989).  
Whiteness is synonymous with intellectual astuteness and translatable to economic 
affluence. To be white and intellectually inferior is a paradox, as is an association of 
being white with being destitute, as the two associations are a defiance of a 
distinctively essential whiteness. In both, whiteness is not affirmed. Whiteness has 
the power not only to define and categorise others, but also itself. It looks at itself 
through a stereotype lens sifting through “what it is” and “what it is not”, from the 
other and from itself. 
“I suppose because I’m white, people feel I have a better chance or something. And 
that I haven’t already stumbled onto that path just amazes them”, enthused Sharon 
(as quoted by Moss, 2003, p. 56). She further added that  (Moss, 2003, pp. 59-60): 
because I’m white and “pretty” has not landed me a good job yet. It hasn’t 
landed me one of those rich executive husbands. It hasn’t even paid for a 
reliable car I can drive. I mean I try, you know, but I can’t change who I 
am. I can’t just be one of those suburban soccer moms who spend all day 
carting their kids around, shopping and cooking for dinner for their families. 
I’m on welfare, struggling to get through my life and raise my two girls. 
This whole idea that all White people are living a carefree life is ridiculous. 
The highly guarded whiteness enjoyed protection against the threat of infusion with 
what would taint its pureness. In the belief of the natural superiority of whiteness,  
laws were developed to clear and guard its territory (Degenaar, 1978; Domínguez, 
1986). Laws designed and pursuit during apartheid South Africa to discourage the 
intermingling of the races are a testimony to this (see section 1.9). 
The frowning reaction against white children attending school with black children in a 
mostly black residential neighbourhood (Morris, 2006) and struggling poor white 
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people like Sharon mentioned above (Moss, 2003) give credence to the belief in 
“nature as the architect of racial distinctions” of white superiority and black inferiority, 
“and man simply as the foreman who interprets nature‘s design” (Domínguez, 1986, 
p. 54), a distinction whose boundaries are not supposed to be crossed. 
2.10 WHITENESS AS PERFORMED  
The abovementioned beliefs in white superiority leave it with a forceful hegemonic 
tinge as an ideal for both those who have it and those who aspire to it. It 
unquestionably remains an ideal with staying power. The Latin Americanisation 
effect (Forman et al., 2002), the non-white biracial identity and the honorary white 
effect (Bailey et al., 2013; Forman et al., 2002; Rockquemore, 1998; Shiao et al., 
2004), wherein identity is sought in proximity with white and distance from black, 
should be understood in this context. One person recalled the inner tormenting 
embarrassment of being thrown in the margins of whiteness and poverty, that “it was 
not the act of shopping at the second hand stores, but the assumption (by me and 
others) that we were poor that was at the core of the embarrassment” (Moss, 2003, 
p. 98). 
A strong belief in setting apart authentic whiteness from disdained inauthentic 
whiteness is based on white stereotypes about itself and about blackness. It is a 
categorisation that sets whiteness apart from non-whiteness, a categorisation based 
on more than characterisation of skin pigmentation and other phenotype markers; it 
is based on practices rooted in stereotypes (Tochluk, 2010). 
Baker (2010) reflects on Franz Boas’ fervent fight at the forefront of a campaign that 
stood against perceptions that not only saw being black as backward, but also 
sought to transform and assimilate it into the superior white culture.  
The hegemonic appeal of whiteness pureness traps those who do not fit and 
conform to its defined category with an internalised negative perception of 
themselves, needing validation through whiteness while seeking and aspiring to be 
white (Durrheim & Mtose,  2006; Hooks, 2009).  
Being white relates to holding categorisation stereotypes about the self as superior 
and others as inferior, which is an entrapping mind-set whose power even leads to 
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black people to adhere to the socialised belief in the fantasy of white goodness 
(Hooks, 2009). Some in South Africa stayed content with being called derogatory 
names (Durrheim et al., 2011) as was the case with the Ghananian nurse Owusu-
Bempah’s experience of enduring subhuman treatment in Britain when “white staff 
and patients frequently referred to him as a ‘monkey’”( Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 
1994, p. 2). Anyone and anything not sharing the stated disposition, worldviews and 
phenotype identities categorised as white (Perry, 2004), would be deemed 
subhuman, their race as undesirable and distasteful (Hood, 1994). 
As an organising racial category in whose projected stereotypes other races are 
looked down upon, whiteness defined blackness as non-white, a lazy race that would 
not work unless made to (Hartigan, 2010), thereby subjecting it to the recorded 
history of presumed deserved exploitation, subhuman living conditions and 
servitude. Ushered in was the whiteness superior race, practising oppression, 
exclusion and enslavement of what is not white, therefore black (Anderson, 1995; 
Durrheim et al., 2011). Whiteness therefore became associated with and 
synonymous with damage to humanity (Anderson, 1995; Tochluk, 2010) by being 
prejudiced towards other races. 
A retort by Rodney (1995, p. 187) that “white society is violent, white American 
society is particularly violent, white American society is especially violent towards 
blacks” emanates from an observation of whiteness reserving life’s equities and 
amenities for all but non-white people, whose low life standards are seen as self-
inflicted from innate unintelligence and laziness. A socially constructed racial 
supremacy (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; Morris, 2006; Tochluk, 2010; Wray, 
2006) measured in lopsided advantages of entitlement to life privileges at the 
expense of other races, it is an ideological hegemonic system of dominance by the 
fair-skinned whose persuasive influence of assumed normalcy means a deluded lack 
of self-scrutiny (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 1997; Morris, 2006; 
Yancy, 2004). Because of its historical majority position, whiteness embodies an 
unwillingness to consider and interrogate its socially and politically composed race, 
either due to lack of awareness or to protect the benefits it stands to benefit from it 
(Mayor, 2012; Steck et al., 2003).  
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Being white is being trapped in a self-serving “white talk” (Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 
1997; Tochluk, 2010; Yancy, 2004) that defines one’s race as the norm and the 
prime standard of measuring others, oblivious to the social political and economic 
moorings in which its normality is rooted. Assumed to be occasioned with hard work 
and material affluence, its ensuing superiority marks it off from poverty that is seen 
as a signifier of black cultural laziness and innate abhorrent mental 
underdevelopment. It is for this reason that poor white people stand to endure the 
brunt of incessant marginal existence of between-ness, akin to Du Bois’s coined 
African American’s drenching two-ness of being (Anderson, 1995; Hartigan, 2010; 
Mahon, 2004; Sampson, 1999) as they are derided for corrupting the esteemed 
white pureness (Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; Wray, 2006). 
To this end, the hypocrisy is laid bare of whiteness’s wishful erasure of its complicity 
in the subjugation of blackness that is deliberate. Being white is being in self-chosen 
oblivion of self, embedded delusional superiority, a two-ness of being and investment 
in the fair skin itself (Lipsitz, 2006), whose superiority has no biological or natural 
foundation but is socially constructed (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 
1997; Wray, 2006; Yancy, 2004), sustained in and supported by law (Degenaar, 
1978; Domínguez, 1986; Durrheim et al., 2011). White people are called to relook at 
their insulated whiteness, their self-serving white talk, convenient colour 
evasiveness, power evasiveness and selective silence tripping them into entrenched 
prejudice that attributes nature and biology to what is socially tailored living 
arrangement serving white stereotypes about themselves and those who are marked 
as not fulfilling the white norm.   
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CHAPTER 3 
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
3.1  CHAPTER PREVIEW 
Chapter 3 is the first of three chapters in which I consider what a phenomenological 
understanding of same-race prejudice would entail. The chapter starts with a 
discussion of essentialist understandings of racial identity and identification (i.e., as 
naturally existing and reducible to describable and quantifiable qualities), which 
leads to and sustains same-race prejudice against those of one’s ‘own’ race who 
appear to be lacking in the necessary authenticity, prototypicality and normativity. 
Phenomenology is introduced as a counter to the naturalist attitude on which 
essentialist understandings are based. It does not seek to determine the presence or 
absence of objective racial qualities, but rather to elucidate how people actually 
experience such supposedly objective qualities, and what meanings they attach to 
them. 
So, how then do people experience race and what meanings do they attach to it? 
Rather than taking phenomenological literature on race as my point of departure, I 
make a somewhat radical move in the chapter, namely to attend in the first place to 
what ‘ordinary’ people have to say about the matter. This is not intended as a formal 
empirical research project, but as a way of strategically finding a way into the spoken 
and written discourses about race ‘from the bottom up’. The short excerpts from the 
conversations I had with people illustrate how ready all seem to be to work from the 
premise that, at some level, race does exist, however much each speaker might 
labour to project layers of complexity onto it. My conversation partners conjured up a 
veritable menagerie of more and less exotic racial types, always making sure to 
position themselves as knowledgeable and unbiased observers who understand the 
underlying dimensions that can bring clarity to the apparently confusing proliferation 
of races and racial characteristics. 
Prominent among these imagined dimensions is an ongoing loss of essential and 
wholesome blackness through an admixture of whiteness. Blackness, in this 
ideation, started as a strong current of essential humanness, but has now split into 
innumerable tributaries and lost itself in the swamps of white-like self-centredness. 
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Similarly, whiteness is imagined not only as being different from blackness, but as 
somehow being estranged from a yet-to-be-realised, truer and more socially 
acceptable version of itself. In addition to the impromptu philosophies emerging from 
these informal conversations, I also weave in excerpts from some supposedly more 
carefully considered academic texts and find that, perhaps not so surprisingly, they 
draw on similar dynamics to construct a world in which races are not only 
differentiated from each other, but also from themselves. 
Whatever the imagined surface manifestations and underlying principles of this 
racialised world, it is sustained by a naturalist attitude in which race exists objectively 
as an essential dimension of reality. In concluding the chapter, I therefore start the 
process of finding a path out of this self-referential world by appealing to a 
philosophical tradition, phenomenology, which explicitly eschews objective 
knowledge of a real world. I review the origins of phenomenology as a science of 
what happens inside of human consciousness rather than in outer spaces populated 
by concrete objects. Like naturalism, phenomenology is essentialist, but rather than 
wishing to ascribe essentialist characteristics to objects existing in objective space 
and time, it wishes instead to explore the essence of human experience. People are 
not imagined as existing in objective space and time, along with other objects, but as 
producing space and time – as being space and time. To round off the chapter, I 
consider some of the key principles involved in doing research from such a 
perspective. 
Beginning with interview discussions, definitions and descriptions about the races of 
black and white situated in an essentialist lens, this chapter builds on the premise 
laid towards the end of the previous chapter regarding the naturalist attitude about 
race, racial identity and identification. It is founded on and responds to the 
essentialist pitfalls that emerge from naturalist thought and attitudes towards the 
definition of race, racial identity and identification, and how these contribute to the 
development and sustenance of same-race prejudice. Encompassed in the interview 
descriptions in this chapter and the literature definitions from the previous chapter, 
the pitfalls are stated next. 
Humanity’s racial identity and forms of racial identification exist in the form of 
mutually exclusive races whose characteristics are distinctive, objectively discernible 
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and unique to each. As separate forms of identity and identification, each race is 
separately quantifiable in terms of uninterchangeable characteristics that mark its 
pure nature as separate from what it is not. For the white race, these are positive 
associations with physical beauty, triumph, innocence, godliness (Hood, 1994), 
academic excellence (Galletta & Cross, 2007), material affluence and superiority, 
and cleanliness (Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; Sibanda; 2012; Wray; 2006). These are 
differentiated from and not interchangeable with those unique to a black race 
encompassing a different kind of humanness (Louw, 1995; Mbigi, 1997), world-view 
and spirituality (Hountondji, 1997; Jones, 1980; Musopole, 1994; Nobles; 1980; 
Teffo, 1999). 
Using black and blackness as examples, the idiosyncratic character and philosophy 
towards life of each race (Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980; Senghor, 1997) call for a 
unique form of appreciation (Baloyi, 2008; Clark, 1980; Howard, 1985; Howitt & 
Owusu-Bempah, 1994). The assertion made in the chapter is that the view about 
race, racial identity and identification as objectively quantifiable offers an illusion of 
reliability and verifiability to certainly describe them (Spinelli, 1989, 2005) as entities 
that essentially have an independent and natural existence defined by the naturalist 
attitude, and as unperturbed by an experiencing conscious individual (Kockelmans, 
1994; Roy, Petitot, Pachoud & Varela, 1999; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974).   
This leads to the view that humanity, race, racial identity and identification are purely 
objective with measurable quantities, a view which is uncritically embraced (Kruger, 
1988) while the thoughts about humanity, race, racial identity and identification are 
reified (Davis, 2005). In this, the primacy of conscious human experiential meaning-
making, understanding and interpretation of race, racial identity and identification is 
ignored. Further ignored is the capacity of human beings for appreciative conscious 
awareness of what looks like objective racial identity and identification realities 
(Kockelmans, 1994; Roy et al., 1999; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). 
This view of humanity, racial identity and identification as naturally existing, reducible 
to describable and quantifiable qualities and virtues as separately black and white, 
leads to, contributes to and sustains same-race prejudices of the authenticity, 
prototypicality and normativity of black and white, as opposed to the inauthenticity, 
non-prototypicality and non-normativity of identity and identification within the races 
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of black and white. Each time we try to define, we get caught up in the objectivist, 
naturalist attitude, even when we seem to think that our new definitions are better 
than the ones before. We tend to view people, their existence in the world and their 
race as naturally given. 
Founded on a naturalist attitude, the previous chapter situated and imbued the race 
definitions of black and white with essentialist, objective and naturally given natures. 
The present chapter, which is phenomenologically founded, is a counter-response to 
the previous one and the stated pitfalls of the naturalist attitude set out in this chapter 
by challenging the essentialist notions of race, racial identity and identification of 
blackness and whiteness as normal, objective, natural and existing independently 
from an experiencing individual (Jacobsen, 2007; Laverty, 2003; Tuohy, Cooney, 
Dowling, Murphy & Sixsmith, 2012). Interrogating the naturalist attitude upon which 
their physical, objective and quantifiable naturalness is founded (Murray, 2012), 
people’s real existence is viewed as a reality only conferred upon by them through 
their conscious lived experience (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Spiegelberg, 1965). This 
naturalist attitude is also viewed as not realising that these notions are only a 
shadow of the true reality of the phenomenon (Converse, 2012), being responsible 
for the generalised understanding that ignores people’s lived experience (Greenfield 
& Jensen, 2012). The naturalist attitude behind the definition of these terms is slated 
for taking human experiences for granted (Kockelmans, 1994; Stewart & Mickunas, 
1974; Wagner, 1983) and not considering them as phenomena whose existence and 
appreciation are not only or always amenable to the natural laws of quantification 
(Zaner, 1970). 
As “a philosophical perspective that helps researchers to explore and understand 
everyday experiences without pre-supposing knowledge of those experiences” 
(Converse, 2012, p. 28), the origin of phenomenology is spelled out in this chapter 
as being influenced by the assumption of the mind-body split (Dowling & Cooney, 
2012), as opposed to medicine’s naturalist and biological understanding of illness 
(Gergel, 2012). Phenomenology is a radical response to the traditional way of 
practising philosophy (Earle, 2010; Laverty, 2003) and is intended to explore the 
phenomena of human experience – lived experiences of an individual’s life-world as 
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they appear in a person’s consciousness and not the world as existing separate from 
the experiencing individual (Gergel, 2012; Kim, 2012; Tuohy et al., 2012).  
This chapter serves to look at the description of the purpose or task of 
phenomenology. With its suspension of the naturalist attitude (Kockelmans, 1994; 
Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), phenomenology is not concerned with 
the mere objective existence and the official definitions (Earle, 2010; Kim, 2012) of 
race, racial identity and racial identification (Gergel, 2012). Tasked with analysing 
people’s conscious and internal experience, its research side (Flood, 2010) focuses 
on the conscious experience of what the supposed objective definition is and the 
meaning people attach to it (Roy et al., 1999; Shamsaei, Kermanshahi, Vanaki & 
Holtforth, 2013). 
It is concerned with the essence and content of conscious human experience 
(Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Simonsen, 2013; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), not with 
humanity’s mere corporeality or the physical body of race, but with how people 
experience and make meaning of their corporeality, and the interpretive 
understanding of the effect the corporeality has on their understanding. It focuses on 
the conscious mental representation of corporeality and its contents (Murray, 2012; 
McDonald & Dickerson, 2013; Spiegelberg, 1965; Wagner, 1983). The chapter helps 
to look at phenomenology’s core concepts of intentionality (Converse, 2012; Dowling 
& Cooney, 2012; Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012), phenomenon (Converse, 
2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010) and consciousness (Greenfield & 
Jensen, 2012). 
The chapter seeks to highlight that the racial definitions we make are based on 
stereotypes resulting from categorisation and prejudice masked in taken-for-granted 
notions of normativity, authenticity, prototypicality and objectivity, not only between 
the races of black and white, but also within the races themselves. 
3.2 WHEN NATURALISM MATTERS 
After accumulating literature definitions of the terms black, blackness, white, and 
whiteness, I found myself lacking a living picture of how people actually define the 
races of black and white, themselves and others, the strategies they use to do these, 
and whether they are aware of how they use such strategies. The literature 
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definitions felt impersonal, distant and lacking in an experientially conscious human 
element.  
I came up with a schedule to randomly talk to people purposively selected to come 
up with the definitions. Coming mostly from organisations whose duties revolve 
around race, intolerance, segregation, justice, labour security and community service 
provision, these individuals were chosen on the basis of having a presumed 
understanding on matters relating to race, racial identity and racial identification. 
Although they were approached from specific organisations, their responses are not 
officially those of the organisations. 
The interviewed individuals were based in Emalahleni (formerly known as Witbank) 
and consisted of the following: 
• three black men from three mostly black national labour unions; 
• a white woman and a white man from two mostly white national labour unions; 
• a white woman from a national labour union; 
• a white woman from a liberal national political organisation; 
• a white man from a national extreme right political organisation; 
• a black woman from a national government youth institution; 
• a black woman from a government labour disputes institution; and 
• a white male car guard. 
The interviews were semi-structured, open-ended conversations whose 
appointments were not pre-scheduled, and were held at the interviewees’ places of 
work. The interviews, which I conducted, focused on asking the interviewees to 
define black, blackness, white and whiteness. The interviewees were not asked to 
sign any participation consent forms, hence the anonymity of their responses here. 
They gave verbal consent to written notes of their responses being kept.  
The dated responses from those conversations are given below. 
A. 12/03/2012 
There is no person who is black or white. Europeans are described as 
white although there is no proper definition of colour. African origin is a 
description of being black. The name African American is preferred over 
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black American for the benefit of being African and American at the same 
time. The name coloured is not preferred as it is considered an insult that 
robs one of being African. 
Blacks stay in the townships, villages of traditional authority and urban 
areas. Whites stay in urban areas. They do not want us to call ourselves 
blacks for the benefits we get from blackness. We should be proud to be 
black. We did not choose to be black or white. Trade unions developed as 
racial revolts against being considered as not human beings.  
B. 12/03/2012 
Race speaks of skin colour. If my father is black so I shall be defined. 
Although we are residentially mixed there are few or no whites in the 
townships. I am defined as black through the language I speak and how I 
treat other people. Blacks are tolerant of having less and living in destitute 
circumstances. 
Whites need special attention. Few of them live in poorer circumstances. 
They expect us to be incompetent but are surprised by our cooperative 
attitude. Unless you hold some respectable position, some blacks will 
disrespect you. Whites have no jealousy although they are competitive. 
Blacks are given to thinking negatively before assisting you. They would 
want to know what it is that they stand to benefit. We are too selfish, hence 
the existing corruption. We are suspicious of each other. There are 
allegations and accusations of corruption among blacks. Blackness has 
changed to selfishness, animosity and competitiveness, to something it 
was never before. We used to live peacefully with those practising 
witchcraft without singling them out. 
C. 12/03/2012 
I treat people equally as set out by the preamble of our Constitution. 
Apartheid differentiated people according to skin colour as blacks or 
whites. Blacks who are now called Africans are of a darker skin. 
Employment equity gives definition of black. 
The unequal distribution of resources was used to the advantage of 
whites. Since 1994, we can express ourselves the same way. The 
economic gap between black Africans and white Africans is still huge. 
People are defined in terms of colour and history of being advantaged or 
disadvantaged. 
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Chinas are being categorised as black although we know they are not. 
One’s race is naturally determined. An albino is still black as their skin 
condition is considered an illness. 
D. 13/03/2012 
Blacks are non-whites. Their identity speaks for Africans, Indians, and 
coloureds even those who are not indigenous of Africa. Whites are those 
who were advantaged by the system of apartheid because of their skin 
colour. Their race defined them as such. These are the British, Europeans 
and Afrikaners. An African is someone whose origin is Africa. 
E. 13/03/2012 
I do not see colour anymore. People are classified mostly because of their 
skin colour although one may find a person whose skin colour is black yet 
is not classified as black, e.g. the Portuguese. Some coloured people are 
light in skin colour yet they are not white. Whites are defined by their 
colour. When you are Zulu you are automatically black. 
F. 13/03/2012 
Afrikaans is not equal to being white. A person can speak Afrikaans and 
not be white or Zulu while not being black. We are people. I would like 
everybody to be treated the same. We do not classify people according to 
race anymore. Colour is not equal to the person. We all live in South 
Africa. 
G. 14/03/2012 
I was never brought up with apartheid attitudes. I never brought up my 
children with apartheid attitudes. I have one black child that grew up with 
my children. My union has 67% of people of different skin colour. It is not 
just a white union. 
It hurts me to see black members of the public that are racist. People I 
meet always accuse me of being white and racist. They do not want to 
reconcile. I was brought up politically correct, not distinguishing between 
the different races or knowing what is being black or white. Colour is a 
physical appearance. All people are the same. The government is 
encouraging black and white racist thinking. It says it is good to be black 
and wrong to be white. We are busy classifying each other according to 
skin colour, appearance and ways of talking. 
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H. 15/03/2012 
We do not classify people according to race because Indians are classified 
as black. Blacks still classify each other ethnically by looking down at 
others. A race is defined according to origin, upbringing and culture, e.g. 
whites do not go to traditional schools. Blacks are known for greeting 
whether a person is known to them or not. Media influence and exposure 
to western cultures are eroding pure blackness of being supportive, 
homely and greeting others. Whites are known for being selfish, self-
centred and concerned only with their immediate families. Depending on 
where a person was raised up, one can adopt white selfish manners while 
having a black skin colour. 
I. 15/03/2012 
I have lots of black people who treat me better than white people. I do not 
see people as black or white. The dying of people in road accidents is 
attended to as not a loss of a black or white life, but of human beings. A 
black person can have a black heart that is evil. A white person can be 
black and have a good heart. 
J. 19/03/2012 
You can be a black person who is brought up in the city, the modern way. 
People are culturally different, conduct funerals and weddings differently. 
Black people are culturally different. The difference between the English 
and Afrikaans cultures implies that white people are not the same. There is 
a traditional Afrikaans language that still excludes other races. I mix with 
other races. 
K. 20/03/2012 
We did not create ourselves. Our body DNA was not created by us. We 
cannot ignore that there are different cultures and nations. Going into the 
bible God separated people according to their different languages. One 
cannot cross pollinate an aloe with a palm tree as each performs different 
duties. It does not matter which nation one belongs to. Whether one is 
Zulu, German, Sotho or created with different skills, we can differ but 
belong together. 
Repeatedly reading the above passages to understand the meanings embodied and 
conveyed through the conversations, I could not help but being gripped by the 
suggestion emerging and reverberating in them that to define a race is to label, 
categorise and judge it, therefore making an unclaimed race prejudice.  
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Each description implies that a race explicitly or implicitly exists. Each of the 
respondents described a discernible race – black or white. In the process, each was 
lulled into unquestionably upheld stereotypes of what it is to be and what it is not to 
be. Each instilled an understanding about the races of black and white as essentially 
existing and as distinctively mutually exclusive and dissimilar. They did this in 
various ways. 
One indication is a decrial of the multiplicity of blackness that has succumbed to 
whiteness and western influence that have rubbed off its Ubuntu. This is the 
blackness that is not liked, as seen to be an admixture of whiteness. Echoed here is 
a sentiment like “blackness has changed to selfishness, animosity and competition, 
to something it was never before” (B, 12/03/2012). Additionally, in Chapter 1, a 
statement by Phatekile Holomisa of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South 
Africa (as cited by Baron, 2012) was given expressing a displeasure at black people 
who practise homosexuality against the prescripts of their culture. These examples 
depict a deviation from the core – the authentic, prototypical and normative 
blackness and its cultural prescripts. The deviational and non-conforming blackness 
is admonished to consider the core. 
While there are multifaceted blacknesses instead of just one (Mahon, 2004), there is 
an unclaimed assertion that these are tributaries not similar to the core blackness. 
Musopole (1994) makes mention of this when he cries foul over an African 
Christianity that is not African because it has been tinged with western influences. 
He tells us indirectly of an Africanness that is not African. Pure blackness is not only 
set apart from pure whiteness (H, 15/03/2012), but also from what it is essentially 
different from – its authentic, prototypical and normative self from within (B, 
12/03/2012). Blackness is seen as a race that exists purely and as the progenitor of 
the virtues of Ubuntu or humanness (Mbigi, 1997; Teffo, 1999). Blackness that lacks 
such virtues is written off because it is a mixture of itself and whiteness.   
The title of the book “Whiteness just isn’t what it used to be: White identity in a 
changing South Africa,” by Steyn (2001), and her observation that there are multiple 
whitenesses and not just one, helps me to argue that the different whitenesses are 
held up by the core essential whiteness that holds sway. 
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Although the respondents in this chapter (E, 13/03/2012; F, 13/03/2012; G, 
14/03/2012), as those interviewed by Steyn (2001), seem to describe a whiteness 
that has evolved as the preferred, I sense from them an unclaimed assertion of a 
whiteness that has not evolved to the present societal requirements and is therefore 
not the desired whiteness. This is summed up by J’s (19/03/2012) mention of a 
traditional Afrikaans language that excludes other races. 
It is here that I liken Steyn’s work (2001) to depicting a whiteness identity that is 
evolving away from and around the core essential whiteness which is different from 
it; a whiteness that is not only distinct and mutually dissimilar from blackness, but 
also from itself. Here the peripheral white is compared to the core white that has 
evolved or seems to be evolving. Although there seems to be an implication in 
Steyn’s work (2001) that whiteness is still evolving, this also implicitly implies the 
existence of a core definitional whiteness from or towards which the new evolves. 
Just like blackness, whiteness is essentialised. It is named as not black, as what is 
not black, but also as what it is not from itself. 
3.2.1 Essentialised definitions to objective existence  
Firstly, African ontology. Far back as one may go into his past, from the 
northern Sudanese to the southern Bantu, the African has always and 
everywhere presented a concept of the world which is diametrically 
opposed to the traditional philosophy of Europe. The latter is essentially 
static, objective, dichotomic; it is in fact, dualistic, in that it makes an 
absolute distinction between body and soul, matter and spirit. It is founded 
on separation and opposition; on analysis and conflict. The African, on the 
other hand, conceives the world, beyond the diversity of its forms, as a 
fundamentally mobile, yet unique, reality that seeks synthesis. This needs 
development (Senghor, 1997, pp. 631-632). 
In describing and extolling one race for what it is, one glorifies it while demonising 
the other race which is seen as its opposite. A definition of the race rests on it being 
distinguished from the other, its opposite. The Africanness of the African and 
blackness of the black rest on the distinguished other of whiteness of the white and 
the European or West. The races are seen as essentially and objectively existing, 
and as differentially determined. Discernible criteria are used to define and set the 
races apart. Each race is quantifiably distinct and separate from the other as a 
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mutually exclusive category. A particular race is seen as a different other, as shown 
here by Senghor (1997). 
An appeal to John Mbiti’s thinking of African philosophy is the ground upon which 
many (Mbigi, 1997; Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980) base definitions of being black 
as being differently enriched instead of being differently depraved and deprived. A 
race becomes an existence reified in thought and definition. As an existential 
embodiment of quantifiable specific virtues, being African American and African can 
be distinguished from what they are not authentically (Paris, 2004). The virtues of 
forbearance, beneficence and practical wisdom inhere in the race of African and 
African American. Such virtues are deemed not applicable to being white and 
Western (Paris, 2004). Each becomes quantified and synonymous with the qualities 
that are used to define it. 
Respondents K (20/03/2012) and J (19/03/2012) made an appeal to culture, skills 
and language as quantifiable virtues that help to differentiate people and nations. 
They saw these as naturally given, and opined that racial boundaries are 
predetermined by God and not meant to be crossed. To understand blackness, its 
African spirituality and cosmological worldview of unity of humanity and nature must 
be taken into consideration (Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980; Paris, 2004; Senghor, 
1997). Ethnopsychology emphasises the reality of distinctively existing races by 
suggesting a need for psychology to be mindful of sensitivity by applying treatment 
interventions relevant to local cultures as opposed to imposing foreign and different 
philosophies on the locals (Howard, 1985). An inability and unwillingness to consider 
the objectively different races and their quantifiable constituents are argued to have 
set in the racism observed in psychology (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994) and 
physical anthropology (Baker, 2010). 
One can understand the truth in the wider call to develop a psychology that is 
distinguishable for each race, and a Christianity that is respectful of African life 
experience as Clark (1980) and Musopole (1994) suggest. It only makes sense to 
have specific psychotherapy procedures for African life conditions as opposed to 
those whose dictates are predicated on Western understanding of cure and 
treatment (Baloyi, 2008; Williams, 1981). 
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3.2.2 Natural man, natural race 
“One’s race is naturally determined” (C, 12/03/2012). “We did not choose to be black 
or white” A, 12/03/2012. “Their races defined them as such” (D, 13/03/2012). “We did 
not create ourselves” (K, 20/03/2012). 
There is no greater comfort in a definition than the assurance of quantifiable qualities 
that combine to make a particular definition. This enables the definer to verify the 
veracity of his/her definition with that of other definers, and across various situations. 
Using the yardstick of a definable paragon, in other words, a quantifiable definition, it 
should be known whether what is seen by various observers and in those varied 
situations is the prototype (Merrick, 1999). That is the comfort that is taken from 
defining the ideal Filipino girl against its non-ideal (Chapter 2), as is the unparalleled 
certainty built upon the success of scientific explanations in a naturalist way to 
account for human behaviour and existence (Kockelmans, 1994; Roy et al., 1999; 
Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). It is the acquisition of this unparalleled 
certainty that makes one unwilling to question the meanings and foundations of the 
definitions one holds (Kockelmans, 1994). 
In this particular instance, assumptions one holds about being or not being a Filipino 
girl are viewed as essentially real and translatable with a liveable Filipino or not 
Filipino life. A clear distinction of being a Filipino girl is made easy with quantifiable 
characteristics that can be observed in values such as not participating in sex prior to 
marriage and subservience to the Catholic religion (Espiritu, 2004). Rigorous training 
is suggested in the natural sciences to separate one’s subjectivity from the object of 
observation in order to objectively discern and differentiate what is real from what is 
not real (Spinelli, 1989, 2005). 
Naturalism and the naturalist attitude derive pride from the allure of an ability to have 
access to testifiable objective information about reality, founded on verifiability and 
reliability (Spinelli, 1989, 2005). When subjectivity is considered a hindrance to what 
counts as knowledge, it is retorted that “we can speak with certainty about the true or 
objective nature of reality” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 132).  
Naturalists argue for the objective reality of the world and the things in it whose 
existence is independent of and separate from peoples’ awareness of them (Spinelli, 
 67 
 
1989). They inspire those who espouse this through considering our existence and 
that of the things around us as governed by natural laws that are external to us 
(Kruger, 1988). They encourage a distant attitude towards life and the world, an 
uncritical attitude dictating that life be lived naively and as pre-given. This leads to us 
turning our lives into pure objectified existence, whose solidified nature is 
unperturbed and uninfluenced by those who live it, to a reification of our thoughts 
about the world outside of our experience (Davis, 2005). It is as a result of the 
adoption of a naturalist attitude (Kockelmans, 1994; Kruger, 1988; Natanson, 1969; 
Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983) that humanity and race are seen as 
naturally existing. The same attitude would make one view humanity’s existence, 
race and other forms of identity and identification as variables of objective existence 
with measurable quantities. 
Just as laboratory experiments are relied upon to yield information of an objectively 
known reality (Kruger, 1988) so ethnopsychology’s cultural sensitivity for the locals 
(Howard, 1985) offers an assurance of a culturally relevant, race-specific description, 
as does behaviourism’s reduction of human functioning to physically observable 
characteristics that are subjected to the laws of quantification (Spinelli, 1989, 2005; 
Wagner, 1983). 
In their naturally existing form, people and race are reducible to describable qualities 
not only as separately black and white, but also as separately authentic or 
inauthentic, prototypical or non-prototypical, and normative or non-normative black, 
and separately authentic or inauthentic, prototypical or non-prototypical and 
normative or non-normative white. 
To know objectively is to know presumably. What we purport to know becomes not 
only predefined, but also confined and constrained within its predefined knowledge 
territory. Belonging to races, in other words, whiteness and blackness, is robotically 
given and never doubted or questioned except for when it is seen to deviate from its 
predefined ideals. Even when the inauthentic, non-prototypical and non-normative 
other is acknowledged, it is because of the discomforting deviance that it brings 
against the authenticity, prototypicality and normativity of the race. It is 
acknowledged as not preferred, as another that is there but should not be there in 
pursuance of the race ideal. Naturally given and defined races can only breed reified 
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thoughts, stereotypes of what and how it is to be white and black, and of what and 
how it is not to be white and black. 
3.3 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESPONSE 
Based on the above, a phenomenological perspective is suggested as a response to 
a naturalist attitude and thought. This section is dedicated to discussing its history 
and the main elements of it as a preferred philosophical discipline in this thesis.   
3.3.1  Origin of phenomenology 
Whereas naturalism and the naturalist attitude hold objectivity as the sole route to 
facts about reality existing outside of human experience and existence, 
phenomenology argues that “we can never know the real world” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 
132). 
Its origin is credited to the thinking of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who is 
considered as its founding father by several authors (Converse, 2012; Earle, 2010; 
Gergel, 2012; Kim, 2012). He is said to have pioneered the origin of a 
phenomenological science that is not loyal to traditional and cultural ways of knowing 
and thinking, calling for unlearning and abandoning the natural habits of knowing 
about humanity and its existence in the world (Kockelmans, 1994; Spiegelberg, 
1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). 
Husserl is seen to have championed a war against all naturalist thoughts that fail to 
account for people’s propensity and ability to be cognisant creatures, for a science 
that accounts for human experience in the consciousness of people themselves 
(Davis, 2005; Kockelmans, 1994; Roy et al., 1999). He saw the need for a science 
that accounts for the thinking person in the study of human thinking, a science that is 
concerned with what happens inside of human consciousness and not merely with 
concrete objects themselves (Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Wagner, 1983). 
As questioning scientism and the biological model of medicine which view and 
reduce an individual to a classificatory category of a definition of an illness (Gergel, 
2012), Simonsen (2013, p. 23) introduces phenomenology’s critique of the naturalist 
attitude of distance and splitting of the mind and body through surmising Merleau-
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Ponty’s (Earle, 2010; Thomas, 2005) idea by saying that, “it was insufficient to 
describe the world’s general structure without also attending to the way they are 
experienced from within.” 
Laverty (2003) laments psychology’s application of natural science methods which 
lead to an ignorance to the fact that it deals with living subjects who have a capacity 
to constitute and be constituted by their living environments that do not solely 
determine their destiny without them making sense of and impacting it. Tuohy et al. 
(2012) view the naturalist attitude as leading to a submission to presuppositions 
about the world and a resistance to wondering about or questioning them, thereby 
causing people to take the world for granted as objectively and naturally existing. 
For Converse (2012), the naturalist attitude impedes us from acknowledging that 
what is considered objective reality is actually a phenomenal reality and a shadow or 
representation of a phenomenon. The physical, objective and material are 
phenomenal (Kim, 2012), and their naturalness needs to be interrogated (Murray, 
2012) as there is no real and objective existence outside of the subjective human 
mind (Dowling & Cooney, 2012). 
Naturalism and the naturalist attitude are lamented for stifling and stunting the 
search for meaning in the world. Their yearning to belong to an empirical science 
and to be subservient to reductionism (Zaner, 1970) are seen to have limited what 
counts as knowledge to that which is quantifiable, verifiable, testable and objectively 
observable, and therefore governed by natural laws. They are lamented for having 
brought naivety in the search for meaning by having stopped wondering and being 
astonished to being merely satisfied with what is captured in appearance.  
With true objective reality unknowable, Greenfield and Jensen (2012) say that what 
we can be sure of is our own subjective interpretation of the purported reality, and 
not its objective existence separate from our subjective perception and constitution 
of it. The inability to unreflectively know reality disengaged, leads them to doubt the 
objective existence of this reality.   
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3.3.2  Definition of phenomenology 
“An interpretive, qualitative form of research that seeks to study phenomena that are 
perceived or experienced,” phenomenology “offers a means by which to identify the 
essence of the experience” (Flood, 2010, p. 13). As a radical and anti-traditional 
philosophy, Edmund Husserl wished to see it elevating philosophy to the status of a 
rigorous science (Earle, 2010) by a focus on human experience in pure 
consciousness, which he termed returning to “the things themselves” (Earle, 2010; 
Kim, 2012). It is a philosophy and research method about intimate and subjectively 
lived experiences, helping to make explicit their structures that lie implicit, taken for 
granted and ignored (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Murray, 2012).   
3.3.3  Intentionality, phenomenon and consciousness 
Quoting Merleau-Ponty, Simonsen (2013 p. 16) says that “the body is not merely ‘in 
space’ or ‘in time’, but inhabits space and time: each living body is space and has its 
space: it produces itself in space and it also produces this space.” 
People are meaning-making creatures who consciously interact with their 
environment by constituting and interpreting their experiences of it (Greenfield & 
Jensen, 2012), rather than passively reacting to its external stimuli (Laverty, 2003). 
Their environment is a living environment with meaning given to it and interpreted by 
the individual (Dybicz, 2013), intricately linking the person (subject) and the 
surrounding world (object) (Dowling & Cooney, 2012). This view about humanity, 
which differs from that adopted in the naturalist attitude, is made clear by looking at 
the following concepts: 
Consciousness: Husserl defines consciousness as the constellation and flow of 
ideas, wishes, dreams, memories, feelings, etc., in a person’s mind (Greenfield & 
Jensen, 2012).  
Intentionality: Greenfield and Jensen (2012, p. 419) define intentionality as “the 
process through which an individual’s consciousness is directed to a vast array of 
objects (surroundings) that constitute his or her reality.” It is the mind’s directed act 
at the world around us. It is the flow of ideas, wishes, etc., about the world. 
Consciousness never exists on its own, but is always about something. A dialogue 
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between the person (subject) and the world (object) (Flood, 2010; Laverty, 2003; 
Tuohy et al., 2012), consciousness is always oriented or intended towards 
something else (the world) (Simonsen, 2013). Its thoughts or memories are 
conscious thoughts or memories about an object (Converse, 2012; Dowling & 
Cooney, 2012). 
Phenomenon: A phenomenon is defined as what takes place in a person’s 
consciousness rather than the objective reality (Converse, 2012; Earle, 2010). The 
lived experience, in acknowledgement that the world can only be known through 
people’s mental representation of it, and that the former exists nowhere outside of a 
human mind (Dowling & Cooney, 2012), must have been the bedrock of Edmund 
Husserl’s “back to the things themselves” dictum that puts emphasis on capturing 
whatever appears in a person’s consciousness, in whatever form. 
The only reality that we know is how we experience and interpret a phenomenon, an 
interpretation that is itself subject to a multiplicity of interpretations. We no longer 
have a reality that exists out there waiting for us to know it without that knowing 
being tempered with by our subjectivity, thereby transforming that which we seek to 
know (Jacobsen, 2007). We are left with an objective reality put in parenthesis. It is 
as a result of phenomenological doubt that the thinly drawn line between the object 
and subject of knowledge entangles the two (Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 
1974). Our attempts to know, hence our interpretations, become approximations of 
the reality to which naturalism and the naturalist attitude assign objective existence, 
however tenuous, unknown and unknowable to us (Jacobsen, 2007; Spinelli, 1989, 
2005).  
3.3.4 Aims of phenomenology 
Hinged on Sartre’s observation that “ultimate reality is both unknowable, and 
‘uncapturable’ in any essentialist sense” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 117), phenomenology 
lays it as its purpose “illuminating and disclosing the meaning structures of lived 
experiences” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 131), with the phenomenon structure consisting of 
detailed whatness and howness of that experience (Spinelli, 1989, 2005). It seeks to 
return humanity to the basic task of traditional philosophy as a critical science 
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(Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 
1974). 
With the focus being on an individual’s internal perception rather than categorising 
definitions that depend on objective quantification of measurement to describe being 
and its nature (Gergel, 2012), it seeks to tap into the core essence of intentional 
experience in consciousness and interpretations as lived (Flood, 2010; McDonald & 
Dickerson, 2013). Prioritising subjective meaning, understanding and the internal 
view of reality, the phenomenal nature of reality as opposed to the objective 
definition that portrays it as external to the person (Earle, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 
2012; Murray, 2012), it seeks to describe pure internal experience by unravelling 
“what is this every day experience like? what is its meaning? how is it experienced 
by the individual?” (Shamsaei et al., 2013, p. 189).    
Cognitive science is seen to be clouded by a naturalist attitude that disregards 
phenomenological data for biased attention towards observable behavioural data 
(Roy et al., 1999). Phenomenology is an intensely interested inquiry of the mystery 
of human experience and its attendant meanings, equally curious about how the 
inquirer knows as it is about how those inquired upon structure their knowing. It is a 
different kind of knowing that concerns itself with what happens inside 
consciousness, in people’s awareness of their experience and less with the external 
world outside of people’s conscious experience (Wagner, 1983). Until this is 
acknowledged, it is cautioned that we will remain trapped in seeing people as mere 
objects and types rather than as individuals with unique life circumstances that they 
constantly work towards making meaning of (Jacobsen, 2007; Wagner, 1983). 
Not to treat people as incapable of transcending themselves and their lives (Wagner, 
1983), phenomenology encourages us to seek an investigation of the phenomenon 
of human experience as described in consciousness (Natanson, 1969; Stewart & 
Mickunas, 1974). Being asked to listen and ask carefully in order to be able to 
describe, we are reminded to eschew the flaws of separatist explanations that only 
serve to not reveal their self-fulfilling assumptions. 
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3.3.4.1 Philosophical wonder and phenomenological reduction     
The fact that the explanations we make are coloured with self-fulfilling assumptions 
challenges the notion that our experiences of the world are necessarily pre-given 
and obviously existing (Kockelmans, 1994). Concerned with what happens in 
consciousness and less with the objective world as it is, phenomenology is premised 
on unlearning and abandoning the ordinary way of knowing as prescribed by the 
naturalist attitude (Wagner, 1983).  
It does not argue that there is no physical world, that there are no “objective races of 
black and white.” It does, however, raise the point that these do not immanently exist 
independent of those who define them (Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; 
Wagner, 1983). It points at how these are subjectively defined and how their defined 
natures form and perpetuate prejudice. Phenomenology informs us of how race 
definitions lay strict parameters of what it is to be, what it is not to be, what makes up 
the authentic, normative and prototypical race, and what makes up the inauthentic, 
non-normative and non-prototypical race, while declaring the territorial boundaries. 
To rid itself of naturalist naivety, phenomenology is founded on a philosophical 
wonder and reduction of the very reality we purport to know (Natanson, 1969; 
Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). It is inspired by what are seen as the 
misgivings of naturalism and what the naturalist attitude failed to offer. It challenges 
the view that holds that racial identity and identification (blackness or whiteness) are 
a normal, natural and expected way of life never to be questioned and supposed to 
be highly cherished while taken for granted (Roy et al., 1999; Spiegelberg, 1965; 
Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). 
Phenomenology alerts us to avert this scenario by being informed by a philosophical 
attitude. People are seen as philosophical when they begin to inquire about their 
existence in and amid their life circumstances, when they are driven by an insatiable 
curiosity for knowledge and wisdom, making them wonder about their knowledge 
about life and the objective world, and its source (Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 
1969; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), an attribute of which 
naturalism and the naturalist attitude have robbed them. 
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Just as those who uphold the naturalist attitude feel no need to question the 
meanings of black, white, blackness and whiteness (Kockelmans, 1994), growing up 
with assumptions of oneself surrounded by heathens not to be greeted with a 
handshake can make one live one’s life robotically, invented from the outside as a 
pure natural existence. 
Phenomenology carries its task by temporarily suspending its own and all 
suppositions about the world, bracketing any prior knowledge of it. All knowledge of 
what it is to be black or white, what it is not to be black and what it is not to be white 
shall be bracketed in the epoch, put into phenomenological doubt as their definitions 
are deemed to be loaded in prior knowledge of suppositions (Kockelmans, 1994; 
Natanson, 1969; Sokolowski, 2000; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). 
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CHAPTER 4 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
4.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW 
In this chapter, I extend the discussion of phenomenology as a counter to the 
naturalist attitude by considering ways in which it could draw on critical race theory. 
Critical race theory runs parallel to phenomenology in that it eschews the kind of 
naturalist thinking that depends on the idea of objectively fixed racial categories. 
Racism, as seen from a critical race theory perspective, is perpetuated by various 
interrelated fallacies, such as the legalistic fallacy,  individualistic fallacy, tokenistic 
fallacy, and historical fallacy – each of which  is an attempt to wish away the fact that 
racial prejudice remains tenaciously embedded in modern societies.  
Critical race theory had its beginnings in the United States in the 1970s, a context in 
which racial discrimination had ostensibly been eliminated, but in practice continued 
unabated in the form of myriad ‘micro-aggressions’ visited on people in their daily 
lives. Critical race theory can, in its emphasis on the inhabited, intentional nature of 
racial experience, be seen as broadly phenomenological in orientation, even as it 
draws attention to the larger structural injustices within which these day-to-day 
enactments of race occur. 
Race and racism flow not only from explicitly formulated legal and social categories, 
but from how people inhabit a racialised world, for example by championing ‘colour 
blindness’ in an attempt to make the problem of race dissappear and thus slipping 
into the comfort zone of ‘dysconscious racism’. 
These types of  mechanisms, used to stratify society along racial lines precisely by 
claiming to have transcended race, can be easily recognised in political fantasies 
such as the ‘American dream’ or South Africa’s ‘rainbow nation’, but they work as 
effectively in many other contexts – the ‘mixed race’ societies of South America, 
Japanese Wajin racial identity, or the complexities of India’s caste system. I review 
these and other manifestations of ‘non-racial racism’ in the chapter, and demonstrate 
how critical race theory shifts from the naturalness of race to focus instead on its 
social nature and on the political and economic purposes it serves. 
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Critical race theory links with phenomenology not only in valorising the subjective 
experiences of people, but also in helping to bring same-race prejudice into visibility. 
Critical race theory denaturalises race and other forms of identity and identification 
by revealing their socially constituted and phenomenally experienced nature, in the 
process revealing the subtle contours of oppression that run not only between races, 
but also among those who are nominally of the same race – what it entails, for 
example, to be a Chilean who is considered to have a dark skin, or a white South 
African who is considered to be poor. 
One framework for making sense of this type of multiply fractured and refracted 
oppression is that of intersectionality theory, which I review in the chapter as, in 
some ways, a further extension of critical race theory. I present some examples of 
how intersectionality can help us understand the lived realities of actual individuals, 
such as Bessie Head, who found herself to be not black enough, white enough or 
male enough to continue living in the land of her birth. I conclude the chapter with an 
assessment of critical race theory as providing a rich heritage of many decades of 
debate and analysis on race, racism and prejudice, a heritage which is not 
incompatible with, and could be used to inform, a phenomenological approach. 
The chapter extends the argument made in Chapter 3 by phenomenological 
philosophy about the naturalist attitude’s pitfalls regarding race, racial identity and 
identification with an introduction of critical race theory.  
The chapter looks at the theory’s critique of the naturalist attitude’s concept of 
unquestionable essentialist and taken-for-granted racial identities and identification 
symbols as they cause and sustain the following: 
1. Racialisation – a belief in and grouping of people into separate and distinct 
racial categories whose differentness is judged to be real (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; 
Paradies, 2006). 
2. Racism – a belief that human behaviour, traits and characteristics are 
naturally fixed and biologically determined, and that they can be passed on 
from one generation to the other within a particular racial category, resulting in 
a hierarchical ordering of people whereby others are subordinated based on 
their believed naturally determined inferiority (Bakke, 2010; Belknap, 1990). 
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3. Racial profiling – the social stratification and ranking of people into positions 
of acceptability/unacceptability, authenticity/inauthenticity and prototypicality/ 
non-prototypicality, whereby those considered non-conforming to normative 
standards of authenticity and prototypicality are called aliens or the “other” 
(Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Romero, 2008). 
The chapter borrows critical race theory’s critique against the persistent 
intransigence of habits of naturalisation amidst advanced human rights legal reform 
and pronouncements (Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; 
Ortiz & Jani, 2010) to show how these contribute to the essentialist definition of race, 
racial identity and identification in a manner that causes intolerance and prejudice of 
the different within the races, contributing to the accentuation of notions of 
authenticity, normativity and prototypicality, while those non-confirming to these 
ideals are othered within the races. 
Using critical race theory, the chapter asks and seeks to respond to the following 
questions:  
• Who gets to define a particular race and racial identity?  
• Who is included in a particular racial identity?  
• Who is excluded by the racial identity?  
• What are the consequences of race, racial identity and identification in the lives 
of people?  
• Who benefits from upholding ideals of pure, normative, authentic and 
prototypical races and racial identities?  
• Who is being disadvantaged by these?  
• What human rights violations and injustices do the naturalist attitude’s concepts 
of race, racial identity and identification mask? 
Answering the inquiry about poor scholastic performance among black American 
children, Howitt and Owusu-Bempah (1994, p. 6) reflects on the American 
educational psychologist Arthur Jensen, who asked, “how much can we boost IQ 
and scholastic achievement?” and further said that “the problem lay in the inferiority 
of black genes which could not be dealt with by throwing money into their education.” 
This reflects the problem of naturalist thinking and its consequences, depicted by 
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Desmond and Emirbayer (2013) as the suppression of alternative ways of thinking. It 
discourages further inquiry and doubt about custom, and instils conformity to the 
usual while intolerance becomes the norm for how the unfamiliar is treated. The  
inflexible knowledge base of naturalist thinking about the world becomes 
impenetrable to further scrutiny, making everything else awkward (Desmond & 
Emirbayer, 2013). 
Critical race theory offers a respite to the usual ways of conceptualising the world. It 
evokes critical sensitivity towards conformity about the monolithic definitions of race 
and other concepts of identity (Cappiccie, Chadha, Lin & Snyder, 2012; Schieble, 
2012). It helps to expose the prejudice that comes from intolerance of the unfamiliar 
and the alternatives that defy popular knowledge with its esteemed criteria of general 
acceptance. It revokes the un-negotiated racial definitions informed by a naturalist 
attitude of distance and objectivity.  
Using the focal point of same-race prejudice, the tenets of critical race theory, 
positioned as equally echoed by phenomenological philosophy, are discussed to 
understand the discriminating consequences of race definitions and actions on 
people’ lives within their races. These are a challenge to ideology, sensitivity to 
people’s subjectivity, intersectionality and the social construction of race. The factors 
that prompted the origin of critical race theory are also discussed. This is done in a 
way that draws the theory’s main argument as a parallel to a phenomenological 
philosophy (discussed in Chapter 3). The convergence of the two is made to dispel 
the general myth of naturally existing categories of racial identity and identification, 
and to reposition the consequences of a race definition as resulting in prejudice of 
sameness and difference within itself. 
4.2 DEFINITION OF RACISM 
Racialisation is a process of not only dividing, but also judging, oneself and others as 
belonging to separate racial categories (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; Paradies, 2006). People 
do this often and with ease, as shown by Howitt and Owusu-Bempah’s (1994) 
quotation of Arthur Jensen in the previous section, as well as in the discussions 
about the descriptions of the black and white races in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
This happens against retorts that ask for people to get over racial identification 
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(Peters, 2012; Potter et al., 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). As a result of its 
judgemental attitude, racialisation becomes a precursor to one of race's pernicious 
prejudices, racism (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; Paradies, 2006). 
Emanating from an ideology that views race as biologically determined with innate 
human characteristics, traits and abilities whose fixed nature can be bequeathed 
from one generation to the other within a particular racial category (Bakke, 2010), 
racism is considered to be a heart-wrenching prejudice of power leading to the 
hierarchical subordination of other groups because of their assumed or obvious 
differentness (Bakke, 2010; Belknap, 1990). It is a form of prejudice towards others 
based on preconceived opinions held about them and their defined racial category 
membership (Hoyt, 2012). It instils a desire to dominate them and a refusal to 
consider them as equals, while supporting institutional arrangements upholding 
stratification that puts them in a hierarchically subordinate position based on their 
racial difference (Hardie & Tyson, 2013; Headley, 2000). As a system of 
disadvantage and exploitation of those who are subordinated (Bryan, 2012), it leads 
to a denial of human rights and needs, and an unequal allocation of services 
(Kyriakides, 2008). Intended to dominate others and assign them to lower strata in 
society (Bakke, 2010), the beliefs and attitudes of racism lead to acts of exclusion 
and discrimination against the other, who are considered inferior according to their 
assumed or obvious biologically determined racial category (Ben-Eliezer, 2008). 
For Desmond and Emirbayer (2013), racism is assisted by fallacies that not only 
sustain racial inequalities but also refuse to acknowledge its far-reaching impact on 
people’s lives. These fallacies, which are embedded in society’ structures, are 
discussed below. 
4.2.1 Legalistic fallacy 
The legalistic fallacy rests on an assumption that the abolishment of race 
discrimination laws and their replacement by democratic legal principles 
automatically bring equality to the lives of individuals and their groups. This is 
contrary to and overlooks the significance of unchecked widespread covert and 
inadvertent racial profiling and stratification in people’ daily lives (Arudou, 2013; 
Barandiarán, 2012; Möschel, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011). 
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4.2.2 Individualistic fallacy 
Refusing to acknowledge the embeddedness of inequality in society’s structures, the 
individualistic fallacy leads to assumptions that racial discrimination is an affliction of 
character aberration located in sick personalities (Möschel, 2011). It leads to a 
refusal to take a systematic and collective effort to eradicate intolerance and 
inequality. 
4.2.3 Tokenistic fallacy 
When a few individuals work hard and surpass the untold obstacles that discourage 
majority of their fellow marginalised group members, the result of their effort is 
mistaken for an indication that racial equality exists. As post-apartheid South Africa 
has had presidents from the previously oppressed black racial group, a cursory 
assumption can be made that the country has reached racial equality. 
4.2.4 Historical fallacy 
For societies that pride themselves on basing progress and success on merit and 
effort, the experiences of whose quality of life is determined by race is made 
insignificant and silenced. They are convinced to see their failing quality of life as a 
result of their lack of effort, not as related to a history of racial inequality. They are 
exhorted to see racial inequality as irrelevant to their contemporary predicament. 
Expressions that assume that society is past racial stratification do not embody the 
daily frustrations that individuals face. Linked with individualistic fallacy, these cause 
people to believe that the hindrances they face in life are due to their lack of 
motivation. Under this, programmes that are meant to redress previous racial 
imbalance, such as affirmative action, are seen as causing more racial rifts and 
therefore as unnecessary. People are enjoined to swiftly move over from being 
preoccupied with divisive racial labels (Peters, 2012; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). 
4.2.5 Fixed fallacy 
Racial inequality can only be understood by the oppressed, through their own 
subjective experiences, and not by the use of general official criteria that tend to 
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quantify it. For those who are oppressed, what is important is being faced with an 
unrelenting reality of inequality, not whether the inequality is greater or lesser. 
4.3 RACIAL PROFILING AND PREJUDICE 
Acknowledging the intention to dominate and ill-treat those racially classified as 
different, Kevin Johnson’s comment reflects this sentiment (as quoted by Ortiz & 
Jani, 2010, p. 178 and by Romero, 2008, p. 28) by stating that: 
fabricated out of whole cloth, the “alien” represents a body of rules passed 
by Congress and reinforced by popular culture. It is society, with the 
assistance of the law, that defines who is an “alien”, an institutionalized 
“other”, and who is not. It is society, through Congress and the courts, that 
determines which rights to afford “aliens”…. Like the social construction of 
race, which helps to legitimize racial subordination, the construction of the 
“alien” has helped justify the limitation of non-citizen rights imposed by our 
legal system. 
Scripted into law to assist the policing of essentialised human bodies, racial 
differentiation is practised through authenticity screening of people for inclusion in 
and exclusion from a particular society. With the body used as a certification 
commodity, racialisation, as a body scrutiny mechanism, serves to sustain the 
restriction of people’s freedoms while it accords privilege and power to others. It 
serves to prescribe who benefits from what and to dictate who does not.  
The law renders the demeaning treatment meted out to those profiled as racially 
different justifiable. The regular stop-and-search procedures that ensure the 
capturing of foreign nationals find support in local law prescripts of population control 
(Matsinhe, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Romero, 2008). All this is against an 
observation of Winant (as quoted by Comeaux, 2010, p. 394), that: 
race is not only real, but also illusory. Not only is it common sense; it is 
also common nonsense. Not only does it establish identity; it also denies 
us our identity. Not only does it allocate resources, power, privilege; it also 
provides means for challenging that allocation. Race not only naturalizes, 
but also socializes. 
It is against this background of malleable and unstable racial identities that critical 
race theory took root.  
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4.4 ORIGIN OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
Freeman (2011) recounts developments in American society from the 1970s which 
are marked by an uneven increase in school segregation against black people, a 
growing rate of black incarceration in tandem with an increased effort in the war 
against drugs, and widening income inequality between black people and white 
people. These and other developments ignited a sense of awareness about how 
race and racism continue to pervade and entrench themselves within every aspect of 
the American society (Bush & Bush, 2013). 
Critical race theory emerged between the 1970s and 1980s as a critique of persisting 
racism and oppression in America. An activist upshot of unity between legal and 
feminist studies (Brown, 2008), critical race theory drew its impetus from the slow 
pace and lack of far-reaching civil rights progress, which were seen to cause the 
subordination of people on the basis of aspects such as race, religion, ability, gender 
and health (Cappiccie et al., 2012). This was assisted by the lacklustre liberal 
approach in the legal system with its race and racism ideologies of purported 
neutrality and objectivity that were written in a way which favoured white society and 
its interests (Comeaux, 2010; Möschel, 2011; Powers, 2007; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). 
Its aim was to analyse and challenge the racialised power relations in the society, as 
they lead to inequality and subordination, supported by law (Arudou, 2013), and to 
highlight how post-civil rights achievements are dwarfed by the entrenched 
marginalisation of people according to race (Odartey-Wellington, 2011). Embodied in 
the society’s democratic laws and sustained by its colour-blind ideologies, prejudice 
against people based on their racial identities manifests mainly through practices, 
called micro-aggressions, that are less obvious and therefore resistant to 
modification and challenge (Cappiccie et al., 2012; Closson, 2010; Kohli, 2012; Ortiz 
& Jani, 2010).  
Micro-aggressions are covert transgressions against people’s dignity that undermine 
their human rights based on their different identity. These may be exemplified by a 
continuing dwindling enrolment of black people at particular institutions of learning, 
whose cause appears to be racial motivation, yet cannot be so justified because 
exclusion of people on the basis of race is not permissible by law in a democratic 
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society. Their unofficial and covert nature makes them immune and resistant to 
intentional notice and eradication by state institutions. 
4.5  CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND PHENOMENOLOGY  
This section looks at the assumptions that underpin critical race theory and from 
which its convergence with phenomenology is seen. 
Murray (2012) critiques crisis rescue operations within biomedicine whose premise 
rests on a human being as a physiological entity which is externally attacked and 
thus requires external assistance. He sees such efforts as giving little consideration 
to the human element of agency, reducing the person to a soulless existence. 
Guided by its strict adherence to a procedural repertoire of extricating an injured 
body from danger, Simonsen (2013) uses Merleau-Ponty’s thinking to see such crisis 
intervention efforts as failing to appreciate the body as able to speak, be spoken 
about, feel and be felt. They are efforts directed at rescuing endangered and trapped 
bodies, not individuals in endangering and entrapping lived circumstances. 
Simonsen (2013) and Gergel (2012) offer an answer to this critique in the form of 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of a human being as having the capacity to inhabit his/her 
space and time, rather than merely existing physiologically, as imbued with a 
capacity to phenomenally exist, and as having an appreciation of his/her attacked 
body as a lived body experience. This reiterates phenomenology’s notions of human 
consciousness and intentionality, to a person’s performative and experiential 
capacity. It not only reawakens its stance of human subjectivity, but also emphasises 
the disquiet with general labels we use to define ourselves and others (Greenfield & 
Jensen, 2012).  
As an ontological discipline, phenomenology (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Dybicz, 
2013; Earle, 2010) converges with critical race theory through its concepts by 
disavowing the tendency to equate people to mere racial and ethnic labels and 
codes. They both cross over to the human being inhabiting the labels as experiential 
phenomena, from their general differential appeal. They move to the unique 
experiential interpretations of the human being behind the labels. Critical race theory 
embraces the view of preferring individual experience of race labels over their 
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general inherent appeal independent of human subjectivity by advancing the 
concepts discussed below.  
4.5.1  Challenge to colour-blindness 
Based on equality and oneness of the nation (Möschel, 2011), colour-blindness is 
the ideology of a belief in everyone having an equal chance to compete and succeed 
as determined by the effort, ability and merit of their actions, and not the colour of 
their skin (Closson, 2010; Comeaux, 2010; Neville, Poteat, Lewis & Spanierman, 
2014). Colour-blindness views failure to achieve equal status as a result of a 
person’s lack of motivation and effort in a society that has evened its playing field 
(Riley & Ettlinger, 2011; Sonn & Quayle, 2013).  
Anderson’s (2012) discussion of multicultural school environments as an example of 
the progress made by post-apartheid South Africa to afford its people equal access 
to opportunities in, for example, employment and sport, allows people like Peters 
(2012) to assert that talking about race is no longer necessary as it is divisive (Riley 
& Ettlinger, 2011). However, Neville et al. (2014) and Riley and Ettlinger (2011) pour 
scorn over such adventures for leading to acquiescence with pre-existing structures 
of domination and subordination and the masked inequalities that they encourage. 
Colour-blindness and its belief in the objective assessment and recognition of 
individual effort is seen as leading to the erasure of race from discourses of 
inequality, while allowing racism to continue unnoticed and unchallenged (Neville et 
al., 2014; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Powers, 2007; Sonn & Quayle, 2013). It is seen 
as the cause of what King (as quoted by Comeaux, 2010, p. 395) calls 
“dysconscious racism”, which he defines as the mental attitude of uncritically 
accepting things as naturally given, resulting in a tendency to support and appreciate 
inequality and oppression as the natural order of life, for example the hierarchical 
organisation of society in India into castes that determine the allocation of 
differential, power, roles and status to individuals (Sabir, 2003).   
With phenomenology encouraging a resistance against the naturalist attitude and 
habit of taking for granted that the world has a natural and objective existence 
independent of people, who have the capacity to constitute it, critical race theory 
critiques the reality of naturally governed laws of social organisation. It looks at the 
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ideologies that embody the myth of colour-blind equality, meritocracy, objectivity and 
neutrality as bandied around in the notions of South Africa’s rainbow nation and the 
American dream rhetoric. It explores the myth of objectivity in hiring people in what 
appear to be equalised opportunities to show how these are socially arranged to 
inequitably benefit certain sections of society (Hawkesworth, 2010). 
Colour-blindness not only justifies, but also sustains racial inequality through a 
refusal to recognise and acknowledge its existence and salience, leaving it 
untouched and uncriticised (Comeaux, 2010; Neville et al., 2014; Odartey-
Wellington, 2011; Riley & Ettlinger, 2010; Sonn & Quayle, 2013). Through it, white 
hegemony and dominance are perpetuated over black marginalisation and 
subordination in retorts of pursuing the nation’s dream that has transcended race 
and its labels (Anderson, 2012). It constitutes an uncritical subservience to 
suppressive ideologies that masquerade as the nation’s laws upheld in nature for the 
nation’s interest (Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). 
What Lee and Rice (2007) see as the intractable and mutating nature of racism 
echoes with King’s (Comeaux, 2010) dysconscious racism whose covert and 
contemporary nature of neutrality belies the sectional interests it serves (Brown, 
2008; Hawkesworth, 2010; Powers, 2007; Schieble, 2012).  
4.5.2  Socially constructed race 
“A social construction without inherent physiological or biological meaning” (Arudou, 
2013, p. 156), race is a tenuous and diffuse identifier of people and groups, 
amenable to distortion and manipulation, whose definitions are legally defended 
(Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). 
Critical race theorists believe that racism, intolerance and other kinds of prejudice 
against differently categorised others are a normal component of both pre- and post-
civil rights strife societies. They are mechanisms employed by societies for their daily 
functioning. Critiquing the individual fallacy, critical race theorists insist that they can 
be better understood, not as an individual aberration displayed by and located in sick 
individual personalities, but as deeply entrenched within societies’ structure and 
institutions (Bush & Bush, 2013; Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011; Möschel, 2011; 
Odartey-Wellington, 2011). An example of this is shown by Barandiarán (2012) in 
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dispelling the myth of a racially homogeneous Chilean society. The myth masks how 
Chilean access to wealth, power, education and conditions of association are 
determined by race, with custom determining that those with a brighter phenotype 
are most privileged at all times. Societies, through people’s actions, invent and 
manipulate race through laws that “frame, codify, and legitimise how people will be 
treated” (Arudou, 2013, p. 157), for purposes of hierarchical organisation into 
positions of unequal allocation of power and resources. They use race to decide who 
is a member and who is not. 
Racial definitions, which are unstable identity organising concepts, are made 
according to contested criteria that change relative to time and place, between and 
within societies. They are a concept of identity messages relayed and sustained in 
systems of social stratification determining the unequal distribution of resources 
(material and symbolic), status and privileges, where some people and groups get 
more at the expense of others (Ferguson, 2013; Weber, 2013).  
The experience in Latin America of mixed black and white identity, where individuals 
re-draw their racial boundaries as being white while resisting being classified as 
black (Forman et al., 2002), indicates the contestation of identity by phenotype and 
ancestry. Using the same criteria differently, American civil rights proponents used 
phenotype (physical features) and affinity to certain ancestry (history and lineage) as 
identity markers to instil black identity and pride in the black population (Shiao et al., 
2004) while, for some, the same criteria were used in apartheid South Africa to deny 
them access to life amenities from both black and white quarters equally (Higgs & 
Evans, 2008; Pucherova, 2011).   
Socially invented racial identities become mechanisms through which practising 
prejudice is officially justifiable as objective criteria for the unequal access to power 
and resources, and as natural markers of differentiation between people. In Japan, 
this is further entrenched through law that legitimises the definition of a Japanese 
Wajin racial identity, and the rights and privileges that must accrue to those of the 
identity, while authorising keeping those defined outside the Wajin identity in strict 
and constant surveillance to determine the authentic national Japanese identity 
(Arudou, 2013).  
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The deportation and refusal of access of Suaad Hagi Mohamud into her official 
country, Canada, was legally defendable and coded in fear of terrorism, while its 
motive was adjudged to be racial prejudice (Odartey-Wellington, 2011), as are the 
search and deportation of African foreign nationals in South Africa and the border 
patrols of illegal aliens in the US that are based on population control policy 
(Matsinhe, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010). The law and other structures of society, 
masking suspicion of the other, are used to perpetuate racial inequality, domination 
and prejudice according to race and other identity markers, and to deny the other 
authenticity for belonging, while serving the interests of those in power and 
entrenching the status quo.  
Racial moment (Spickard, 2005) or racialisation (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; Paradies, 2006), 
both defined as the process of seeing ourselves and others as differentiated by racial 
criteria which make us fundamentally mutually exclusive and dissimilar, hinges on a 
fallacy that assumes race as biologically and naturally fixed (Desmond & Emirbayer, 
2013; Weber, 2013). India’s caste system differentiates the Dalits as those of the 
lower rank, made to perform demeaning duties and looked down upon by the rest of 
the society (Sabir, 2003). Racial prejudice is assisted by an adherence to a colour-
blind ideology whose tenets and fallacies shield the practice of disadvantage to 
which others are subjected and by making people believe in a description of racism 
in the overtly rough way only, while ignoring its persistence in subtle forms, its micro-
aggressions (Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011). 
From the furore over Brett Murray’s painting of Zuma (see Chapter 1) emerged 
contrasting descriptions of blackness and whiteness with their respective proponents 
defending their views, with Brett Murray and the Goodman Gallery seen as 
representing white people while their objectors represented black people. Regarding 
this, Mmila (2012, p. 2) commented that “neither the Goodman Gallery nor Jacob 
Zuma can generally claim to represent all whites and blacks respectively.” This 
should be considered out of an inquiry that seeks to find out: who lays claim to 
represent blackness or whiteness, with what consequences?  
Shifting from the naturalness of race, critical race theory focuses on its social nature. 
It looks at the political and economic purposes served through the socially supported 
practices. It inquires about the arrived-at evidence that is used to describe and 
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differentiate us from them, and the hidden beliefs served by this (Hawkesworth, 
2010). It challenges people’s common-sense and normative descriptions to expose 
racial identification as a mechanism of hierarchical ordering of people into positions 
of domination and subordination, as serving the purpose of unequal power and 
resource allocation.  
Race is a socially manipulated factor used to determine who is a member and who is 
not, who gets what and who does not (Arudou, 2013; Closson, 2010; Comeaux, 
2010; Hawkesworth, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). It relies on essentialist thoughts 
of being that see people’s identities not only as having naturally quantifiable 
essences but also as qualitatively separating them from others who have less of the 
essence.  
Rooted in the belief that true and enduring naturally determined essences can be 
found through thorough inspection (Crawley, Foley & Shehan, 2013), essentialism 
fixes racial identity into an unchanging monolithic category. It simplifies a complex 
sense of being into a flat category that results in intolerance of alternatives between 
and within (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013). As reductionist (Sanders, 2007), it denies 
individuals the capacity to see their race as a multiply-existing defined identity. It 
reduces those falling outside the master category as irrelevant at best and as non-
being at the worst. Those adjudged to have enough of the race’s essence are 
welcome into its category (Wagner et al., 2010), while the rest are cast aside for 
ignoring the natural order of biologically existing and determined races. The 
significance of intolerance for those differentially marked is poignantly shown through 
the rejection, designation as non-beings and denial of privileged resources towards 
hybrids (Pucherova, 2011; Wagner et al., 2010), while laws are instituted to 
strengthen existing distinctions of belonging and punishing their transgression 
(Barandiarán, 2012; Sabir, 2003). 
Critical race theory denaturalises race, families, nations and other concepts of 
identity that describe it as monolithic, homogeneous, uncontested and natural. It 
sees them as not natural, but as socially created, legally defended and ideologically 
sustained by humanity (Cappiccie et al., 2012; Hawkesworth, 2010; Schieble, 2012), 
and acknowledges the  consequences they have on the lives of people (Crawley et 
al., 2013). Critiquing their assumed given nature and their essentialist character, the 
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theory helps to unpack the naive and distant definitions and appreciation of identity 
as the natural order of things as portrayed by the conversations in Chapter 3. 
4.5.3  Subjective experiences of people 
Prizing human subjectivity, phenomenology has introduced the concepts of human 
intentionality, consciousness and phenomenal experience to counter the naturalist 
attitude that renders human beings as naively responding to a life that objectively 
exists. It warns against tendencies to objectify and essentialise experience into the 
rigid categorisation of people. 
It is against this background that an emphasis on the phenomenology of black 
experience was honed as a response to what is generally seen to be a rigid 
prejudice-prone perception of others based on their perceived race category. Notions 
raised by proponents of black phenomenological experience (Baloyi, 2008; 
Hountondji, 1997; Jones, 1980; Mbigi, 1997; Musopole, 1994) seek to respond to 
those of rigid existential essentialism that render black experience insignificant, as 
mentioned by Thomas Jefferson (Sarich & Miele, 2004). However, like the 
essentialist Thomas Jefferson, proponents of black phenomenological life 
experience stop their phenomenological quest midstream and fall into a similar 
essentialist categorisation of people and their existence. By emphasising black 
experience as enshrined in a certain unified philosophy of life, they too are trapped in 
universalist descriptions of identity, assuming to speak for a general population. 
Mmila’s (2012) reflection that neither Zuma nor the Goodman gallery should assume 
to represent all black people or all white people respectively becomes relevant.  
In this lies the critique, inquiry and answer of critical race theory. It begins with 
enquiring: what lies behind the name? Can and should we rely on generalist titles of 
identity which assume homogeneity? It seeks to understand what lies hidden behind 
the universal titles which assume to describe people’s homogeneous experience. It 
challenges the hidden ideologies behind such descriptions and their attendant 
practices (Cappiccie et al., 2012). It is curious about the “ours and us” descriptions in 
whose practices the assumptions and biases of dominant voices are not revealed 
(Brown, 2008). It wants to find out: whose descriptions of race and identity are 
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these? Whose needs and purpose are being served by such definitions and at 
whose cost? 
It is here that critical race theory and phenomenology converge. As a vanguard of 
subjectivity, critical race theory seeks to talk to the individuals themselves, to capture 
their marginalised voices against the dominant voices of triumph that exclude their 
pain of being downtrodden (Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010). It expresses 
cynicism about notions of multiculturalism and national unity whose ideology erase 
diversity of race, ethnicity, gender, ability, etc., from their discourse (Cappiccie et al., 
2012), and distort people’s experience, if not excluding them altogether (Weber, 
2013). Like phenomenology, it explores our identity descriptions that are taken for 
granted as facts of being equal, united, peaceful and tolerant, by inquiring about the 
customs and practices of hierarchy and domination from within (Brown, 2008; 
Cappiccie et al., 2012). As a theory critiquing ideologies of oppression over 
marginalised racial groups, for example black people, it carries its mission through 
an incorporation of their subjective descriptions of oppressive experiences as 
sustained by colour-blind ideologies that encourage subservience to existing laws 
and practices, to consider them as the natural order governing life and requiring 
docile submission.  
The theory challenges socially constructed identities, their customs and ideologies 
that carry assumptions of people being equal in a society governed by egalitarian 
principles. In a society like South Africa, whose Constitution outlaws overt signs of 
prejudice and is guided by United Nations principles on humanity, the theory should 
help to show that the country’s general multicultural ideals of one united nation erase 
and “mis-specify” other possible identities from its main discourse (Brown, 2008. p. 
54), and how these are rendered insignificant because they do not fit within the 
general discourse of an ideal South African identity. It critiques how the rating of 
people according to the same standards of ability, ethnicity, race, etc., essentialises 
and flattens their experience while ignoring their subjectivity (Freeman, 2011). 
Freeman (2011) notes how unique individual experiences may be side-lined in 
favour of general descriptions that purport to represent us all. It is here that the 
voices of the racially marginalised become important for a clear understanding of the 
nature and extent of racial prejudice that they endure. It is only through their 
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subjective experiences, and by exposing the use of myths of general description that 
essentialise and assume a race as naturally given, that the existence and nature of 
micro-aggressions can be appreciated. 
Critical race theory links with phenomenology not only through a concentration on 
subjective experiences of people, but also with a focus on same-race prejudice (as 
argued for in this thesis). It is a theory that denaturalises race and other forms of 
identity by revealing their socially constituted and phenomenally experienced nature 
(Hawkesworth, 2010), dispelling the myth of them being natural identities. Its critical 
conversation about (Schieble, 2012) and oppositional scrutiny of (Cappiccie et al., 
2012) ideologies that pattern our social life and naturalise our identities bring a sense 
of doubt and curiosity about the titles we carry, the myth behind them and the 
ideologies of hierarchy and prejudice serving parochial interests, not the interests of 
all subsumed under them. It helps to highlight how identity concepts do not 
unilaterally shape people’s destinies, as well as how people experience and interpret 
them. It looks beyond how racial identities are imposed on and determine the 
direction of people’s lives, to shed some light on people’ interpretive capacity to 
make sense of such identities. 
Research on the experiences of white people and poverty shows how whiteness is a 
racial identity that describes and is enjoyed by certain white people only (Moss, 
2003; Sibanda, 2012). This reveals how, for the poor, their racial identity is not static 
and does not offer secure certainty, but is reminiscent of navigation between various 
life domains. It reflects multiple negotiations between access to privilege and 
destituteness, and affinity to ancestry of superiority and dwindling life opportunities. 
An insistence on white narratives of self-sufficiency renders them and their 
experiences un-white and a non-being racial category. The experiences of the 
individuals in the research show how, through their interpretive capacity, racial 
identity is constantly negotiated and constituted just as it patterns their daily lives. 
Honour for an essentialist African philosophy evokes notions of a distinctively 
existing African lifestyle embodied in various domains, such as family and religion, 
and practices such as parenting and sexuality. One’s blackness is socially carved 
within the various domains of existence to give others the authority to rule out on the 
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authenticity of existence to be black. A reliance on monolithic descriptions of being 
may discount certain racial beings as unfamiliar, non-being, un-white or un-black.   
4.5.4 Intersectionality 
Ferguson (2013) describes intersectionality as a theoretical perspective that 
orientates one to sensitivity for multiple definitions of race, moving with time and 
changing with place. It is a fluid concept steeped in not one but multiple woven 
fallacies and ideologies.  
Racial identity is never static or homogeneous. It defies the generalised terms we 
use to describe it. It is made up of converging variables that render its character 
complex and unsuitable for narrow generalisation that assumes it to be constant and 
determined by nature. Its socially constructed character renders its definition 
constantly contested (Freeman, 2011; Schieble, 2012). 
While names like black, white and South African are generally used as definitions of 
identity and differentiation in society, critical race theory has already brought a sense 
of wonder about whose purpose and needs they serve and at whose cost. These are 
terms of identity description whose titles are too general to be able to capture the 
finer intricacies of overlapping variables known only by the individual. Their one-size-
fits-all descriptions (Schieble, 2012) make them too convenient, broad and ignorant 
of the varied factors that make up racial identity (Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). They 
embody hidden intolerance and prejudice coloured in an intricate web embedded in 
the wider institutional social fabric, shrouded in invisible micro-aggressions whose 
exploration can only be fully captured through people’s subjective experiences of 
them.  
The theory brings wariness about uncritical perceptions of a person’s identity and 
sees it as being broader than the essentialised, naturalised and objectified race 
whose ever-changing social construction is ignored. It critiques politicised social 
requirements of conformity and assimilation into generalised and essentialised racial 
definitions that bring a murky sense of identity of a straddle in shame, non-being and 
non-belonging, yet fail to adequately capture what it is to be individually either black, 
white or South African (Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Pucherova, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011; 
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Wagner et al., 2010), while being paraded in homogeneity that mask discrimination 
and prejudice (Barandiarán, 2012). 
Laced in veiled stereotypes of racial being intersecting with gender and sex, 
Pucherova (2011) shows how essentialised imaginations of race by both black and 
white sections during apartheid South Africa left someone like Bessie Head with an 
unwelcome predicament in the society as not black-enough, white-enough or male-
enough, forcing her to emigrate.  
Made up of interlocking factors, being white is depicted as a conflation of socially 
held perception, skin pigmentation, individual ambition, subjectivity, material 
possessions and wealth (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; Moss, 2003; Sibanda, 
2012). The intersection of race with class, privilege and hierarchy renders 
explanations of homogeneity not only obsolete but incongruent with the experiences 
of individuals. 
Similarly, intolerance and prejudice are neither singular nor unidirectional. They are 
covert and overt, individualistic and societal, impinging on more than just one aspect 
of an individual. Similar to Pucherova (2011), Higgs and Evans (2008) depict an 
experience within Bophuthatswana of multiple, splitting yet interlocking intolerances 
for not being legally South African and not being culturally Tswana, being hunted 
down by state security forces and refused educational and health facilities, to show 
how multiple interlocking factors sustain racial identity and discrimination.   
While most of critical race theory’s effort is spent on critiquing ideological organs in 
their production and dissemination of information, and politics through censuring of 
policies and laws, as the main drivers of inequality, Weber (2013) shows how their 
eventual success rests on being interwoven with economic players that siphon 
valued resources and services to the identified few. Therefore, every aspect of 
society becomes unilaterally and collectively arranged so that race is designed and 
manipulated to produce and sustain inequality. Neville et al. (2014) recommend an 
approach of multi-level programmes to deal with the many angles of racial 
intolerance and discrimination that are embedded in the society’s structure, instead 
of standalone programmes whose efforts will fail.  
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Critical race theory brings an expanded view of the many races within the race and 
categories within the category, all upheld in law and custom of hierarchy and 
prejudice, decreeing privilege on some and disadvantage on others (Arudou, 2013; 
Sabir, 2003). This cautious and irreverent perspective of looking at race through the 
lens of critical race theory will help to expose the ideology-driven explanations that 
encourage veneration and mask discontent within. Its move away from reductionist 
explanations of monolithic and flattened experience converges with a sense of 
curiosity that inquires about same-race prejudice. It values and incorporates 
alternative concepts of identity within the main narratives that are customarily 
ignored. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
5.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW 
The research on which this thesis is based was not structured according to the usual 
conventions of an empirical study. Instead, I attempted to draw in a flexible manner 
on both theoretical and empirical sources in order to iteratively move toward a richer 
understanding of same-race prejudice. However, the current chapter reports on the 
design and execution of the major empirical enquiry of the overall study. 
I undertook this enquiry, the design of which I explain here, to unravel the unsaid, 
taken-for-granted experiential meanings of being prejudiced within one’s race, and to 
solicit subjectively lived accounts of race, racial identity and racial identification and 
how these are played out and sustained in taken-for-granted categorisations, 
labelling, intolerance and prejudice within one’s race. I did this to arrive at a 
psychological structure of the essence of the phenomenon of same-race prejudice. 
To do this, I selected a purposive sample of eight co-researchers from Emalahleni. 
The selection criteria for the sample were race, as either black or white; economic 
status, as determined by economic affluence or less economic affluence and by the 
nature of one’s work and responsibilities; and gender, as either male or female. 
I collected information for this research in the form of two open-ended, 
conversational, face-to-face interviews with each co-researcher, held four months 
apart. All co-researchers except for one were interviewed at their places of work, 
after the logistics of data recording, storage, benefits from the research, what the 
research is focused on and their rights to participate or terminate participation, were 
discussed and they had signed participation consent forms. Information from each 
interview was separately audio-recorded with written notes kept by me. I later 
transcribed the interviews.  
Not directly mentioning the word prejudice, I introduced the purpose of the research 
as the exploration of the nature of interactional life influences of a black person on a 
black person and by a black person; and of a white person on a white person and by 
a white person. To do this, the first interviews centred around answering the overall 
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question, “how do you think people of your race are treating you now and how do 
you think they have been treating you before?” It was hoped that this would help to 
solicit subjectively lived experiences of practised same-race categorisation and 
prejudice. 
Four months later, the second interviews were conducted. These were aimed at 
debriefing the co-researchers regarding the experiential issues discussed in the first 
interviews and to offer them time for clarity on the latter by answering the overall 
question, “do you have anything to add to the responses you gave in the first 
interview, have any thoughts or questions to ask or ideas evoked by the discussion 
from the first interview?”, to assess their ability to reflect about and critique their own 
race, and their reflections about these reflections. 
I analysed the information from both interviews for each co-researcher using 
interpretive phenomenological analysis, aimed at extracting each co-researcher’s 
experiential themes of same-race prejudice, and an overall interpreted structure of 
black on black prejudice, and white on white prejudice. This was done, not to make 
generalisable findings, but for a rich subjectively lived interpretive understanding of 
the phenomenon of same-race prejudice. This last point is clarified by looking at the 
expanded phenomenological philosophy behind this research design. 
Firstly, the role and position of those to be researched upon (co-researchers) is 
clarified in this chapter. Based on phenomenology’s principle of considering a human 
as a conscious being, the research method mentioned in the chapter and to be 
applied in the thesis’s research adopts an interpretive and qualitative style seeking to 
speak to the co-researchers’ subjectively lived and experienced phenomenon of the 
races of black and white instead of these as the taken for granted corporeal markers 
of objective racial identity and racial identification. The co-researchers are 
considered as the experts who are able to describe their subjectively lived 
experiences of the phenomenon of the races of black and white. The use of open-
ended questions and conversational interviews was meant to allow the co-
researchers to tell the experiential understanding of their racial identity and racial 
identification. 
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Secondly, the role and position of the researcher is articulated as not separable from 
those one conducts research on. Through my own intentionality and consciousness 
as the researcher, I did not have the privilege to make objective, value-free and 
generalised statements of knowing and understanding, but considered mine to be 
particular, unstable and in constant involvement with those of the co-researchers. I 
regarded myself as a key instrument of the research, intent on exploring the co-
researchers’ experiences, to explicate the structure of the phenomenon of the black 
and white race, and give the phenomenon of race a psychological interpretive 
meaning to understand the phenomenon of same-race prejudice. 
Thirdly, the purpose of the research is to explore and describe the co-researchers’ 
unique and subjectively lived experiences of the phenomenon of a black and white 
same-race prejudice and not their factual details. 
Fourthly, I discuss in the chapter how focus is on human behaviour observed or 
inquired upon, that is, the subjective experience of the phenomenon of same-race 
prejudice, in the natural setting where the co-researchers live instead of a laboratory 
experiment to determine behavioural cause and effect. 
Finally, the validity and reliability of research results are redefined. The method 
offers a counter-perspective to the naturalist attitude’s view of the world and the 
experience of it as being independent from the experiencing individual. Race, racial 
identity, racial identification, validity and reliability are considered to be experiences 
and interpretations whose objectivity is tinged with the subjectivity of the 
experiencing human element. Validity and reliability of research data are gauged in 
terms of the ability of the research results to reveal the intricate nature through which 
they allow dialogue about the narrowing or enlargement of the distance and 
proximity with the co-researchers’ original text, and not by the use of detached 
bracketing or the discerning of constant phenomenon data that are rated by objective 
standards. 
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Several critical race theory authors (Arudou, 2013; Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011; 
Hawkesworth, 2010; Ortiz & Jani, 2010) criticise the naturalist attitude’s 
naturalisation of race, as well as its forms of identity and identification, as being 
socially constructed and sustained by colour-blind ideologies that have economic, 
social and political consequences on people’s lives (Closson, 2010; Comeaux, 2010; 
Freeman, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Powers, 2007). Phenomenological 
philosophy also criticises the naturalisation of race for ignoring human experience 
(Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 
1974). Both critical race theory and phenomenology put primacy on people’s 
subjective experiences, firstly by critical race theory’s critique of embedded 
subordination and discrimination of people assisted by race-neutral laws (Brown, 
2008; Cappiccie et al., 2012; Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Weber, 2013) and 
second by phenomenology’s importance of human innate interpretive subjectivity 
about corporeality and the lived world (Converse, 2012; Gergel, 2012; Laverty, 2003; 
Simonsen, 2013; Tuohy et al., 2012). Given the above, this chapter rests on the 
following: 
• A phenomenological tenet that considers race not merely as an objective symbol 
of identity and identification separate from an experiencing human subject, and 
unperturbed and uninfluenced by those who live it (Davis, 2005; Dowling & 
Cooney, 2012; Jacobsen, 2007; Laverty, 2003). 
• The adoption of a phenomenological research method which considers a human 
as a conscious being (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012) and humanity’s racial identity 
and identification as phenomena (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; 
Earle, 2010; Kim, 2012). The chapter presents an interpretive and qualitative 
phenomenological research method that seeks to study and inquire about racial 
phenomena as perceived and experienced by the human subject and not as 
objective signifiers of identity and identification, with an intention to make explicit 
their subjectively lived innuendos that are implicit and taken for granted (Flood, 
2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Murray, 2012; Spinelli, 2005).  
As this study presents a phenomenological window into the conscious and 
subjectively lived experiences of being black and white (Earle, 2010; Flood, 2010; 
Kim, 2012), this chapter presents the following: 
 99 
 
• The type of research best suited to tapping into people’s experiences of race as 
subjectively and consciously lived, rather than as objective standards of identity 
and identification (Dybicz, 2013; Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; 
Laverty, 2003). This is explored through a discussion of the two types of 
phenomenological research and the preference for a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative research method. 
• Selection and allocation of research participants (Krahn & Putnam, 2003; 
Polkinghorne, 1989; Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009). 
• The type of research data that was collected (Creswell, 1998; Giorgi, 1994; 
Leedy, 1996; Merriam, 2009; Wertz, 1985) and what specifically was looked for  
(Creswell, 1998; Giorgi, 1994; Leedy, 1996; Merriam, 2009; Wertz, 1985). 
• The nature of the relationship between the researcher and the research 
participants (Creswell, 1998; Krahn & Putnam, 2003; Leedy, 1996; Von 
Eckartsberg, 1998a, 1998b). This is explored through a discussion on the ethical 
considerations of the study. 
• The validity and reliability of the research (Churchill, Lowery, McNally & Rao, 
1998; Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Jacobsen, 2007; Polkinghorne, 
1998). 
5.2  THE TWO TRENDS OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
A distinction is made between a descriptive phenomenology as represented by 
Edmund Husserl and interpretive phenomenology as represented by Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Laverty, 2003; 
Tuohy et al., 2012). The two trends of phenomenology share the same aims and are 
both motivated by a desire to reclaim and extricate philosophy from the naturalist 
attitude by asserting that reality is not merely out there, but that it is in human 
meaning and experience. As qualitative research approaches, both are concerned 
with the articulation of the internal experience of human subjects who are in 
interaction with their environments and who are not seen as passive reactors to 
external stimuli (Laverty, 2003). However, they differ markedly on several points 
discussed below. 
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For descriptive phenomenology, Husserl’s method offers hope that the subjective 
phenomenal meaning of the lived world and its true essence can be accessed. 
According to descriptive phenomenology, a phenomenologist can reveal the true 
essence of a phenomenon as it is. What is revealed from consciousness is therefore 
considered a pure description of the phenomenal reality (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; 
Earle, 2010; Kim, 2012; Laverty, 2003). Descriptive phenomenology promises 
access to true meaning as existing separately from the inquirer and the experiencing 
individual, its discovery made possible through the use of unbiased techniques and 
humanity as the one who knows or is supposed to know or discover true meaning 
(Laverty, 2003). The use of phenomenological reduction, as well as bracketing or 
suspension of the naturalist attitude and preconceptions, help to reveal the true 
meaning of the experience (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010). 
Participants in interpretive phenomenological research are considered as experts 
with valuable inside understanding of the experience of the phenomenon of 
investigation and not as the passive objects experimental research would require of 
them. They are therefore called co-researchers (Polkinghorne, 1989; Von 
Eckartsberg, 1998a). For interpretive phenomenology, continuous dynamic 
interaction between the researcher and co-researchers (Tebbet & Kennedy, 2012) 
implies that complete bracketing and reduction of one’s pre-understanding is not 
possible (Dowling & Cooney, 2012) as meaning is circularly created by and between 
the two (Flood, 2010).  
True and finite meaning of reality existing independent of humanity cannot be seized 
or discovered as what we purport to know is an interpreted reality resulting not in one 
reality but many, along with their interpretations. It remains what humans do and do 
not discover, with the rejection of bracketing making value-free knowledge a fallacy 
(Converse, 2012; Laverty, 2003). Complete extrication from pre-conceptions by 
bracketing as promised by descriptive phenomenology is rendered impossible by an 
indissoluble unity between humanity and its object of knowledge (Dowling & Cooney, 
2012; Laverty, 2003). Every act of understanding mirrors interpretation linked to 
presuppositions (Converse, 2012; Laverty, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012). Interpretive 
phenomenology makes no suggestion for a value-free, accessible understanding of 
unchangeable essences rooted in human consciousness and intentionality (Laverty, 
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2003). Caught in a continuous intricate connectedness to the research object, 
researchers cannot step outside of their cultural and political preconceptions of 
understanding. As passionate and subjective participants of the research process, 
their role extends beyond mere description to include interpretation, from mere 
revelation of what is hidden in consciousness to digging beyond taken for granted 
meanings (Kim, 2012; Laverty, 2003). 
Simonsen (2013) encapsulates this idea with a reference to Merleau-Ponty’s 
argument of a human being not as a restrained object studying constant objects, but 
as a phenomenal being who is in constant conversation with and constitution of and 
by his/her world, enabling him/her to cast a position of inhabiting space and place 
through understanding that is informed by interpretation.  
As casting aside simplistic bracketing and centralising interpretation, Kim (2012, p. 
644) reflects on the thinking of Van Manen that portrays a phenomenological 
research as embodying the need to “question the way we explain the world, and, 
more specifically to know the world in which we live as human beings, to understand 
what it is to be a human being.” A renewed appreciation of bracketing and the 
phenomenological attitude sheds new light on the position of the researcher in 
interpretive phenomenological research. “Situatedness” (Earle, 2010) implies that the 
researcher’s intentionality and consciousness are among those that he/she conducts 
research on and with. Informed by his/her pre-understanding instead of discarding it, 
the researcher becomes inseparable from his/her process of understanding as 
guided by an interpretive repertoire. It brings to the centre the experiential reality of 
the researcher just as it prioritises that of those being researched upon. When 
descriptive phenomenology would suggest the uncontested eliciting of pure and 
unbiased essence of the phenomenon, research through interpretive 
phenomenology tells of interpretations informed by the researcher’s assumptions 
and preconceptions (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Gergel, 2012; 
Tuohy et al., 2012).  
This leads to a different kind of bracketing informed by reflection and not objective 
cutting off from pre-knowledge (Tuohy et al., 2012), guided by time- and space-
sensitive embodied experience that moves away from making objective and general 
statements (Converse, 2012; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012). One’s constant personal 
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involvement implies that one’s knowing is particular and unstable, not based on 
objective and generalisable understanding, but through ever-evolving interpretation 
(Converse, 2012).  
5.3  A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SAME-RACE PREJUDICE 
As a philosophical discipline, phenomenology is also seen as a research method 
founded on and guided by its very much defined philosophy (Kockelmans, 1994). 
When naturalism and the naturalist attitude would want us to venerate our races, 
their identities and forms of racial identification, and to see them as essentially and 
objectively existing, phenomenology ventures the unimaginable. Enshrined in the 
philosophy of wonder and doubt about what we should naturally know, it calls for a 
research method that seeks to describe the phenomenon’s meaning as consciously 
experienced, locating its validity in the human life-world rather than in experimental 
measurements as espoused by the naturalist attitude, to explain its silent, invisible 
and taken-for-granted nature based on interpretations (Von Eckartsberg, 1983). 
When the races of black and white are considered untouchable and normal, 
phenomenology looks at them with suspicion to begin suggesting the existence of 
prejudice within them. 
Phenomenology is a research method whose character is descriptive and 
interpretive rather than merely explanatory. Guided by the imperative of reduction, it 
would aim to describe the interpreted experiential meaning(s) attached to the race 
phenomenon (black or white), while temporarily suspending and continuously 
acknowledging a tendency to be influenced by assumptions, prior to one’s tendency 
to categorise and label that which comes to consciousness. It is a research method 
used to explicate the structure of the races of black and white as subjectively 
experienced along with the dimension of prejudice within, rather than as concrete 
realities (Kruger, 1988). The research study aims at exploring the unique lived white 
and black experiences of same-race prejudice. It is aimed at understanding what it 
entails to experience the phenomenon, its textual description (what it is) and its 
structural description (the condition and situation of the experience) (Creswell, 1998). 
Such a reliance on subjective description of the experience is geared towards 
exposing the finer details of the phenomenon that are usually taken for granted in the 
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objective assumptions of generalisation. The naturalist assumption about the races 
of black and white as identity and identification markers with unity and similarity 
within them is interrogated by the research method. This is done by considering 
people to be capable of transcending their naturally given races, and able to make 
affective, emotional and psychological interpretation of the experiences and impact 
the assumed natural races have on them (Merriam, 2009). 
Considered as a research method “well suited to studying affective, emotional and 
often intense human experiences” (Merriam, 2009, p. 26), phenomenology should 
help the researcher attempt to “gain a better understanding of the meaning an 
experience has for others, as well as for themselves” (Leedy, 1996, p. 161). While a 
naturalist view would serve to reify, mask and take the race phenomenon for granted 
as essentially existing, a phenomenological view would describe, explore and 
interpret the race identity and identification challenges of those who experience it, 
rather than solely relying on the researcher’s expert description (Krahn & Putnam, 
2003; Leedy, 1996). 
So premised, a phenomenological stance would help the researcher assume that to 
live up to the ideals of being black and being white is to ignore a person’s 
constitutive ability to reflect, interpret and make sense of his/her lived experiences, is 
to assume that people’s existence is merely given, and not interrogated and 
constantly negotiated by those who live it. It is to ignore the meaningfulness or lack 
of it, of those who go through and constitute, and whose experiences are constituted 
by it. 
Taking a qualitative form as consistent with a phenomenological philosophy and 
approach, the method employed here was meant to assist in getting to the core 
interpreted essence of the lived experience of the phenomenon of black on black 
and white on white prejudice (VanderStoep & Johnston, 2009). 
5.4  QUALITATIVE STUDY 
A qualitative research method is characterised by its focus on human behaviour and 
experiential meaning-making in the natural setting where people live, instead of 
laboratory experiments’ measurement of the sequence of cause and effect in 
behaviour to determine the nature and direction of the relationship between the two 
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or how the cause sequentially precedes the effect of the behaviour  (Creswell, 1998; 
Hayes, 1997). Reliant on experiential description of the phenomenon being 
researched (Kruger, 1988), the researcher as the key instrument allows those 
researched upon to tell their stories with a less limiting interactional style (Creswell, 
1998; Hayes, 1997). 
Because the aim is “understanding why people respond as they did, the context in 
which they responded, and their deeper thoughts and behaviours that governed their 
response” (Creswell, 1998, p. 40) to the phenomenon of concern (same-race 
prejudice), it would be unfitting to adhere to a strict quantification of their experiences 
and responses rather than exploring them, and to establish and confirm hypotheses 
rather than asking questions in an interactive manner (Krahn & Putnam, 2003). With 
less emphasis put on cause and effect, predicting and explaining the prevalence 
(Merriam, 2009) of black on black, and white on white prejudice, I attempted to 
explore the phenomenon, in other words, how black and white “people interpret their 
experiences, construct their worlds, what meaning they attribute to their experiences” 
(Merriam, 2009, p. 5), and how these come to impact on their lives. 
Such an explorative endeavour would have proven fruitless without an employ of 
open-ended and semi-structured questions asked in an in-depth interview in a 
dialogue or conversational style (Smith et al., 2009) where the researcher’s non-
expert position relies on cues from the co-researchers themselves (Creswell, 1998; 
Leedy, 1996). It was hoped that the semi-structured and open-ended nature of these 
questions would help in exploring the nature and essence of the silenced 
experiences of same-race prejudice while laying bare the taken for granted 
complexities of being black and being white in South Africa. 
5.5 SAMPLING AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
The research was conducted by me in Emalahleni in the Mpumalanga province, 
South Africa. The selection criteria for the sample were economic status as 
determined by a person’s nature of work, that is, where they work and the nature of 
their work activities and responsibilities, and race as classified into black and white. 
Four black people and four white people were selected, both consisting of two men 
and two women whose ages ranged from twenty-five years and upwards. The 
 105 
 
sample from each race group was subdivided into one economically affluent man 
and woman, and one economically not affluent man and woman, as purposively 
selected and allocated. This was based on the assumption that a person’s economic 
status has a bearing on how he/she considers and defines him-/herself and others, 
and how others view and define him/her. 
Differentiated by me as such, a person’s skin pigmentation and other visible physical 
features were used as defining criteria to determine whether a co-researcher was 
black or white, as stated in the work of several authors (Domínguez, 1986; Forman 
et al., 2002; Rockquemore, 1998; Tochluk, 2010; Wander et al., 1999). A black 
person was differentiated as someone with a darker skin pigmentation and other 
physical appearances, for example hair form, dissimilar to those of a person defined 
as white (James, 2001; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Sarich & Miele, 2004; Tate, 2005). In 
accordance with objectivist thought and the naturalist attitude, these criteria are 
similar to the definitions provided in the literature review of Chapter 2 and the 
interview descriptions in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
All the co-researchers were approached individually with a request to include them in 
the research. They were provided with an explanation of their expected role in it, how 
the research would benefit or not benefit them, my role as the researcher and 
student, as well as the recording and storage of the research and interview, as 
suggested by several authors (Flowers, Duncan & Knussen, 2003; Johnson, 1998; 
Lauver, 2010; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Singleton & Furber, 2014). The language used 
in recruiting the co-researchers was mostly English, with a mixture of Afrikaans, 
Sepedi or Zulu used with those who struggled to properly converse in English. 
A date, time and venue suitable to the prospective co-researcher were set for the 
interview after the prospective co-researcher had agreed to take part in the research. 
In most cases, the interview was held at their place of work, at lunch time or before 
or after work, with only one participant (Ranko) interviewed at his home. The 
research participation consent form, which was written in English, was signed only 
after each co-researcher had individually agreed to take part in the research, on the 
day of and before the first interview, as discussed in the work of several authors 
(Eatough & Smith, 2006a; Johnson, 1998; Lauver, 2010; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; 
Spichiger, 2009).  
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It is not clear whether willingness or declining to participate in this research was as a 
result of or lack of interest in the activity, knowledge about my occupation and study 
level, or any other impression-forming factors. In recruiting co-researchers to take 
part in the research, I told them about my occupation (clinical psychology) and study 
level (doctoral study in psychology). 
A plan to compensate the co-researchers for their participation in the research 
(Flowers et al., 2003) with R 100.00 each at the end of each interview was rescinded 
for the three marked as economically affluent after one (Stephans) declined it and I 
felt that I had offended him. I gave it to them after the second interview, with an 
explanation as to why it had not been given the first time. The rest of those who 
received the compensation at the end of the first interview appeared to appreciate it. 
There was no hope for a participating sample representative of the population 
demographics in both Emalahleni or the whole of South Africa, because external 
validity and generalisability of findings are not the bedrock of this research as would 
be expected in a naturalist inquiry of a quantitative nature. Centred on the 
unravelling of unsaid, silenced, taken-for-granted and unique experiential meanings 
of same-race prejudice, seeking to generalise the research findings would be 
counter to tapping into those unvoiced moments.  
It was with a concern for this aspect of the research that the randomisation of sample 
selection and allocation fell away (Krahn & Putnam, 2003; Smith et al., 2009). Each 
of the interviews was meant to explore experiences of same-race prejudice, how 
categorisation within one’s race plays out and is sustained, and people’s ability to 
reflect about and critique their own race. The co-researchers were purposively 
selected and allocated to the different groups on the sole criterion of hopefully having 
the potential to lead one into a rich interpretive description of the experience of black 
on black and white on white prejudice and not on a pre-empted understanding of 
what the experience should be like (Polkinghorne, 1989; Smith et al., 2009). 
Although Polkinghorne (1989) points to the qualifying criteria stipulated by Van Kaam 
as the ability to express oneself linguistically, to express inner feelings, and to sense 
and express organic experiences accompanying their feelings, having experienced 
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the phenomenon most recently, I did not strictly adhere to this list as it may serve to 
quantify and preferentially treat experiences. 
5.6  DATA GATHERING  
Although the interviews were held in English, the co-researchers were allowed to use 
whichever language they were comfortable with in between. They infrequently used 
Afrikaans, Sepedi or Zulu. These were semi-structured conversations whose details 
were audiotaped and kept in written notes for later transcription. Information from 
each interview was audio-taped. I later converted this information verbatim into 
written and readable notes while intensely listening to each interview. This process 
resulted in having the information stored twice, the audio as the original and lived 
conversation, as well as the verbatim written notes of these audio conversations. 
Two individual interviews were held with each of the eight persons sampled, with the 
second as a debriefing four months after the first.  
To ethically safeguard the co-researchers’ identities (Smith et al., 2009), information 
that may make them individually identifiable, such as their names or those of others, 
was erased and discussed with each. Each individual was given a pseudonym for 
the purpose of this research. Details about their age, gender, race, nature of work 
and story events were kept unaltered. 
The first interviews were held from 13 April 2013 to 5 May 2013. Because of the 
conversational structure of the interviews, some took longer than the presumed one 
hour and the one hour initially allocated for each of the interviews was therefore not 
strictly adhered to. Using interjecting prompting questions, these open-ended 
conversational interviews were based on answering an overall question, “how do you 
think people of your race have been treating you previously, and how do you think 
they are treating you now?” 
The second interviews were conducted from 12 September 2013 to 4 October 2013. 
These conversations revolved around finding out whether the co-researchers 
thought of anything to add to the responses they had given in the first interviews, if 
they thought of any questions to ask, or if any ideas had been evoked by the 
discussions in the first interviews. Responses to this inquiry can be summed up in 
comments like, “nothing to add, ask or change.” Each interview was shorter than the 
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30 minutes initially arranged. I conducted, audiotaped and transcribed both the first 
and second interviews. The second interviews were designed for an inquiry about 
the co-researchers’ ability to reflect and critique their own understanding of their 
race, and the practices of same-race prejudice. These interviews were ethically 
arranged to fit the nature of the study, as asking participants to reflect on their years 
of growing up and the psychosocial moorings thereof was expected to be 
emotionally provocative. Expecting that this intensity of emotion was not likely to be 
felt by the participants at the time of the first interview, but that the reality of the 
introspection may sink in with time after, the second interviews were ethically meant 
to serve not only as a data gathering tool but also to debrief the co-researchers. 
5.7  DATA EXPLICATION 
I used explication to work with the interview data and to identify the themes. This 
process is explained here. What is called analysis in the natural sciences, is termed 
explication within the phenomenological research methodology (Von Eckartsberg, 
1998a). It is described as the process of working with collected data to reveal the 
universal characterisation of its meaning, as well as the form and structure of the 
phenomenon of inquiry. Although the word is not used explicitly by Spinelli (1989), 
he sees it as a process of stripping bare the varied data gathered to arrive at a more 
adequate approximation of the phenomenal meaning. Through the use of explication 
guiding questions (Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), the researcher adopts a reflective 
interrogative conversation with the data in pursuit of the experiential moment of the 
phenomenon revealing itself from the fundamental descriptions as carried in the 
data.  
By fundamental description, reference is made to the inherent essential character of 
the phenomenal experiences as captured in co-researchers’ first-hand reporting. The 
fundamental description is revealed on a phenomenal level, while the fundamental 
structure, as revealed on the phenomenological level, is on a second-order 
explication of the data. Although the fundamental structure comes about as the 
fundamental description is explored and interrogated further, one is always wary of 
the former whose form and nature are devoid of the co-researchers’ experiences in 
the latter, as explained in Colaizzi’s assertion (as cited by Von Eckartsberg, 1998a, 
p. 30) that: 
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the structure of an experiential phenomenon need not coincide with a 
description of that same phenomenon as it is experienced by a subject, 
because the former is largely implicit and the latter is of a more explicit 
nature. After all just as the description of a particular essence is not 
identical to the essence of a particular description, FS and FD of a single 
experiential phenomenon are not identical. 
Mindful of this, of Edmund Husserl’s imperative to stay in the operative fold mood of 
“back to the things themselves” (Kim, 2012; Smith et al., 2009; Spinelli, 1989; Von 
Eckartsberg, 1998b), and of narrowing the gap between the fundamental description 
and the fundamental structure, the following phenomenology specific rules were 
followed as depicted to be invaluable to the explication process (Jacobsen, 2007; 
Spinelli, 1989): 
1. The rule of the epoch 
Through phenomenological reduction, one has to temporarily, not completely 
bracket and suspend, but put in phenomenological doubt, all pre-assumptive 
knowledge, theoretical understanding and explanation temptation. This is done 
in order to employ intense interest and immersion into the primary data to 
discern the fundamental description of the phenomenon – in this case, black on 
black and white on white prejudice. 
2. The rule of description 
As one slows down and patiently refrains from explaining  (Polkinghorne, 1989; 
Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), one becomes able to describe the phenomenal 
essence behind which co-researchers’ lived experiences and meanings are 
embedded, as embodied in the data. 
3. The rule of horizontalisation 
With concentrated focus, and disciplined and concerted fascination with the data 
while emphatically dwelling on the described situation (Churchill et al., 1998; Von 
Eckartsberg, 1998a), the importance of every information proffered can be seen 
for its amplified significance without rushing to any preferential hierarchical 
ordering of it. In line with the temporary bracketing of one’s pre-conceived 
assumptions, through the endeavour of moving from concentration with factual 
details to experiential meanings, one hopes to expose the approximate structural 
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characterisation the phenomenon (black on black and white on white prejudice, 
in this case), its nature, what it means, what it is, and how it manifests itself for 
the co-researchers. 
The stage thus set, the explication of the data gathered from the interviews was 
aimed at describing, thematising and translating (interpreting) the phenomenal 
experience of black on black and white on white prejudice rather than counting its 
frequency (Giorgi, 1994). It was aimed at discovering and describing the meaning 
units of such prejudice as experienced by the co-researchers themselves (Leedy, 
1996), recording these in a way not only coloured by the researcher’s prior 
specifications. 
To bracket and reduce my own assumptions of scepticism, the following actions 
were implemented (Creswell, 1998; Eatough & Smith, 2008; Giorgi, 1994; Merriam, 
2009; Wertz, 1985): 
• Information from each interview was separately stored and emphatically 
attended to. Detailed descriptions, recorded in a way that refrained from 
increasing or reducing its reported characteristics, were used to capture the 
detailed dimension of the phenomenon.   
• No attempt was made to preferentially judge any detail as relevant or irrelevant. 
Acknowledging the laborious nature of the act and the extended period to 
conduct this kind of research, Giorgi (1994) suggests that one should spend a 
considerable time with the interview data, neither reading nor categorising its 
meaning quickly. 
• The interview information in audio form from each interview was transcribed to 
be sequentially arranged in a manner that told a meaningful story as meant by 
the co-researcher. Priority was given to each co-researcher’s description and 
revelation rather than the researcher’s prior conception and explanations (Giorgi, 
1994; Wertz, 1985). This was followed by ordering the information from each 
interview separately according to its emergent themes and interrelatedness of 
these without altering its intended meaning (Wertz, 1985). 
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While the above activities were guided by a commitment to distil a thick description 
of the phenomenon of black on black and white on white prejudice as experienced 
by the co-researchers themselves, the step to follow was a critical interrogation of 
the individual interview information, which added a psychological description of the 
themes far removed from the psychologically opaque descriptions offered by the co-
researchers themselves (Eatough & Smith, 2008). This added an interpretive 
element to the process of a detached experiential description of themes. 
From each individual interview, an individual psychological structure of the 
phenomenon was derived by distilling individual phenomenon descriptions and 
appropriating themes that revealed the invariant characteristics or essences of the 
phenomenon of black on black or white on white prejudice, depending on whether 
the co-researcher was black or white. This is seen as the purported purpose of 
phenomenological research and data explication/analysis (Creswell, 1998; Eatough 
& Smith, 2008; Giorgi, 1994; Merriam, 2009; Wertz, 1985). 
When all eight individual interviews were run through and the individual 
psychological structures of the phenomenon had been allowed to emerge, I moved 
to a stage where a general psychological structure of the phenomenon was 
interrogated to emerge from the divergent and convergent themes in the individual 
psychological structures. 
Information gathered from a good phenomenological study should allow 
extrapolation and transferability to other similar societal circumstances, thereby 
contributing to and aiding with the healthy upkeep of humankind (Wertz, 1985). From 
detailed individual fundamental descriptions, descriptive structures, fundamental 
structures, individual psychological structures to general psychological structures, a 
meaningful extrapolation into societal black on black and white on white prejudice 
could be made, however tenuous and interpretive in nature. 
5.8  PHENOMENOLOGICAL VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
“Back to the things themselves! Back to the life-world! Back to the validity of personal 
experience!” (Von Eckartsberg, 1983, p. 200). So goes the naturalist view of validity 
and reliability turned on its head. Our experiential observations and descriptions of 
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others’ experiences remain interpretations whose objectivity is tinged with the 
subjectivity of the human element (Spinelli, 1989). 
A rejection of a world independent of the involved individual, and the object-subject 
dichotomy (Kruger, 1988; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), implies an inclusion of an 
observing human element, requiring that we cement what we know and the acquired 
knowledge in continuous interrogation as “the world is not just there – not without us” 
(Jacobsen, 2007, p. 3). 
The naturalist foundation of knowledge would want one to assume one’s research 
findings to be valid to the extent to which they are true, and to be reliable when their 
core essences can be replicated, when they can withstand the test of verifiability and 
constancy under different circumstances and by different investigators (Merrick, 
1999; Spinelli, 1989). Phenomenologically, there is a sobering moment of humility in 
being confronted with the question of whether the general psychological structure 
tallies with the individual psychological structure, and whether the fundamental 
structure reflects the descriptive structure (Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 
1998a). 
Reliability and validity may be seen as tenuously and movingly implicated by the 
extent to which there is a correspondence between the descriptive structure in the 
first-hand experience and the fundamental structure in the analyst’s explication and 
thematisation of the collected data, however approximate this may be. 
This brings into focus a critique of the researcher’s interpretive skills, acumen and 
perfection in execution. It lays bare how one has emphatically dwelled with the data, 
and how much one has bracketed one’s pre-assumptive theoretical inclinations or 
allowed them to help one arrive at a refined approximation of the essential 
characterisation of the phenomenological structure of the phenomenon. One needs 
to reflect on how well the distance or proximity between the original text and the 
interpretation has been narrowed, considering that co-researchers’ descriptions are 
naive, although original, without the researcher’s psychological characteristic 
interpretation of his/her human element. In their revelatory endeavour, the 
researcher’s specific descriptive questions can leave so much unrevealed. 
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A reliable and valid phenomenological finding is so judged for its ability to reveal the 
intricate nature through which it allows a dialogue about how it managed (or failed) to 
narrow  the distance or proximity with the original text, and not how it shies away or 
persuades its audience to believe in its objective facts. It is not judged on the basis 
of using personally detached bracketing and discerning constant phenomenal data 
that can be rated according to objective standards.  
It should serve as a medium of interlocking interpretive avenues from the captured 
data/text to the researcher and the audience, none of whom can evade the 
subjective interpretive nature of human experience and existence (Converse, 2012; 
Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Tuohy et al., 2012).  According to Churchill et al. (1998, 
p. 83), “the value of the findings depends on their ability to help others gain insight 
into the ever mysterious realities of human life,” in other words, the frailties of human 
subjectivity and not revelation of unquestionable objective facts. 
A review of any phenomenological finding is itself phenomenologically an interpretive 
human exercise. As Jacobsen (2007) argues, the world is not without us. “No 
narrative description can in practice embrace the ‘whole’ phenomenon” (Churchill et 
al., 1998, p. 83). The naturalist’s attitude should be forgiven for not knowing this, for 
not realising the interpretive capacity and intentionality of human consciousness, for 
sticking with a static view of reality, and for failing to account for the human cognitive 
element that forever wants to make sense of reality and not be naively subservient to 
it.  
5.9  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2008, p. 265) quote the American Psychological Association 
preamble to ethical principles for psychology as stating that “the decision to 
undertake research rests upon a considered judgement by the individual 
psychologist about how best to contribute to psychological science and human 
welfare.” Flowing from this, it is elaborated that it is necessary to reflect upon why 
this particular research inquiry is deemed valuable to be pursued, and what benefits 
it holds for the co-researchers involved or the public at large (Brinkmann & Kvale, 
2008). 
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The chosen co-researchers for this project shall not individually benefit from taking 
part in it. However, I anticipate that, in their approximation of reality, the results from 
this research will shed invaluable insight into our challenges of interrelation and 
serve as a bridge between what is presently known about human prejudice and the 
void that is there about same-race prejudice. In this way, the co-researchers too will 
indirectly benefit. 
To avoid harming them and violating the co-researchers’ human rights (Smith et al., 
2009), I had to further be mindful of the responsible ways of conducting the research 
in such a way that their participation was not coerced. Each co-researcher’s consent 
to take part in the research was sought individually by explaining to him/her what the 
purpose was, what role he/she was expected to play, the time needed to conduct the 
interview, the tentative format and the recording and storage of the information. 
Smith et al. (2009, p. 53) note that “to say that something is ‘confidential’ is to say 
that no one else will see it, and this is not the case.” There was a promoter 
overseeing this project. The results of this research have been documented for 
public consumption and human knowledge contribution. Smith et al. (2009) therefore 
advise that the word anonymity should be used. Information that would make the co-
researchers individually identifiable was removed from both the interview records 
and the final report results. Each co-researcher was given a pseudonym to make it 
impossible to individually identify him/her with the events and the reported story, both 
in the data recording and in this thesis. 
The nature of the research and the content of the phenomenon inquired upon 
implied that the co-researchers’ privacy would be invaded. They were implicitly 
required to share private experiences they had not shared with anyone or even 
thought of sharing at all. Although one could not certainly know what these were 
specifically, I anticipated an emotional toll to be left on them due to this. The second 
interview served not only as a data gathering technique, but also as debriefing, by 
asking the co-researchers  to indirectly but actively reflect about the reflections they 
proffered in the first interviews. 
The nature of the phenomenon of inquiry makes the research itself contaminated by 
demand characteristics, that is, co-researchers attempting to influence the outcome 
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of the research by providing answers led by their own private agendas (Banister, 
Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1994). To balance the possibility for this not to 
happen and avoidance of complete deception, the purpose of the research was 
explained as an inquiry into the nature of interactional life influences of a black 
person on a black person and by a black person; and of a white person on a white 
person and by a white person. This was deemed appropriate to an exploration of the 
experiential interpretations of the phenomenon of black on black and white on white 
prejudice, although differently worded. This is in line with the wording in the interview 
questions themselves where no specific emphasis and reference was made of the 
word prejudice. 
The conversational mode of the interview made it possible that the hierarchical 
position of power between the researcher and the co-researchers be diffused. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH INTERVIEW RESULTS 
6.1  CHAPTER PREVIEW 
The present chapter is made up of interview conversations between myself  and 
eight co-researchers in Emalahleni. Its intended purpose is to expose the flawed, 
rigid and essentialist definitions of race that objectify it, to prepare one to appreciate 
how such definitions are lived through experiences laced with prejudice within the 
race. Pursuit of this task was assisted by asking and attempting to respond to the 
following questions: 
• What are the subjective experiences of being black?  
• How does it feel to be black?  
• What are the subjective experiences of being white?  
• How does it feel to be white?  
• What are the subjective experiences of living up to the normative, authentic and 
prototypical ideals of a black race?  
• What are the subjective experiences of not living up to the normative, authentic 
and prototypical ideals of a black race?  
• What are the subjective experiences of living up to the normative, authentic and 
prototypical ideals of a white race?  
• What are the subjective experiences of not living up to the normative, authentic 
and prototypical ideals of a white race?  
• How does it feel to not live up to any of the above ideals? 
To avoid contamination of information gathered by command characteristics, no 
direct mention was made in the interviews of same-race prejudice or any of the 
abovementioned reflective questions (Banister et al., 1994; Smith et al., 2009). 
However, the questions asked and the interview schedule adopted (Eatough & 
Smith, 2006b, 2008; Smith et al., 2009) allowed the phenomenon of same-race 
prejudice to be explored. 
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In this chapter, the discussion of the interviews is preceded by a restatement of how 
a phenomenological attitude is helpful to allowing for a tapping into the lived human 
experience of racial identity and identification as they did.  
Next, themes extracted from the interviews are presented, supported by and 
interspersed with verbatim expressions of the co-researchers during the interview 
conversations (Johnson, 1998; Polkinghorne, 1989; Reid, Flowers & Larkin, 2005; 
Robson, 2002; Singleton & Furber, 2014). The co-researchers’ responses revolved 
around answering the main question of “how do you think people of your race have 
been treating you in the past and are treating you now?”, the intention of which was 
to gain an exploratory description of the experience of the phenomenon (Chung, 
2010; Lauver, 2010; McManus, Peerbhoy, Larkin & Clark, 2010; Singleton & Furber, 
2014) behind the racial labels of blackness and whiteness. This anchoring question 
was used to explore same-race prejudice, and how it emerges and is played out or 
done.  
The chapter ends with an explication act (Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), which is my 
reflection of what the themes extracted from the co-researchers’ interviews are 
understood to be with regard to same-race prejudice. This also serves as an 
introduction to the next chapter. 
My initial assumption was that a person’s economic status would correlate with the 
nature of work that they do, hence their work would determine whether they are 
economically affluent or not. This could be determined by where they worked and the 
nature of the work they did. As can be seen later in this chapter, this was challenged 
in some of the interviews held – see the interviews with Mokgopo, Stephans, Ranko 
and Belinda. 
While I use the chapter to serve as an attempt to move away from the naturalist 
attitude embedded in the taken-for-granted self and other definitions regarding the 
races of black and white in both Chapters 2 and 3, I still consider the interview 
themes gleaned in the research as essentialist and objectivist. 
I consider the chapter to be an example of descriptive phenomenological research 
based on the following two points. First, the co-researchers’ description of their 
interactions with others are a reflection of an uncontested objective reality of same-
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race prejudice quantifiable in dichotomies of acceptability against unacceptability, 
normativity against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity and 
prototypicality against non-prototypicality of a race. This is shown by not reflectively 
critiquing one’s assertions about experiences whose reality is naively taken for 
granted as true.   
Additionally, I consider the researcher’s systematic use of bracketing pre-
suppositions and prior knowledge to give hope for a possible access by the 
researcher to an uncontested core essence of the phenomenon of same-race 
prejudice. The use of bracketing portrays the researcher’s role as a neutral expert 
objectively having access to and reporting on uncontested truths. Although these 
themes are about experiential definitions, the experience of same-race prejudice is 
rendered by the two different but complementary positions and roles by myself and 
the co-researchers as merely out there, as what is reported on and done by others to 
them. As not including the selves of both myself and co-researchers in the moment 
and act of defining, offering a critique that does not critique the critiquing self, the 
same-race prejudice themes and race definition themes offered from interviews are 
marked in essentialist normalisation tendencies. 
6.2  PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE INTERVIEWS  
In pondering about the research matter, I had to confront my own race definition 
stereotypes as couched in and subsumed under general assumptions of social 
perception (literature definitions in Chapter 2 and interview descriptions in Chapter 3 
of this thesis). This included defining the races of black and white in distinct 
observable physical terms. My perception was not unique from the general 
perception, as it too was essentialist and reducible to quantifiable characteristics. I 
had to rely on a naturalist lens which was blinded from and unknown to the 
phenomenological attitude, which is less concerned with the observable functional 
qualities of things (Ryba, 1991). 
Necessarily, I needed to begin with a naturalist stand in order to begin to shift from 
the glorified cultural and ethnic essentialisation of the races, to their subjectively lived 
experiential definitions. This is a view guided by Franz Bretano’s (1838-1917) sage 
phenomenology (Converse, 2012; Dowling, 2007; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Laverty, 
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2003), which indicates the need to view race and racial being as phenomena whose 
nature goes beyond the observable physical, to their descriptions and definitions as 
they appear in subjective human experiences (Spiegelberg, 1965). 
Durrheim et al. (2011), Tochluk (2010) and the conversation descriptions reflected 
upon in Chapter 3 of this thesis show that, in South Africa and elsewhere, race 
distinctions still run supreme. People’s living spaces are an objectified race-
dominated existence where the objective race serves as a definer and marker of 
belonging. This racial thinking of seeking identity in the physical body (James, 2001; 
Mallon, 2013; Matsinhe, 2011) not only obscures but also ignores personalised 
experiences beyond the observable, robbing existence of its human experience 
(Converse, 2012; Earle, 2010; Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Laverty, 
2003).  
Years after South Africa’s apartheid race laws have been officially repealed, the 
races of black and white still exist in clear distinction from each other (Hammett, 
2010; Malefane, 2012; Meintjies, 2012; Seekings, 2008; Sesanti, 2008). They still 
regard each other with suspicion, and conflict and threat loom eminently between 
them (Durrheim et al., 2011). The outlawing of racial discrimination did not make 
their distinctions insignificant (Tochluk, 2010). Being white is likened to being 
differently and relatively advantaged in life (Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 2001; Lipsitz, 
2006; Mayor, 2002; Steck et al., 2003; Tochluk, 2010), as is shown by the race 
definitions in Chapter 3 and in this chapter’s interview conversations. Blackness has 
not shed its historical relative inferior social standing, involuntary subordination and 
servitude to whiteness (Brooks & Rada, 2002; James, 2001; Lipsitz, 2006; Tate, 
2005; Yancy, 2004).   
Even laws that are intended to reverse apartheid South Africa’s disadvantages of 
racial distinctions (Du Toit, 2006; Gready, 2009; Jones, 2006; Malherbe, 2011; Small 
& Grant, 2005) serve to solidify the distinctions between black and white, and 
blackness as inherently different from whiteness (Sesanti, 2008).  
We set ourselves up traps of racial distinctions because we hope that the best 
course of action is to get rid of the distinctions (Anderson, 2012; Peters, 2012). Race 
has not shifted from its history of not only determining opportunities that accrue to 
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people, but also how we define ourselves and others (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013; 
Weber, 2013). While it is not my intention in this thesis to comment about the merits 
or demerits of political, economic and social arrangements of the apartheid and 
present political era in South Africa, previously white people benefitted from a 
system that affirmed their whiteness at the expense of black people (Budlender & 
Lund, 2011; Guillebeau, 1999; Jarmon, 2010; Pillay & Karlsson, 2013). The present 
setup is such that black people are affirmed to benefit from their blackness at the 
expense of white people (Guillebeau, 1999; Thompson, 2006).  
The perception of racialised bodies crept into my curiosity as I thought about the 
selection of co-researchers for this research. The mere allocation of people into 
black and white, and economically affluent and not affluent, made me realise how 
trapped I am in the naturalist attitude. Even the venerable Franz Boas, with his 
epoch-making propositions of countering physical anthropological race perceptions 
(Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006), was not left unscathed by racial profiling. A proponent 
of a thinking that does not see black and white as biologically superior or inferior to 
each other, his tenet of black and white as culturally dissimilar and all worthy of 
recognition in the space of human existence, was different from other thinking, but 
entrenched the races as distinctively dissimilar. In the same way, the pro-black, pro-
African-American supporter Du Bois said that, “that there are differences between 
the White and Black races is certain, but just what those differences are is known to 
none with an approach to accuracy” (Williams, 2006, p. 36). This led to a clubbing 
together of each race in a way that insulates it from and denies it self-scrutiny 
(Frakenberg, 1993). 
With a belief in people’s multiple and varied understanding, life backgrounds and 
contesting definitions of their living circumstances, suppressed or overtly known, I 
was inspired to encourage the conversational interviews to unfold in the manner that 
they appeared. Their nature and content are meant to dispel the notion of a simplistic 
objective race that is quantifiable, to an illuminated race experience as a 
phenomenon of a subjectively lived human encounter. Challenging my assumptions 
and those of the co-researchers about blackness and whiteness, to be deduced from 
the conversations and reflections on the conversations, is the introduction of a notion 
that our objective and obviously existing races are a phenomenon whose physical 
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naturalness exists only as conferred by humans in experience (Johnson, 1998; 
Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Spichiger, 2009). 
The debate in Chapter 1 of this thesis about Brett Murray, the painting of Jacob 
Zuma and the counter-reactions to them, the philosophical views of black and 
blackness (Anderson, 1995; Baloyi, 2008; Hountondji, 1997; Musopole, 1994; 
Senghor, 1997), as well as the observation by the National Association of Black 
Social Workers about white families adopting black children (Shiao et al., 2004), are 
all popular voices  (Eatough & Smith, 2006a) about and against a particular defined 
race. The popular voices encapsulate the tendency not to see their singular and 
partial form, thereby instilling and perpetuating the stereotypes of being, as well as 
prejudice not only between, but also within each particular race. It is in challenging 
these popular voices, as I do throughout the thesis, that a phenomenological stance 
alerts one of the flawed and limiting frameworks of understanding and description of 
race, to being oriented to race being a nuanced experiential and lived reality 
(Eatough & Smith, 2006a, 2006b). 
A study by Spichiger (2009) indicates how terminally ill patients can equate an 
ordinary stay in hospital with being in prison or heaven. It shows how being 
terminally ill in hospital goes beyond being carried in the physical body as unitary, 
singular and uniform, to being multi-faceted in lived experiences. This understanding 
shall never be accessed if we only concentrate on the popular debates of describing 
existence in titles that give credence only to names reliant on objective distinctions 
(Brown, 2008; Cappiccie et al., 2012; Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010). 
Phenomenological understanding, as a guide behind the interviews in this chapter, 
argues for a race that is not only what is there (Dusi, Girelli, Tacconi & Sità, 2011), 
as “not an object that stands before one” and as “not something that runs its course 
behind one” (Johnson, 1998, p. 200). It allows one to not only be concerned with the 
name of a particular race, but also to appreciate and empathise with the feeling and 
experiencing human being (Johnson, 1998). Always concerned with the race 
phenomenon of human meaning, it is oriented to the inner life, to living and being 
identified with a particular race. 
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Black people’s existential struggle of betweenness in being (Anderson, 1995; Biko, 
1978; Hartigan, 2010; Mahon, 2004; Pucherova, 2011; Sampson, 1999), being 
formally defined as black, self-classifying and re-aligning their race contours as a 
“whitened black” (Bailey et al., 2013), yet as non-white, show the multiplicity of racial 
experience that goes beyond the quantifiable features of the physical in the popular 
voices. Viewing racial being as a lived phenomenon, the interview conversations 
should lay the ground for realising that how we distinguish blackness from 
whiteness, and the self from the other, is similar to how blackness, whiteness, the 
self or the other defines itself within.  
Guided by a phenomenological lens of prioritising people’s experiences, the themes 
arising from the semi-structured interview conversations with each of the eight co-
researchers highlight the importance of temporarily bracketing one’s theoretical 
understandings (Eatough & Smith, 2008; Merriam, 2009; Polkinghorne, 1989; 
Robson, 2002; Wertz, 1985) to appreciate peoples’ inside understanding in what is 
termed “letting the data speak for itself” (McManus et al., 2010; Ray & Vanstone, 
2009; Reid et al., 2005; Singleton & Furber, 2014; Spichiger, 2009). The verbatim 
recording of the interviews is meant for unravelling and understanding the lived 
(Eatough & Smith, 2006b) phenomenon of prejudice within the black and the white 
races. 
6.3 THE FORMAL INTERVIEWS 
Deduced from the formal interviews, same-race prejudice is made up of objectivist, 
essentialist and quantifiable virtues of the phenomenon of race. Guided by a 
naturalist attitude, it is displayed through notions that define a race in objective and 
quantifiable virtues of acceptability against unacceptability, authenticity against 
inauthenticity, normativity against non-normativity and prototypicality against non-
prototypicality of identity and identification within the race. Those assumed to have 
none or less of the authentic, normative, prototypical and acceptable virtues are 
categorised as different, judged and labelled as inauthentic, non-normative, non-
prototypical and unacceptable to the race. 
For white and whiteness, the looks of the physical body, nature of work, how much 
one earns at work, educational qualifications, interpersonal manners, work 
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experience and material possessions are the virtues that serve as a yardstick for 
categorisation and differential treatment. Intolerant quick assumptions were made 
about Danie’s lack of the required looks and about Belinda doing a less respectable 
job. Magda considered disrespectful white people to be odd. Danie was aware of his 
lack of the qualifying virtues for a normative, authentic and protypical white, hence 
his use of self-isolation. Belinda’s use of the qualifying comment that “it is by all the 
car guard, but there is actually no work out there” indicated her awareness of her 
lack of whiteness’s preferred virtues. Stephans and Magda portrayed themselves as 
having the virtues of an authentic, normative and prototypical white racial identity 
and identification. For Stephans, these were the requisite trade qualification and 
work experience, while for Magda, her interpersonal manners, and work and 
educational qualifications indicated these virtues. 
For black and blackness, such qualifying virtues are material possessions, 
employment and economic affluence. Those with less or none of these are treated 
with intolerance, categorised and labelled as non-prototypical, non-normative, 
inauthentic and unacceptable to blackness. They become subjects of negative social 
judgement and grading for not being materially affluent, for example Mokgopo, 
whose friend was called “mahlalela” (loafer); Ranko, whose colleagues isolated him; 
and Simangele, who was deserted after losing her job. Thulisile, Mokgopo, Ranko 
and Simangele were all aware of how being differentially graded set the boundaries 
between them and others within the race and disqualified them from acceptable, 
normative, authentic and prototypical racial identity and identification. Thulisile 
mentioned the stereotypes people have about work and nature of work, and the 
possession of clothes and accessories. For Mokgopo, it was the stereotypes about 
cars, clothes and houses people have that contribute to the labelling and othering of 
people. With a sense of pride and positive social judgement, Simangele spoke of 
how her newly found employment brought people back into her social sphere, as 
now being acceptable, authentic, normative and prototypical. Better than those peers 
who dropped early from school, Ranko considered himself “an advanced man”. 
Each interview is discussed separately below. 
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6.3.1 Belinda: “It is all by the car guards” 
Belinda was a 52-year-old white female car guard at an open car parking lot 
surrounding several shopping outlets. I classified her as not being economically 
affluent. The interview was held on 13 April 2013 at her place of work.  
As if not concerned with what was happening, Belinda did not ask any questions. 
She merely responded to the questions asked, personally detached from the story, 
as if talking about someone else, and with no personal connectedness to the detail. 
It was not easy to draw any personal feelings from her regarding whether she was 
pleased with these events or not. The themes extracted from the interview with 
Belinda are presented below. 
6.3.1.1 Justification 
Although none of the questions raised with her asked why she was living the life that 
she did, Belinda offered answers that came mainly in the form of justifications why 
she was doing the kind of work she did. This made me wonder about the possibility 
that she could be judged every day, required to be on the defensive for her kind of 
occupation. When asked how being treated in this way made her feel, she 
responded, “bad. But I work long enough here to manage all that, the good ones and 
the bad ones”. 
She indicated that she relied upon her religion, saying: 
I work more nine years. Ups and downs. It is life. You cannot say it is that 
person’s fault not to go further. You must believe in God that you will make 
the best of every day. Go to work every day with faith. 
Regarding why she thought that those who said she should go look for another job 
that is better were wrong, she said: 
but there are no jobs really. I did this job for nine years. Some people are 
good, some are bad. But we handle it because it is our work. But it is the 
position you are in that says you must come and do this work. They think 
you can make better money by other places. But work is work in my eyes, 
because in financial quotes there are people without food at night. There 
are people who do not want to work for R2000 or R3000 a month, saying 
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that is not money. For me if you have a piece of bread at night, you have 
enough food to eat.  
She made a comparison between herself and those who are homeless and jobless: 
So many people out there who look into dustbins for something to eat. I 
have got a job. Not a big one. Roof over my head, bed. I am willing to 
work, whether I make R50 or R100 a day. It is work. 
On her style of using money, she said that, “if I were to answer, I say I am successful 
because I have everything I want. Not many to spend every day, but have the 
necessary things, clothes, bed, roof, food. That is enough in life.” She added that it is 
enough to be able to “pay all your expenses every month, put away R100 or R200, 
because today’s life is expensive.” 
6.3.1.2  Normalising bad treatment 
Not questioning how she and other car guards are treated, Belinda resigned to 
saying that: 
all car guard are treated like that. Some people are good, some are bad, 
but we handle it because it is our work. The other people also complain 
about that. But it is by the car guards, all at Checkers, at Game. 
6.3.1.3  Differentially categorised and looked down upon 
Belinda noticed that people have a tendency to categorise others and that for them 
as car guards, being categorised as different resulted in being looked down upon. 
Trying to play it down, she said: 
but there is a few bad people who look at you and say, no thank you. Not 
bad in a way…. They think they are better than the people who look after 
the cars. It is really bad. I think they are rich, that is why they are, or they 
do not like…. Say go look for a better job. 
She used the same differentiation and categorisation of people: “The regular people 
behave like regular people, but people who are rich look down on you.” 
The boundary between them as car guards and the other people is marked by 
assumptions about the kind of work one does: 
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We think they are rich because they drive larney cars, come out with lots 
of groceries. They think they got some money. Where I stay people know 
me as a person, not by the work I do. There is no better or bad ones. It is 
just here at work. Maybe white people look down at car guards because 
they say go get a better job, you are not supposed to be here.  
On a first reading of her account of events, the temptation is to identify her as 
someone who was making simple justifications of doing a car guard’s work. Further 
dwelling on her story reveals the extent of “differentness” she endured in her daily 
work, making her justifications necessary. 
She seemed surprised at the different treatment between what she called regular 
people, who understood her situation, and rich people, who were judgemental of it. 
She was aware of how differently car guards are treated, that their chosen work is 
not in conformity with expected work ideals, and how they are treated as outsiders 
because of this. She saw that she was subject to irregular and surprising treatment, 
which she had to endure for survival purposes, “only here at work”. 
Her justification and normalisation responses appear to be an attempt to either 
minimise the regularity at which the treatment occurred or to deem it insignificant. 
While she was viewed and treated in a prejudiced way for her car guard status and 
as living un-white, her reaction to this appears to regard the treatment as 
uncharacteristic of being white. This view is discriminatory of a view that 
discriminates against her, based on a stereotyping way of perceiving and expecting 
how one should be. Either as their view of her or her view of their view about her, 
each perceives itself as a prototypical (Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999) white way of being, refusing to consider itself as an alternative among many. 
6.3.2  Stephans: “I have earned my respect” 
Stephans was a 33-year-old white male butchery manager. Before this interview, I 
assumed him to not be economically affluent. I later re-classified him as being 
economically affluent. This interview was held at his place of work, the butchery, on 
15 April 2013.  
Not asking any questions, but merely responding to those asked, he presented 
himself as satisfied with the details of the story, the things he related. It seemed like 
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a story of normal and deserved events for him and others. The themes extracted 
from the interview with Stephans are presented below. 
6.3.2.1 Hard work earns high status 
Stephans opined that one’s progress in life is only made certain through a specific 
attitude towards life by those who can specifically work hard, and by implication not 
idle wishful thinking. Hard work earns one a better and higher life status: “Like I said, 
it was hard in the beginning. That is exactly the reason why I am here today.” 
6.3.2.2 Educational qualification and work trade experience 
Considering that working hard to acquire a requisite educational qualification and 
acquiring enough work experience should make navigating life spaces with ease, 
Stephans said: “I have been in this trade for 14 years now. I have qualifications in 
this trade. Was hard when I was at the bottom, struggling, learning the job. Never 
easy.” 
6.3.2.3 A trade or educational qualification is a commodity 
Stephans saw people’s worth as measured in terms of their educational or trade 
qualification: “Especially in our culture. If you do not have a qualification behind your 
name, you are considered a nothing.” To be respected, one needs an educational 
qualification. It is a yardstick that indicates that a person is worth taking seriously. “A 
trade or qualification comes first. That is what makes a person these days. 
Everybody respects you for your qualification.” A qualification is a commodity that 
“nobody can take away from you”, that can be used in one’s favour. 
6.3.2.4 Educational qualification, work experience and respect 
If a qualification is a commodity that can be wielded in one’s favour, being less 
qualified leads to receiving unfair treatment. Educational and work qualification boost 
confidence and pride in social circles, as indicated in Stephans’ statement: 
Where I stay they treat me well. Everybody has their own trade. I cannot 
tell a miner how to do his job, that is what he is trained for, that is his 
industry. Likewise I am in the butchery industry, people cannot tell me 
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what to do. Respect is always good if you respect people for their trade, 
then they will respect you for your own trade.  
6.3.2.5 Trade experience, educational qualification and confidence 
According to Stephans, without hard work, a person will not reap the rewards of a 
high life status that an educational qualification brings with hard work and dedication. 
This will not allow one to get the better work experience that such a life offers. 
Without these, one will not benefit from the respect accorded by others, and one’s 
confidence will amount to naught. He said: “If I was out of work, still living with my 
parents, I would not have any confidence.” 
To be deduced from the above themes is an essentialist whiteness defined in 
specific virtues (Frakenberg, 1993; Hartigan, 2010; Lipsitz, 2006; Tochluk, 2010; 
Yancy, 2004) in which Stephans took pride. Although he seemed to be aware of a 
differently defined whiteness, that of idleness and not pursuing higher educational 
qualifications, its core values seem to be less preferred and more discouraged 
(Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; Sibanda, 2012; Wray, 2006).  
Gunning for higher educational qualifications, working hard and having more work 
experience appeared to be Stephans’ ideal. He seemed to be complacently 
unquestioning of a whiteness defined as such. He saw being treated badly as a 
springboard for one to working hard and bettering oneself: “When somebody is hard 
on you, it is for your own benefit. It motivates you as a person, to have more. It is 
worth living. The harder you work, the more you will accomplish.” 
His defined whiteness normalises the unfavourable treatment given to the less 
qualified, making it an expected social norm, a required motivation for people to 
strive for more. It raises the problem of inadvertently blaming those less 
educationally qualified, and those holding lower positions at work and everywhere, 
for being treated unfavourably.  
The interview with Stephans displays a partial whiteness encompassed in its defined 
virtues in whose extolling alternative whiteness is ignored or suppressed. The 
alternative whiteness becomes eschewed for being non-conforming to the preferred 
ideal whiteness. 
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6.3.3 Danie: “Just give me a chance” 
Danie was a 40-year-old white man without permanent employment, whom I 
classified as not being economically affluent. He was interviewed on 16 April 2013 at 
the place where I found him doing temporary work.  
Continuously engaging the interview, he expressed personal relatedness to his story. 
He recounted unhappiness with life events as related, viewing himself as more of a 
victim and appealing for fairness. The themes extracted from the interview with 
Danie are presented below. 
6.3.3.1 Isolated for being different 
His lack of the “looks” and not adhering to the expected dress code made Danie to 
be differently marked, as shown in his statement that: 
If I can’t go to the casino, not having enough money to be in their group, 
not having the looks, they classify you. They say you are not a VIP, you 
are a poor guy, you have got nothing we are interested in. 
The isolation permeated even in the private territory where he lived, with the 
described comfort seeming to be one-sided, only serving the other: “Where we stay 
we try to make it as comfortable as we can and live with each other. We do not sit in 
one kitchen and eat. It is just hello, goodbye.” 
6.3.3.2 Preferential treatment 
Public space like the shopping area illuminated Danie’s differentness: 
If you go to town you have to be pretty fine. I am from work now. If you go 
to the shop they do not treat you well like when you come there dressed 
neat… Ja… You can see the attitude changes totally from the customer 
that was in front of you, that is neat and tidy, wallet with money. 
6.3.3.3 Feeling pushed away and restricted 
Being marked and treated as different filled him with feelings of being pushed aside 
and restricted in showing what he was capable of. The feelings were summed up in 
appeals for equal recognition and appreciation: 
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I know I can be of better use to someone, just give me a chance. It pushes 
us back from doing what we love to do, because they look at how you 
dress and say you are not part of them. Push you away. Judge you.  
Pushed away as different caused him to wonder about belonging, as when he said: 
“makes me pushed away because I am also a South African. I am born here. I do not 
have the finances to live overseas like everyone.” 
6.3.3.4 Rushed judgement 
People easily judged him, not considering him as one of their kind and calling him 
names. They judged him by where he stayed, and how he looked and dressed, and 
would say “this is a hobo or whatever even if I come from work. They….” 
6.3.3.5 Avoided 
People’s judgement of him and those of his kind, make others “not bother if you are 
lying next to the road busy dying.” 
6.3.3.6 Isolation 
He deliberately isolated himself and steered clear of situations that would expose 
him to further social ridicule and humiliation: “Me too I also do not go to that guy 
because I will be treated the same way.” 
6.3.3.7 Material possessions as social markers of inclusion/exclusion 
In combination with physical looks and dress code, what one possesses or does not 
possess serves as a yardstick for one’s inclusion or exclusion in social 
engagements. These are used as visible markers of judging others and making 
sweeping statements about them. These are markers of their differentness from the 
rest, used to exclude those who do not have them.  
The more material possessions one has, the higher the social status one is 
accorded. Danie said: “They treat you in terms of what you have, status. The way, 
your appearance, what you have. If you do not have a brand new Mercedes or a 
motorbike, you are not welcome in this.” In these words are laid bare the excruciating 
experiences meted out by the status-driven whiteness that uses outward looks as 
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yardstick for inclusion or exclusion, a whiteness whose demeanour isolates and 
judges those who are not smartly dressed or not materially affluent. 
Danie was baffled at this uncharacteristic whiteness, wondering whether it is 
handmaiden from the new South Africa or whether he was too young to notice it 
before: 
It is worse now than it was before. Because everybody says each for 
himself and God for his own. People do not care for each other. I do not 
know if it is going over from apartheid into the new era, white people 
saying, with an attitude, well carry on, I do not worry about the next 
person. 
The tendency to dismember, isolate and disown his uncharacteristic whiteness by 
other white people caused him discomfort because it is not in line with his expected 
ideals of whiteness. To disown and name them uncharacteristic of whiteness is to 
perpetuate stereotypes that name, isolate, exclude and socially other, although 
Danie seemed to wonder whether that is authentic whiteness.  
6.3.4 Thulisile: “Doing domestic like work” 
Thulisile was a black woman who did not disclose her age, working as a cleaner 
outside a shopping complex. I categorised her as not being economically affluent. 
This interview was conducted at her place of work, the car parking area, on 16 April 
2013. 
A victim of those around her, with evilness and unfairness directed at her, Thulisile 
expressed a personally involving story as someone who was unhappy and dealt a 
heavy blow. Although not happy with the events in the story, she presented it as the 
truth by not asking any questions. Providing a free-flowing account of the events, she 
did not need much probing to give details. The themes from the interview with 
Thulisile are presented below. 
6.3.4.1 Preconceptions, rumours and attitudes 
People can easily develop preconceived ideas about others, and are fond of making 
rumours about them based on these ideas, thereby making it easy to develop 
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attitudes about them due to those unfounded conceptions, as Thulisile indicated in 
the following statement:  
People would just have an attitude towards you without knowing you, 
especially women. Women can be evil. Competing with you can cause you 
to kill yourself. They talk and act. There were bad rumours about me fed 
into people. It was horrible for people to accuse me of things I did not do. I 
told myself that it is only God who knows what I did. Continued to live my 
life even if it was not enjoyable. They got the influence from my aunt. She 
thought it better to spread the bad rumours about me. 
6.3.4.2 Being undermined 
Because of people’s preconceived ideas about other people, their attitudes towards 
others will be of an undermining nature. Thulisile said:  
Even the job that I do causes one to be undermined. If people see you do 
work like domestic work, they think of themselves as being better than 
you. They take you for a stupid for doing a domestic like work.  
They categorise themselves and others based on outward looks, thereby developing 
judgements of disregard for the other: 
Because they regard you as doing a useless job compared to what they 
are doing, even if our pay is the same, just because they look more 
presentable than you. Maybe them working in the shade, me in the open 
sun, me working with garbage. 
Being lowly regarded makes one feel disrespected. Preoccupying one’s mind with it 
can take your focus off important life tasks: “Sometimes you can stay with it the rest 
of your life. I can see that had I been taking these seriously, I was going to reach that 
decision because Witbank is not right.” 
6.3.4.3 Materialistic competition 
Thulisile considered that having the outward looks of being better helps one to gain a 
sense of respect and positive regard. This makes people to want to live an 
impressive life “with the clothes they wear, food they eat, accessories, necklaces that 
are up to a standard of the rich though the person is poor. At the end impressing 
people on the street at the expense of those at home.” The need to be positively 
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regarded leads to spending “what we cannot financially afford, to be seen to belong 
and not to be undermined because of our low status jobs.” 
6.3.4.4 Materialism as being better 
Thulisile opined that a better life is defined as being materially well off. Most people 
want to associate with this assumed better life. They show off more than they have, 
and are driven by a mind to be rich because of the negative stereotypes about 
looking poor and being pitied: 
The mind-set to want to be rich, to be rich in a short spell of time, in a 
miracle, even if they do not afford it at that time. At the end you have to 
borrow money from loan sharks. 
No one wants to be associated with the stereotype of being black and poor: “Wanting 
to be seen. Wanting to look to be affording even when not. Mostly people are 
stereotype. They want to be seen. Possible for a person staying in a shack wanting 
to behave like someone staying in town.” 
6.3.5 Mokgopo: “It is showing off and wanting fame” 
Mokgopo, a 30-year-old black male petrol attendant, was interviewed on 18 April 
2013 at his place of employment. Although I have, for the purpose of this research, 
classified him here as not being economically affluent, his definition of himself and 
his situation differed from my classification. He seemed to consider his situation as 
economically affluent. 
Mokgopo talked about himself but only as aloof and immune to the events around 
due to his working status and economic affluence. Merely giving an account of 
events happening out there to others by others, he mostly did not see himself as 
implicated in the events mentioned, either as a victim or as victimising others. The 
themes extracted from the interview with Mokgopo are described below. 
6.3.5.1 Competing definitions of blackness 
Mokgopo described being black in an essentialist and quantifiable way (Mahalingam, 
2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 2011; Wagner et al., 2010). For him, blackness is what 
it is not supposed to be, yet it is what and how it is. It is characterised by ways of 
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being that are deemed uncharacteristic of it. He alluded to an exclusionary blackness 
that he excluded in his definition of the preferred blackness:  
We are competing as black people. We do not want others to achieve 
things before us. We always want to be the ones on top. It is not well. It 
makes you feel bad and think of bad things, and these are family people. 
People will pull one down from progressing, are preferentially and conditionally 
respectful of others, and are inclined to bragging and being competitively displaying 
of their material possessions. He attributed this to wanting fame, showing off and 
being after status. Because “we always want to be the one on top,” black people 
compete among each other. Their materialistically driven lives search for success 
that is defined in terms of cars, clothes and houses. 
From this, I sense the materially affluent black that engages with the not materially 
affluent black in a demeaning way, seeing it as unrepresentative of its race. The 
latter would endure being disregarded for being unrepresentative of the authentic 
blackness. However, as Mokgopo indicated, the materially bragging black people are 
viewed by the less materially affluent as being after fame. The latter view the 
former’s nature as uncharacteristic of the authentic blackness.  
While challenging the materialistic definition of a successful living, he seemed to be 
secretly pursuing that ideal for the benefits it brings one, as seen in the statement 
that “they treat me well now that I am working.” His unstated blackness is but the 
opposite of the blackness that he sees. 
6.3.5.2  Not being respected 
Working and being in gainful employment is equated with having enough material 
belongings to be taken seriously. “Even when you speak, they just let you on, not 
seriously considering what you say,” said Mokgopo of those without work and with 
less materially. Respect is earned by having accumulated material possessions that 
one can show off.  
6.3.5.3  Changing graded positions 
According to Mokgopo, as one’s material standing changes, so does the type of 
treatment and attention one gets from others. Respect and social standing are 
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commensurate with material standing. Like being sifted through, one’s social 
standing is a graded one: “They treat me well now that I am working. They used to 
treat me so bad. They did not respect me.” 
6.3.5.4   Name calling 
Mokgopo indicated that being called degrading names, given differential treatment, 
and socially graded according to what one materially possesses and whether one is 
in gainful employment or not, happens in the family and on the street:  
I know it from my own experience. They disregard you, but they are your 
family, friends, people on the street. They tell you without a blink of an eye 
that you are ‘umahlalela’ (loafer). I know of a friend. They do not respect or 
treat him well where he stays. They call him names and say that his peers 
are working while he is loitering around.  
6.3.5.5  Bragging about material possessions 
According to Mokgopo, one’s status in society is determined by one’s material 
possessions – the more one has, the higher the status. Status is actively sought by 
displaying what one has, to be taken seriously. It is generally acknowledged that the 
clothes one puts on, the house one lives in and the car one drives earn one status. 
People end up competing to accumulate more of these relative to what others have: 
“Clothes, house, car. How they live life at home, comparing and assuming that they 
are better, live better and that those with less than them cannot tell them anything.” 
6.3.5.6   Competitive jealousy 
Mokgopo indicated that, while it seems that the more one has the better, it may also 
make one suffer the brunt of jealousy from those around you. Material possessions 
are competitively sought for and everybody seeks to be the one to get more and 
better first: 
Here at work, this person got a driver’s license. In life we are not similar. 
People have different aspirations and plans in life. If you beat them at what 
they hoped to achieve, they would not like it. We were the last ones to 
arrive here at work, which makes them unhappy. If you study or acquire a 
driver’s license they would not like it that way. They would open you office 
cases.   
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6.3.5.7 Definitions by others and by ourselves 
Mokgopo made a distinction of appraisal of people’s situations by themselves and by 
others. How we are defined by others is often loaded in unfavourable, negative, 
inaccurate and less preferred appraisals. Examples are when people are called 
derogatory names and not respected. Just as he could not understand the attitude 
meted at him before finding work, so he was baffled at how his unemployed friend 
was being called names. 
6.3.6 Simangele: “Back on my feet again” 
A 44-year-old black female project director, Simangele was interviewed at her place 
of employment on 30 April 2013. I categorised her as being economically affluent. 
Merely responding to questions asked, Simangele told a story of personal pride. With 
a few moments of mistreatment having befallen her, the incidents of segregation she 
talked about seemed to be mostly about others, as either done or endured. As if 
making a statement that economic affluence buffers against mistreatment or 
tendency to acting unfairly, she gave a personally detached story. The themes 
extracted from the interview with Simangele are discussed below. 
6.3.6.1  Social standing, material possessions and recognition 
Simangele described that people’s social standing correlates with the state of their 
material possessions. When they gain material possessions, which she termed being 
“up”, they are also better regarded in society. Their social connections increase. 
When they lose material possessions, they become socially isolated as everyone 
who associated with them cuts them off: 
When you have something or are something, people will treat you 
differently than a person who does not have anything. Everyone would 
want to be part of your life. If today I am in a higher position, I will definitely 
have more friends. If tomorrow I lose that position, I will lose the friends 
also. 
6.3.6.2  Materially conditioned social life 
In Simangele’s view, people are judged and valued in terms of what they have. They 
are driven to acquire more, due to being socially pressured or wanting to use it as a 
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buffer against the unfavourable attention given when they have less. Materially 
defined success is pursuit in terms of what can be quantifiable: “Other people define 
success by having lots of money, maybe having a degree, having a better job… Yes, 
better position”. 
6.3.6.3 More is better 
For Simangele, having more than others is regarded as better. The more one has, 
the more people would be around one and the merrier: 
People expect something out of a relationship or whatever. If you are not 
in a position to can give out… then…. I have a friend who lost everything. 
She lost a car. In that process she lost her friends also. Now she is up. 
She has got a tender. She is back on her feet and people are back again 
in her life. 
Portrayed in this is a juxtaposition of a life that is materially driven and the ideal life 
that one wishes for. The materially lived life is contrary to her espoused virtues of a 
decent life. Although she realised that people congregate around each other based 
on material possessions, this did not form the core of her ideal human living. As if 
puzzled by it, although using the same material distinctions of being up and not 
being up, she said that: 
I was once in a position of power. When I lost that position, people left. I 
became alone. Now again I got another higher position in this company. 
You will find that you have more people in your life. Those who 
disappeared came back. Even the ones who left would find their way back. 
She separated herself from the very distinctions that she made. She did not realise 
that she found meaning in the very values she eschewed by the distinctions she 
made. One does not realise that, by wishing to wipe off the materially driven values 
as toxic to blackness, one denies what is meaningfully continuous with itself and 
driving it to be what it is. It is to exclude that which is not only in the self, but is the 
self. Making distinctions within disembowels the wholeness of blackness. By 
pronouncing her preferred characteristic black life as opposed to the practised, she 
set boundaries of what it is to be and is not to be. 
 138 
 
She resorted to religious explanations to minimise the effect of material striving on 
her: “I am a child of God. I accept. I do not have a problem with it. My friends who left 
in those days are still my friends.” 
6.3.7 Magda: “It is the odd people” 
Magda, a 50-year-old white female store manager, was interviewed at her place of 
work on 2 May 2013. I classified her as being economically affluent. 
Magda recounted a distant story of life unfolding out there with little relevance to her. 
Seeing herself as a perfect, balanced and prejudice-free individual, she portrayed 
herself as being buffered from discriminating and being discriminated against, with a 
few exceptions. The themes extracted from the interview with Magda are described 
below. 
6.3.7.1  The odd people, materialism and snobbishness 
As if materialism and snobbishness are not allowed, Magda described these as 
uncharacteristic displays by people she categorised as not fitting into her definition of 
being decent. Although she found these people to be few and far between, and 
considered that they should not be taken seriously, she found that they remain a 
reality: 
You get your odd people who actually do not have manners, respect and 
then I just ignore them. Odd people. You get people who do not know how 
to handle people, but then I handle them in the way I would like to be 
handled, in a decent way. 
Odd people and their lack of decency are seen through the snobbish way that they 
conduct themselves. This is shown in her response to the question, “do you think the 
position that people hold in society makes a difference in terms of how others treat 
them?”: 
I would say there are, especially in Witbank. There is lots of them. People 
who just think they are better than other people, in terms of their living, in 
terms of their cars, in terms of their whole outlook. They just think they are 
better. No, they have got money. They can buy all those big cars, big 
houses, all the children. 
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She acknowledged that materialistic snobbishness causes people to neglect certain 
aspects of their lives: “But once again, there is too much money in the family, there is 
actually no life because no support for the children.” She decried how people are so 
enamoured with the positions they hold and what they can materially show that 
nothing else counts, regarding which she said: 
if people think they are snob or think they are better than you, good for 
them. Let them be. Money is not everything in life. Money is definitely not 
everything. Respect people around you. If you want to be better than your 
next door neighbour, good for you. Do it, just leave me alone. 
6.3.7.2 Quick assumptions we make 
Positioning herself as not implicated in doing this, Magda noted that people are given 
to easily making quick assumptions about others before actually spending more time 
to know them, with attitudes towards them being informed by these assumptions that 
are so easily arrived at. However, she indicated that these assumptions are changed 
when spending time with them: “They change the whole attitude completely. They 
become more decent, talk to you in a decent way and decent manner. Ja….” 
She depicted a kind of whiteness that is manifested by odd white people, in their odd 
white characteristics, qualifying them as few and rarely occurring. She said that, “I 
would say still the same. I cannot actually see any difference,” as an answer to how 
she thought other white people were treating her, then and earlier. The rarity of the 
“odd people” and their behaviour came through again in her answer to the question, 
“have you seen any other people who have been treated favourably or 
unfavourably?”, to which she mentioned one person and said, “so this is basically the 
only experience I have.” 
She indicated a kind of whiteness that, despite its discontinuity with her generally 
upheld ideals of authentic whiteness, is still white. It may lack the decency of treating 
others with respect, “to greet you properly, to look you in the eyes when they talk to 
you,” yet it is still whiteness. 
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6.3.7.3 Work experience, educational qualification and respect 
Magda further indicated that work experience and educational qualifications make it 
easy to earn respect. They buffer one against the misgivings of disrespect and ill-
treatment. The more work experience one has and the higher one’s educational 
qualifications, the less likely one is to be negatively treated: 
People of my age are treating me on the same level. People younger than 
me are treating me with respect. What I have achieved for now with my 
background, qualifications and everything, I am successful. I am a very 
loyal person. I was working for the new government from 1994 to 2000. I 
was a private secretary/personal assistant for the minister, director 
general. 
One’s background in life insulates one from ill-treatment. It is a window through 
which one comes to look at life or is exposed to it. It is an enabling and limiting 
window into the world, whose perspective is part of the many in the whole. It serves 
here to discount odd characteristics displayed by white people as un-white, as 
unfitting to the normative, prototypical and authentic whiteness that is known. 
Challenging the odd people’s values of bragging and lack of respect, she cast them 
as insignificant, lacking the background and family influence she had. Regarding 
people lacking her behavioural repertoire, she said that those who “do not like me, it 
is fine, they can maar just carry on. This is fine with me.”   
This portrays the oddity within as non-existent or minimally of value, a character that 
plays little part in explaining whiteness. Their fewness and rarity of influence implies 
that snobbishness and materialism are un-white. She continued to other the self-
other that she considered not self-enough. The despairing parts are pitted in contest, 
each laying majority claim to the normativity, prototypicality and authenticity of 
whiteness, although the scale appears to be stacked against the odd whose 
whiteness is questioned. 
In dividing the indecent from the decent, the disrespectful from the respectful, one is 
not aware that the indecent is part of the decent, as is the latter part of the indecent, 
each rooted to its stereotyped corner prejudicing the other.  
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6.3.8 Ranko: “An advanced man” 
Ranko, a 60-year-old black male professional nurse working for a state-owned 
enterprise institution, was interviewed at his home on 5 May 2013. He is classified 
here as being economically affluent. 
Through an unemotional story of personal sadness recounted with pride about life 
and no questions asked, Ranko portrayed himself as not capable of discriminating 
others. His sense of personal pride and emotional detachment from the story, even 
when discriminated against, allowed him to be easily forthcoming with information. 
The themes extracted from the interview with Ranko are presented below. 
6.3.8.1 Comparative categorised living 
In Ranko’s view, people are seen as belonging to different categories whose unequal 
positioning are comparatively arranged. How they define themselves is dependent 
on their relative comparison with the other, each belonging to the same or different 
category. Definition of oneself derives from this comparative living as made by the 
self and others: 
People of my race, people around me. I would say that out of my own 
experience, they regard me as a respectable man, man with integrity. 
They think I am advanced, sort of living a fully-fledged developed life. I see 
myself to be successful, though it came through the hard way, even if it is 
in a mediocre way. 
Ranko’s social standing was not only judged or rated by others, comparing him with 
others, but also by him comparing himself with others. He showed this by saying 
that: 
I think it is because they know from my childhood, where I grew up 
because I am born and bred here. Taking into consideration my childhood, 
my parents, how they struggled from a disadvantaged position to be where 
I am today. 
This understanding is facilitated by comparative juxtaposition of the self against the 
other that serves as the background mirror. In this case, the other is those who have 
not achieved what the self has. The other is the many who: 
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are considered in a different way. Many that we reject because of their 
level of education, their status – they are not educated. Sort of putting a 
blame on them that they deliberately made it not to happen for them not to 
go to school.  
6.3.8.2 Isolation and exclusion 
Ranko indicated that those who are deemed as deliberately having not made it are 
blamed and treated in an inferior way. Made to feel inferior, they also isolate 
themselves and relate with you at a distance, to avoid further embarrassment: 
They look at you, compare themselves with you, and say they were with 
you at school. They keep the distance to associate with you. In their 
distance, they imagine you thinking that you view yourself as better than 
them. 
6.3.8.3 Social grading of categories within categories 
According to Ranko, living arrangements are depicted in marked graded positioning: 
“Jaa… social grading is marked. I would say even among family members. Ehe… 
you are not in my class therefore I would not associate with you.” 
Sub-categories are differentiated within delineated categories. As there are 
differentiations within families, so finer grading is done among those seen to be in 
the same class, making each other feel that their levels are dissimilar: 
Even my colleagues who are on a higher strata like doctors, managers 
and so on. They regard you as being on a lower class. Though they 
associate with you, they feel somehow you are inferior. Though you were 
with them at school, they consider themselves as being above you. 
6.3.8.4 Impermeable boundaries 
Ranko indicated that there are markers of difference to be crossed at one’s peril. He 
said the following about an acquaintance: 
Even if he relates with you and encourages you to pay him a visit, he 
would still make you feel that your lower status should be kept clearly 
marked. He would want you to visit them while they keep the distance by 
not visiting you themselves. 
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He further said that it makes one feel bad, “hence you end up not visiting them, 
dissociating yourself from those people and prefer to be with those of your own level. 
Those that are accepting you.” 
6.3.8.5 Materially marked boundaries 
When asked what these classing boundaries are based on, Ranko responded: “I say 
economics, economically. Like you cannot buy the same car they are buying. When 
they drive a Mercedes you shall be driving an Aveo.” It is based on educational 
qualifications or lack thereof and what one has achieved or not achieved materially. 
As a social grading by the self and others, Ranko also rated himself as successful 
based on tangible comparison with others in his living environment. He 
acknowledged the contesting sides of blackness and did not explicitly oppose or 
support either, although subtly living to the ideals of success, being “advanced and 
progressive.” He did not seem to realise how his cherished values are in line with 
and perpetuation of the materialistic whose blackness he at times laid in doubt. He 
did this by not realising that materialism is not in contravention of the authentic 
blackness. It does not negate being black. It is at the core of blackness, which sees it 
as a peripheral characteristic. The excluding, categorising and materialistic 
blackness is part of the assumed authentic, normative and prototypical blackness 
that wants to exclude and categorise it as another.  
6.4 A FURTHER EXPLICATION OF THE INTERVIEWS 
This is a deliberate, critical and thorough interrogation of the interview data aimed at 
distilling a general structure, a thick psychological description (Eatough & Smith, 
2008; Giorgi, 1994; Wertz, 1985) of the phenomenon of black on black and white on 
white prejudice. The results may often not tally with the co-researchers’ descriptions 
(Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), whose stories may be 
psychologically opaque (Eatough & Smith, 2008), and may not even make mention 
of the phenomenon of same-race prejudice.  
6.4.1 Prejudice unnamed 
None of the co-researchers mentioned same-race prejudice, intolerance or 
categorisation. If they did, they called these by different names. No one explicitly 
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claimed that these occurred in their lives. I make inference here from the references 
they made using different names.  
Being undermined and disrespected. This was repeatedly mentioned by both 
Mokgopo and Thulisile through feelings and experiences of being categorised and 
treated as a different other due to one’s economic status. They called this a 
competitive materialistic mentality. Unlike these two, Magda’s story was of her 
categorising people as different and other. 
Being judged and avoided.  Danie and Ranko mentioned the experience of being 
categorised as different and non-conforming, as well as the resultant intolerant 
treatment of avoidance to which people are subjected. They were being judged 
according to material possessions or lack thereof, for example, cars, clothes and 
houses. The avoidance results from and causes being undermined. 
6.4.2 Respect is a double-edged sword 
Exemplified in stories by Ranko, Simangele, Stephans and Mokgopo, respect and 
the resultant pride are not guaranteed virtues. It is given to and acquired by some 
and at some times, and denied and inaccessible to others and at other times, mostly 
dependent on changing material conditions. Those with less endure intolerable 
treatment and prejudice, for example few favourable social engagements. 
6.4.3 A natural arrangement 
Encouraged by a naturalist attitude, people are given to viewing something of the 
natural arrangement as being beyond their questioning and rearrangement. The 
categorisation of people as different and the resultant intolerance and prejudice are 
assigned to natural makeup, not to people’s deliberate doing. This inspires 
acquiescence and rule-following. That discrimination is understandably a prevalent 
natural norm is attested in comments by Thulisile, Belinda , Ranko, Magda, Mokgopo 
and Stephans. For them, intolerant practices are a general occurrence and one can 
do better by just sitting idle and accept. It is likened to a prototypically predetermined 
arrangement. They made reference to it as an acceptable cultural norm.  
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6.4.4 They are doing it to me 
The idea that “they are doing it to me” is a conception that all the co-researchers 
expressed generally without realising it. It manifests in non-self-reflective conduct. It 
hinders their ability to look at the confluence of material possessions and 
commodities, and how they treat themselves and others. It is indicative of an inability 
to notice one’s complicity in the interactions about which one complains.  
It is “the rich people, with more groceries and driving larney cars,” according to 
Belinda. “The odd people who do not know how to handle people,” according to 
Magda. 
None of the co-researchers reflected upon on how their views about themselves and 
others impact on their interactions, hindering how one looks at the self in relation to 
those they consider different. Ranko spoke of “doctors, managers and those able to 
take their kids to better private schools,” yet was unable to realise that he also 
viewed himself as “as a respectable man, man with integrity, advanced, sort of living 
a fully-fledged developed life,” different from his peers who he reckoned dropped out 
of school early. 
Mokgopo talked about the others who are after status, cars, clothes and houses, yet 
did not realise or interrogate how his employment status and the acquisition of a new 
phone changed his outlook on life about himself and others. Simangele talked about 
a friend who “lost everything, lost a car, lost friends,” and “now she is up, she has got 
a tender, she is back on her feet again and people are back again in her life.” 
This reluctance to be self-aware and reflect is implicated in the inability to notice the 
playout of the hypothesised same-race prejudice. It leads to a prejudice that is made 
invisible. In something resonating with revenge, Ranko said that, “you end up not 
visiting them, dissociating yourself from those people, and prefer to be with those of 
your own level, those that are accepting you.” Danie said that, “me too I also do not 
go to that guy because I will be treated the same way.” Dismissively, Magda said 
that, “people who do not like me it is fine, they can maar just carry on.” 
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6.4.5 It does not matter 
Although the interview question did not directly mention same-race prejudice, firstly 
to allow the interviews to be conversational and exploratory (Chung, 2010; 
Golsworthy & Coyle, 2001; Smith et al., 2009) and secondly to allow the co-
researchers to freely tell their stories (Eatough & Smith, 2006b; McManus et al., 
2010; Singleton & Furber, 2014), the co-researchers did not fully employ the 
interview’s flexibility and open-ended nature (Eatough & Smith, 2008; Kim, 2012; 
McManus et al., 2010; Plexico & Burrus, 2012). 
In their stories, same-race prejudice was not only indirectly referred to, unnamed, 
called other names, or not mentioned, but was mainly invisible and invisibilised. It 
was invisible in that it was not explicitly mentioned and noticed by an outside 
observer (the researcher). It was invisibilised because it was actively, albeit 
unconsciously and inadmittedly, rendered insignificant and invisible by the co-
researchers. In the many retorts considering it a normal part of the natural 
arrangement of life, it is swept under the carpet, while other means are employed to 
avoid it. By not being actively attended to, spoken about and named, and by being 
ignored, it however becomes perpetuated.  
The second interviews lasted less than the anticipated 30 minutes, generally being 
characterised by the dismissing comments, such as, “I am neutral, no questions,” by 
Stephans, and “no questions nothing to add,” by Magda. Belinda had “nothing to 
add, ask or change,” and Simangele was “having nothing much to say,” when asked 
for a comment. That same-race prejudice is not considered, was attested to by 
Danie when he said that, “people don’t think about it, don’t make work about it.” 
Thulisile, whose first interview was long and winding, declined to take part in the 
second interview. 
As was the case most of the time in the interviews, the co-researchers drifted away 
from the subject and had to be constantly probed and redirected to the interview 
focus (Chung, 2010; Eatough & Smith, 2006a; Plexico & Burrus, 2012). This was 
exemplified in the second interview by Mokgopo going on and talking about “people 
in the community drinking alcohol these days,” and by Stephans mentioning that “the 
area went down badly businesswise. All the shops, the bottle store, in this area.”  
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In summary, I used the semi-structured conversational interviews presented in this 
chapter to unmask the taken-for-granted naturalist and essentialist notions of race 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 by giving primacy to subjectively lived experiences of 
its identity and identification. This served to echo the notion by Merleau-Ponty (in 
Simonsen, 2013) that sees humanity as not only a physical body imposed in a space 
and a time, but as actively and subjectively engaging and inhabiting its own space 
and time to make sense of these. 
I pursued this purpose by presenting as factual information the themes, individual 
psychological structures and general psychological structure of same-race prejudice. 
I mined these understandings from the interviews using explication, and finely sifted 
and compartmentalised the facts of experienced same-race prejudice and then 
presented these as revealing a true and objectively testable reality of the co-
researchers’ interpretive understanding of same-race prejudice.    
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CHAPTER 7 
REFLECTION OF REFLECTIONS 
7.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW   
The chapter is presented to address the questions asked here in a manner that is 
consistent with an interpretive phenomenological philosophy and not the naturalist 
attitude that objectifies existence, as discussed by several authors (Converse, 2012; 
Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Gergel, 2012; Laverty, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012). 
This thesis developed from a hypothesis that there is same-race prejudice 
perpetuated through essentialist identity and identification profiling ideals that not 
only include, but also exclude those who are inauthentic, non-normative and non-
prototypical within the races of black and white. The partisan markings of 
differentiation of identity and identification within the races often go unnoticed, 
unacknowledged, ignored, taken for granted and considered as normal. This thesis 
began with a wonder at the assumed prevailing robotic living of and within the 
essentialised races, the extent to which people are willing to acknowledge and reflect 
on the partisan and corrosive assumptions they hold about themselves and others 
within their respective demarcated races that polarise their existence and serve as 
boundary markers between them. 
The following questions, emerging from the hypothesis of the existence of same-race 
prejudice, are stated and explored:  
• What is being black?  
• What does being and living black feel like?  
• What is being white?  
• What does being and living white feel like?  
• Can a person be black and not be black?  
• Can a person be white and not be white?  
• Can a person be black and not be not black?  
• Can a person be white and not be not white? 
The task of the thesis therefore emerged as an exploration of these questions, from 
which Chapter 2 (literature definitions of the terms race, black, blackness, white and 
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whiteness) and some parts of Chapter 3 (informal interview definitions of the terms of 
black, blackness, white and whiteness) were developed. Although the layout of 
Chapter 2 and the relevant parts of Chapter 3 sought to answer the questions 
presented in the thesis, their lens of naturalist thought meant that an entanglement 
into the dichotomous stereotypes of authentic against inauthentic, pure against 
impure, normative against non-normative and prototypical against non-prototypical 
race identity and identification, leading to same-race prejudice, could not be evaded. 
Predicated on naturalism and its naturalist attitude, these definitions (some parts of 
Chapter 3) and the theoretical answers (Chapter 2) provided are seen to consider 
race as real, as discussed by several authors (Davis, 2005; Jacobsen, 2007; 
Kockelmans, 1994; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983), while being imbued 
with a tone of same-race prejudice, perpetuating a tendency to objectify racial being 
and take it for granted as essentially, distinctively and objectively existing. These 
exhaustive and exclusionary definitions of a race indicate a blindness to how race is 
constituted in politically and socially composed definitions, perceptions, stereotypes 
and categorisation thinking (Arudou, 2013; Cappiccie et al., 2012; Freeman, 2011; 
Hawkesworth, 2010; Odartey-Wellington, 2011). These answers fail to acknowledge 
how race talk (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 1997; Tochluk, 2010; 
Yancy, 2004), stereotypes and prejudice appear within the race, as shown in the 
work of Morris (2006). 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were introduced as a challenge to the naturalist thought 
embedded in responses provide in Chapters 2 and 3, to address the need to explore 
race, racial identity and identification as subjectively lived human phenomena, as 
found in the work of several authors (Johnson, 1998; Lauver, 2010; Plexico & 
Burrus, 2012; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Spichiger, 2009). As alternatives to naturalism 
and the naturalist attitude, phenomenological philosophy and critical race theory 
encourage the unlearning of naturalist and traditional habits of thinking about and 
knowing people, their existence and race (Kockelmans, 1994; Spiegelberg, 1965; 
Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). Phenomenological philosophy and 
critical race theory encourage a sense of wonder about what we traditionally take as 
known and given, as they lament naturalism’s objectivist attitude about and towards 
race (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Murray, 2012; Tuohy et al., 2012; 
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Zaner, 1970). In this study, this culminated in the adoption of a philosophy 
(phenomenology) and research method (interpretive phenomenological analysis), as 
described in Chapter 5, to address the need to consider race as a subjectively lived 
human phenomenon. 
However, as indicated in Chapter 6, a phenomenological research whose philosophy 
sets out to merely uncover people’s subjectively lived experience of race (same-race 
prejudice in this case) runs the risk of falling for a naturalist attitude whose 
endeavour is to reveal unchanging, real and objective descriptions of realities. This 
also portrays the researcher’s perception of the co-researchers’ perceptions as 
unquestionably real (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010; 
Laverty, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012). By merely setting out to uncover lived 
experiences, the chapter raised an expectation of revealing essentially existing 
realities (Kockelmans, 1994; Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 2011; 
Wagner, 1983), running the gauntlet of portraying co-researchers’ lived experiences 
and perceptions regarding race prejudice as unquestionable and objectified. There 
was also the risk of me objectifying my perception of the co-researchers’ 
perceptions, and presenting it as unquestionable. 
Without a carefully sustained self-interrogation, phenomenology, critical race theory 
and the former’s embodied research style as presented in Chapter 5 may not resolve 
the tension the naturalist attitude is lamented to pose (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; 
Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Kockelmans, 1994; Simonsen, 2013; Tuohy et al., 2012), 
creating more of a challenge than they seek to resolve. 
The present chapter stands out to illuminate and critique the attitude of taking for 
granted experiences and perceptions pertaining to race definition(s) and same-race 
prejudice by both the researcher and the co-researchers alike in Chapter 6. By 
debunking the naturalist attitude’s essentialist and objectivist definitions of race, it 
seeks to address the sequential failure from Chapters 2 to 6. As a thoroughly self-
reflective research endeavour, the present chapter highlights the task of interpretive 
phenomenological research, as discussed by several authors (Eatough & Smith, 
2006a, 2006b, 2008; Flowers et al., 2003; Golsworthy & Coyle, 2001; Jacobsen, 
2007). It necessitates a deviation from what would ordinarily be inquired upon at this 
point.  
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A naturalist attitude would force one to inquire whether the mission and goals built 
upon through Chapters 2 to 6 have been achieved. It would want to know whether 
the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter have been satisfactorily 
answered, and whether phenomenology, assisted in this case by critical race theory, 
has proven to be a better option than the naturalist attitude. It would fail to consider 
the multiple emerging and merging realities whose natures are constantly mapped in 
interrogation by those involved and not existing prior to human subjective 
experience, including that of the researcher (Reid et al., 2005). The discussion 
around the themes shown in the chapter, however, is meant to highlight how a 
tendency to objectify experiences and perceptions can easily establish and 
perpetuate same-race prejudice, even by those intending to challenge it.   
The present chapter sets out to unravel the multiple, emerging and evolving nature 
of same-race prejudice, as interrogated by and from the interviews with the co-
researchers, and not to consider the interviews as revealing its objective description, 
as argued in the work of several authors (Creswell, 1998; Greenfield & Jensen, 
2012; Jacobsen, 2007; Laverty, 2003; Wertz & Van Zuuren, 1987). 
7.2 THE NEED FOR A MATCH BETWEEN THE RESEARCHER’S AND CO-
RESEARCHERS’ INTERPRETATION 
This section is dedicated to discussing the need for and importance of the 
researcher’s interpretation and understanding matching those of the co-researchers, 
the challenge brought by the lack of such a match, and examples of how my 
interpretive understanding in these interviews seemed to have failed to match those 
of the co-researchers interviewed. 
7.2.1 Interpreter, interpreted synergy   
It would not have been necessary to discuss at such length the part that 
intuition plays in the understanding of personality were it not for the fact 
that the psychologist (of all people) tends to forget about it. The 
psychologist delights in the use of recording instruments… and scales of 
all kinds. Yet strange to say he discredits the most delicate of all 
recording instruments – himself. The human mind is the only agency ever 
devised for registering at once innumerable variables and for revealing 
the relation between them. It is the one and only instrument capable of 
comprehension. Failing to employ intuition the psychologist unduly limits 
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his resources. Without it he starts with analysis and ends with 
conceptualization; on the way he sacrifices his chance to understand 
living people (Gordon Allport, as quoted by Churchill, 2006, p. 105). 
The above quotation brings to the fore the centrality of the human element in 
research. Even with highly developed research technology, the researcher remains a 
key element in the planning of the research, as well as the collection and 
interpretation of the research data (Creswell, 1998). 
Even when phenomenological research is billed as the suitable method for 
understanding the insider perspective of a phenomenon and its experiential meaning 
as lived by the individual(s) (Chung, 2010; Golsworthy & Coyle, 2001; McManus et 
al., 2010; Plexico & Burrus, 2012; Singleton & Furber, 2014), it does not reduce the 
role of the researcher to the passivity of naively reflecting upon obviously existing 
facts (Wertz & Van Zuuren, 1987). 
Interpretive phenomenological analysis is not a subjectively disengaged exercise 
process. In requires the constant participation of the researcher because the co-
researchers’ experienced lived world is never readily available. It can never be 
readily available in an objective sense without subjective interpretive tempering by 
the researcher (Jacobsen, 2007). It needs continuous digging and re-fashioning. 
There cannot be data analysis without interpretive meddling by the researcher to 
attempt to make sense of the inside experiential sense-making proffered by co-
researchers. This is what Eatough and Smith (2006a, 2006b), Flowers et al. (2003), 
and Golsworthy and Coyle (2001) call a mediating window into co-researchers’ 
meaning making world. It also fits in with Jacobsen’s (2007) statement that the world 
does not externally exist without us. This is where the intricacy of the task makes it a 
challenge to execute.  
If there is no comfort of a direct window into co-researchers’ lived experiences, how 
does phenomenology, as a research method, stay truthful to its philosophy? How 
does it begin to answer the questions, allay the scepticism and satisfy the wonder 
about race and same-race prejudice? Although the questions’ curiosity and need for 
clarity seem to be grounded in the naturalist attitude of seeking certainty in the 
objective world, they can still be responded to in the attitude of phenomenology. One 
needs to realise that interpretive phenomenological analysis is an endeavour to 
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make sense of making sense. It seeks to make the implicit explicit. It pits the 
insider’s perspective of the co-researcher against the outsider’s perspective of the 
researcher. It represents a culmination of a synergy of interpretation of interpretation. 
It is not just the naive acceptance of the insider’s views or one interpretation. It is an 
enriched constellation of co-researchers’ and researcher’s meanings whose pinnacle 
is marked by a contestation and confluence of the two’s interpretations. 
Reid et al. (2005) and Eatough and Smith (2008) argue that the process of data 
analysis begins to be interpretive only when the co-researchers’ psychologically 
opaque insider perspective starts to be tossed around. This is entailed in the task of 
the researcher attempting to comprehend their thinking, understanding and sense-
making of the phenomenon (Smith et al., 2009). It is at the confluence of the insider 
and outsider perspectives (Reid et al., 2005). Beginning with the researcher’s 
emphatic understanding and sense-making of the co-researchers’ sense-making, it 
leads to a serious psychological meaning-making reading of what the researcher 
interprets the co-researcher as saying (Eatough & Smith, 2008). This challenge 
requires thinking about how to sustain this effort without the interpretation moving 
away from being inspired by the co-researchers’ lived experiences (Smith et al., 
2009), and how to keep closer to the phenomenological imperative of narrowing the 
gap between the fundamental structure and fundamental description of same-race 
prejudice (Von Eckartsberg, 1998a). However, it is more phenomenologically 
consistent to consider how consistent and faithful the method (interpretive 
phenomenological analysis) has been to the philosophy (phenomenology), and not 
how truthful the answers provided in the method have come to be, to unravelling the 
phenomenon of same-race prejudice. 
The appearance of this challenge encourages the researcher to be wary of the 
naturalist attitude’s taking for granted and to be constantly self-reflective while not 
assuming that research results become merely revealed to one. 
7.2.2 The challenge extended 
If the names we give to situations are made up of words as shorthand descriptions 
that fail to capture the true sense of the situation itself, and our own experience of 
being in circumstances (Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Johnson, 1998; Ray & Vanstone, 
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2009; Spichiger, 2009), how do we entrust them with matching our experiences or 
those of others? If there is a doubt of a fit between our reality as experienced and as 
expressed in words, what then of representing someone’s experienced reality in 
words that are not his/hers? As Ray and Vanstone (2009) imply, our perceived 
reality and the words we use may put us in equidistance from others’ experiences. 
Taken as they are, our cleverly worded theoretical explanations and definitions shall 
leave their stereotypes unexplored.  
When I planned to do the research, I assumed to know beforehand how people are 
categorised. I classified people according to economic status as assumed from the 
observed nature of the work they do. Mokgopo, a petrol attendant whom I initially 
classified as being not economically affluent and therefore assumed to admire a 
higher economic and social classification, proved me wrong. He related with pride 
how his standing in his family, among friends and in the general community, was 
elevated, and how his job made him financially able to afford the things that turned 
his life into one to be envied. This differed from the assumption I had, which was that 
to be a petrol attendant is to have a lowly and an unfulfilling economic life. 
Belinda, a car-guard whom I classified on the same level as the petrol attendant, 
noted the negative treatment she received due to evaluations made based on the 
nature of her work, but generally described her life as fulfilling beyond limited work 
difficulties.  
Ranko, a nursing services manager at a state-owned enterprise institution, 
recounted experiences of shifting moments of pride and doubt as his status depends 
on whom he relates with at a particular time, although I initially classified him as 
being of high economic and social status. The same sentiment was expressed by 
Simangele, a project manager, and Magda, a store manager, both of whom I had 
assumed to be enjoying a stable economic and social status. In both, one can sense 
a fluid sense of being different from the static categorisation description to which I 
allocated them. 
Not everybody that works at a butchery envies life outside of his/her work industry. 
The butchery manager I interviewed, Stephans, proudly equated his life with that of 
other educationally qualified employed professionals. This proved that life as 
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experienced is far deeper than the words we use to describe it. The expert outside 
opinion is far removed from the intricacies of the lived life, as deduced from work by 
Spichiger (2009). 
My framework of understanding could not keep up with the lived world of the petrol 
attendant, the nursing service manager and the butchery manager, as deduced from 
work by Eatough and Smith (2006a). In assuming to know beforehand, I took a lot for 
granted. I assumed that a person’s nature of work defines how he/she views 
him-/herself as rated by others. I assumed that the first interview would take one 
hour while the second one would take half an hour. I relied on stereotyped 
descriptions to understand and define people and their situations, a prejudicing 
understanding. I did all this having taken steps to fully acquaint myself with the 
phenomenological philosophy and a personal oath to adhere to the philosophical 
attitude of the research. 
What the process has left me with is that thinking phenomenologically and 
conducting phenomenological research are different things. I had to confront my own 
preconceptions as I engaged with those of the co-researchers, asking myself how to 
refrain from making self-serving reflections and not critiquing viewing things as I do, 
thereby succumbing to a naturalist attitude of objective distance from others’ 
experienced world. 
Beholden to a phenomenological research method, tasked with bridging the gap 
between what is culturally, religiously and theoretically known, and the individually 
lived race experiences, I needed to keep my subjectivity in check and bracketed 
while employing it interpretively, keeping my mythical understanding at bay, while 
interrogating it and those of the co-researchers, as urged by several authors 
(Eatough & Smith, 2008; Giorgi, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a; 
Wertz, 1985). This results in the risk that the researcher may be at fault for assuming 
to be able to and want to leave his/her opinion unchecked, the myth of assuming that 
the researcher occupies a personally uninvolved and objective position in research 
while his/her role is only about inquiring about others’ (co-researchers’) opinions.  
Remaining faithful to a philosophy of exploring deeper personal points of view of 
those researched upon and their privileged descriptive inside account of the 
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phenomenon (Dusi et al., 2011; Johnson, 1998; Lauver, 2010; Plexico & Burrus, 
2012; Ray & Vanstone, 2009), one needs to constantly balance that with a caution 
against falling victim to expressing one’s interpretations as perfect at the exclusion of 
other understandings, continuing to categorise, other and label oneself and others 
differently, in the process perpetuating stereotypes and prejudice. 
Informed by a spirit of wonder, doubt and scepticism, and not seeking universal 
objective truths, interpreted themes as assisted by verbatim reflections from the 
interviews are presented in the following discussion to indicate what is considered 
the given reality and taken for granted.  
7.3 KEY FINDINGS ABOUT SAME-RACE PREJUDICE 
Debunking the notion that people are passive victims, same-race prejudice is 
reciprocally enacted and sustained by people as victimising victims of stereotypes, 
labelling, categorisation, intolerance and prejudice. This is done through the use of 
self-righteous cultural beliefs that lay an authoritative power to authenticity, 
normativity, prototypicality and acceptability of defining a race. People’s ability to 
competitively define, classify, categorise, label and other themselves and others 
renders others as false, illegitimate and unreal.    
Same-race prejudice is not merely a natural occurrence. It is actively enacted 
through the use of compensatory strategies to deal with and perpetuate 
stigmatisation and stereotypes for classification of the self and the other (for 
example, stereotypes and stigma about work and nature of work), the use of space 
and distance to justify differentness, to minimise belonging anxiety and to seek 
approval, thereby causing more differentiation of people. Marked by essentialist 
descriptions, the inability and unwillingness to reflect on one’s actions and 
acknowledge one’s acts of prejudice within a race lead to a tendency to uncritically 
submit to self-righteous and fundamentalist beliefs, and conventionally defined ways 
of being, while being aggressively punitive to violators of defined norms. 
 157 
 
7.3.1 Competing cultural explanations – doing and undoing culture 
“We can’t think like Africans, in Africa, generally. We are in Johannesburg, this is 
Johannesburg. It’s not some national road in Malawi.” (South African president 
Jacob Zuma, quoted by Ndenze & Seale, 2013, p. 6) 
The comment above attracted a barrage of criticism, with the comment being dubbed 
as stereotypical, while Jacob Zuma himself was called “un-African” and an “Afro-
pessimist” (Ndenze & Seale, 2013; Zhangazha, 2013). While his casting of 
Johannesburg and Malawi as dissimilar in his attempt to define his position might 
have been problematic, the reflection on his reflection was equally problematic. 
Jacob Zuma’s scornful reflection attracted literary, cultural, political and academic 
reflections whose scorn did, as much as undid, the initial race or cultural reflection he 
proffered, just as he is called “un-African” or “Afro-pessimist”. As he used a binary 
description with polar distinctions to define a situation of being, so those who went 
on to critique his distinctions did the same.  
We know so much about race from what the theories inform us. We know how race 
is done or undone, yet at the same time, little is said about how it is done and 
undone. While the characterisation of existence helps to set the boundaries of what it 
is against what it is not, its undoing is less noticed. Stephans depicted highly 
cherished values of hard work, aspiring to trade and educational qualifications, being 
financially independent and working as attributes that lead to success and earn one 
respect, yet the undoing of a white race was not clearly made visible in his rhetoric. 
This is reflected in his depiction of values that oppose the ones he mentioned as 
uncharacteristic of whiteness, shutting them out of what represents being white. 
Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) mention that definitions of being and identity are 
never singular. They are portrayed in reciprocal processes of competing evaluation, 
devaluation and projection of attributes by groups and individuals who lay claim to 
authoritative power of authenticity, normativity and prototypicality of being.   
Weaver (2011, p. 2724) quotes Dworkin as saying that Hispanic people prefer their 
own cultural kinds for marriage and neighbourly living because Anglo-American 
people are, among others “prejudiced… snobbish… having little family loyalty… 
hypocritical… tense, anxious, and neurotic… conformists… and puritanical.” 
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Strengthening this argument, while noticing the self-concept variations among black 
Americans across age, sex, socioeconomic status and geographic region, Howard 
(1985) highlights that an essentialist black self-image exists peculiar to its race. This 
is in contrast to “the poor, the sick, the weak and the ‘unfit’” black of Thomas Malthus 
that needs to be wiped off from the face of the earth (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 
1994, p. 4). Such depictions of Hispanic and black people are both counting and 
discounting ways of being, both outside and, less noticeably, within the race. The 
less noticeable practice of this within the race is usually perceived as an assertion 
and affirmation of the race.     
Chung (2010) spoke to foreign women married to Korean men to explore their 
experiences of motherhood. Chung (2010) found a clash between the women’s 
motherhood and childrearing expectations, and the Korean cultural environment they 
had moved into. Here, culture serves as an impenetrable insulating layer between 
the self and others. To penetrate such layers is to diffuse one’s sense of being, as in 
the social distance maintained between the Hispanic and Anglo-American people 
(Weaver, 2011). It is the Hispanic people who decide on the level of distance and 
proximity between them and others, and who name what is for or against a Hispanic 
family lifestyle. There might be definitions from outside, but these are balanced by 
those within. The comments by Jacob Zuma and by Stephans make distinctions of 
being within their different race beings, and not from outside.   
Various attempts to maintain a race’s pure authenticity are seen in resistance within 
the black community to black children being adopted by white families, calling such 
efforts “cultural genocide”, while white families wishing to adopt a black child are 
faced with white disapproval both within and outside their families (Shiao et al., 
2004), as they are seen to court trouble by not adopting “baggage free, desirably 
different, and savable” Asian children (Shiao et al., 2004, p. 9). The disapproval by 
white people of other white people adopting black children is a measure of insisting 
on an uncontaminated, pure, authentic, normative and prototypical whiteness, as is 
the black disapproval that terms it cultural genocide. Black people do not want an 
admixture with white people, just as white people are antipathetic to it. Black people 
and white people are respectively doing and undoing their own race. The level of 
entry and exit is equally monitored outside and within the races.  
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Jacob Zuma tried to define what qualifies as African and what does not. His 
definition was subjected to further definition of either qualifying as African or not. In 
both cases, the parties insisted upon their definition to such a degree that they 
seemed to think that their definition is naturally existing. One can easily dissociate 
and deny the very act that is one’s own doing. The tendency to consider the self as 
the paragon of identity and definition, the sole arbiter of the standard criteria of 
existence, prototypicality, representationality, authenticity and normativity, 
contributes to intolerance towards alternative ways of being that fall outside of and 
do not conform to this definition (Falbo & Belk, 1985; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). 
Danie’s comments of being appalled by how white people of his kind may easily be 
left dying on the side of the road by other white people seems to suggest that this 
behaviour of other white people is un-white, just as his perception is that the other 
white people will leave him dying because he is un-white. Definition of who is white 
or not white is done within whiteness by whiteness. Those who are considered to fall 
outside of the standard criteria suffer not only suspicion but also denigration and 
rejection, as mentioned by Danie. Their assumed non-conformity to normative, 
authentic, prototypical whiteness subjects them to hostility, rejection, disapproval, 
stigmatisation, devaluation, and social censuring (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey 
& Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Just as the self-righteousness (Falbo & 
Belk, 1985) of others towards him rendered him un-white, he too entertained self-
righteous tendencies that caused him to label the other as not befitting of whiteness, 
to indicate the reciprocal and competitive projection of attributes of definition and 
identity, as shown in the work of Mummendey and Wenzel (1999).  
A sense of competing definitions of being culturally black appropriate can be gleaned 
from Thulisile's understanding and interpretation and those of her colleagues. 
Sympathising with her view that her colleagues’ behaviour is culturally inappropriate 
not only labels them, but also categorises and others them (Moncrieffe, 2007a, 
2007b). It leads to a rushed, simplified interpretation of a complex situation 
(Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Eagly & Diekman, 2005). 
Both Danie and Thulisile identified and differentiated people as belonging to distinct 
kinds as determined by discernible racial characteristics (Aspinall & Song, 2013; 
Mallon, 2013). A differentiation was made between the kind that leaves the 
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unfamiliar white person on the side of the road dying against the kind that is appalled 
by an unkind and aloof white person, and the culturally appropriate black person that 
self-righteously considers the culturally inappropriate black person with caution. The 
competition for authenticity, normativity and prototypicality renders the other false, 
illegitimate and unreal (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). 
7.3.2 Competing religious definitions – doing and undoing religion 
Gervais et al. (2011, p. 1189) note that Americans are intolerant of atheists, who are 
seen as spiritually different and considered as a “group that they would most 
disapprove of their children marrying.” Differently defined and categorised, certain 
characteristics are ascribed to them as a group (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; 
Brown, 1995; Fiske, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Sampson, 1999). It is not 
as though atheists do not have values or spirituality. Rather, their values and 
spirituality, which are seen as contrary to and posing a threat to the American dream, 
make them less preferred and not trusted. They are viewed differently and are 
excluded due to their assumed non-prototypicality of and non-conformity to (Hornsey 
et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 
2008) the main American values.  
While Woodford et al. (2013, p. 106) quote Gordon Allport as saying that “the role of 
religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice,” I see it as a 
wrongly worded statement. Religion and spirituality do not stand on their own. They 
need believing in and enactment by individuals to exist. They are what individuals 
and groups do and undo. This is the case with my maternal grandparents’ family, in 
which I grew up, who converted to Christianity long before I was born, preparing us 
to shun and look down upon all that was regarded as a black religious practice. The 
choice that the family and I made dictated the action we took towards ourselves and 
those we deemed religiously different. It was as if the choice we opted for was the 
only religious choice, and every other choice was judged relative to their 
prototypicality and conformity to the main (Hornsey et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 2010; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). 
Religion is another form of self and other classification (Fiske, 2005), a choice that 
we make to belong or not to belong, yet one that is taken as given. It is done by 
 161 
 
drawing a boundary between us and them, yet it is seen as fixed, not interrogated 
and taken for granted. It is a self and other marker (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; 
Eyben, 2007). We do not see it as a choice for us, yet we expect others to choose 
our choice. We chastise their religious choice, hoping that they can join ours, yet we 
see ours as a given. 
If a black person does not believe in or practise ancestral worshipping, and does not 
subscribe to the assumed norms and values of African philosophy and spiritual 
cosmology, does that make him/her more or less of an authentic black person? Does 
a white person of western ancestry who does not subscribe to any religious following 
other than the one of African spiritual cosmology, lose or gain official affinity to a 
definition of authentic whiteness?  
For Gervais et al. (2011), being an atheist is viewed as contrary to American values 
of religiosity. Cunningham and Melton (2013) observe how, in Texas, being sexually 
involved with someone of one’s own sex runs contrary to what is religiously defined 
as the norm for a sexual relationship, as also indicated in Patekile Holomisa’s 
mention of black South African homosexuals whom he regarded as practising a 
sexuality that is against their African culture (Baron, 2012). Woodford et al. (2013) 
also  found discriminative attitudes towards same-sex relationship practices. 
African spirituality, African cosmology and African  philosophy are preferred for their 
broader embracing attitude of an ecological African life, over the limited and 
fragmentalist European and Western view of religious following (Hountondji, 1997; 
Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980). So defined, to live an African life is to be 
subservient to a philosophy of togetherness with others in cosmology with one’s 
surrounding, rather than being absorbed in individualist existence. This is a bigger 
philosophy within which African religion is engendered. Being left to her threadbare, 
lonely existence after losing her job made Simangele mournfully wonder at how 
relationships have changed to last only to the point where one cannot offer anything 
materially. Encouraging her wonder is perhaps the dissonance to the stereotypes of 
knowing how to be black (Eyben, 2007; Hooks, 2009). To hint that such a behaviour 
is a deviation from an African philosophy of togetherness is to label it (Fiske, 2005; 
Moncrieffe, 2007a). This offers a beautifully well-knitted persuasive thinking, 
however rendered as a fixed and given reality as the Western/European Christian 
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thought it is meant to oppose and improve on. Both are just philosophical ways of 
explaining how and who we should be or not be. 
The challenge carried in both is a lack of self-reflective consciousness, each perched 
to its corner of reality. Restricted to their separate wisdom corners of self-
righteousness (Falbo & Belk, 1985), each is likely to be intolerant towards and tear 
off some parts of it that are seen as atypical to it, those that do not conform to its 
upheld distinctive normative character (Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999).   
7.3.3 Self-classification   
Cultural and religious distinctions are a form of self-classification. They are a way of 
differentiating the self from the other, for instance in terms of sexuality (Cunningham 
& Melton, 2012; Southall et al., 2011), religiosity ( Anderson, 1995; Musopole, 1994; 
Sahl & Batson, 2011), family values (Espiritu, 2004), attitude towards education 
(O’Connor et al., 2007), general life philosophy (Hountondji, 1997;  Jones, 1980; 
Nobles, 1980; Senghor, 1997), and other cultural specifics (Baker, 2010;  Williams, 
2006). Seen as not the self, as mostly what the self does not want to be like or 
associated with (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), the other is used as a referral point 
of distinction. The self only relates to it in distinction of disparity, for example black 
against white (Brooks & Rada, 2002; James, 2001; Yancy, 2004). Culture and 
religion become distinctions of differentness and justifications of uniqueness of the 
self. 
Self-classification further serves to exclude the other, insisting that one is different. 
Changing one’s hairstyle may not only be a way of looking different and good, but 
also as a way of looking better than the other, as mentioned by Thulisile. It is not 
only a way of looking closer to the admired, prototypical and normative, but a way of 
looking distinctively different and further dissociated from the non-prototypical and 
non-normative other. Being driven by a need for social domination and to leave an 
impression on others (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), people are given to considering 
those around them as competitors. Relationships are determined by competitively 
acquiring more material possessions as a yardstick of how advanced the person is 
(Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel et al., 2010). Both Mokgopo and Thulisile recounted a 
 163 
 
number of instances where colleagues and friends heeded the drive for acquiring 
cars, houses, clothes and other accessories as a measure of success and having 
progressed in life as compared to others who have less or none of those. Higher 
educational qualifications (Stephans) and employment (Mokgopo), though valued, 
are pursued to differentiate oneself from those less motivated. The benefit of both is 
respect in the community.  
However, this competitiveness results in less social cohesion, respect and empathy 
between people, contributing to intolerance (Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & Walker, 
2011). It leads to the spreading of stereotypes among people, causing people to feel 
excluded and rejected (Higgs & Evans, 2008; Matsinhe, 2011). Danie felt 
undermined for looking dirty whenever he went shopping, while for Thulisile, doing 
domestic-type work made people look down on her. They both had to endure the 
challenges of conformity to definitions of an authentic and normative job within their 
respective races (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Mummendey & 
Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008).   
Forman et al. (2002) depict a Latin Americanisation thesis in which the United States 
moves from a two-tier, white and non-white, dichotomy, to a three-tier system of 
white, honorary white and collective black racial subgroups. In it, they see a shift in 
people’s racial classification away from being evaluated in terms of how white they 
are, to how black they do not want to be and thereby how white they want to be. This 
indicates a movement in racial preference more attuned to wanting to be white by 
choice and by self-presumed association to whiteness, while rejecting the black race 
classification. 
Obsession with visible bodily appearance and being driven by a desire to reap race 
discrimination benefits can be seen as resulting in disloyalty to the legally defined 
“one-drop rule” of black and white distinctions that force mixed race offspring to take 
on the racial classification of the parent of the lower race status (Rockquemore, 
1998). Initially required by law to be classified as black, individuals from such mixed-
race unions defy existing distinctions to define themselves, highlighting not only their 
hybrid nature, but more so the legally suppressed white kinship (Rockquemore, 
1998). 
 164 
 
While this appears to be a self-affirming identity against the other, it is a boundary-
marking distinction within the self as it wishes to be seen against the self as socially 
differentiated. It signals contesting definitions within the self, claiming and denying 
authenticity and how multiple competing definitions and positions of purity and 
impurity face off. Now that he is working, Mokgopo shall no longer be called 
“umahlalela”. He mentioned an awareness of the stigmatising treatment people 
endure for not being employed and being different. These range from being judged 
(Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011), not being respected (Mokgopo) and 
being avoided (Danie). 
Shapiro and Neuberg (2008) mention that people are constantly aware of a potential 
for devaluation and negative treatment. With these ranging from social censure, 
punishment, rejection, and being considered as inferior and false, to causing social 
conflict and uncertainty of belonging (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), people are motivated to use compensatory 
strategies of seeking approval and minimising their belonging anxiety (Shapiro & 
Neuberg, 2008).    
The negative impact of stigmatisation on people and its implication on their lives, for 
example during apartheid South Africa (Higgs & Evans, 2008; Pucherova, 2011), for 
America’s Sikh men (Ahluwalia, 2013), for South Africa’s foreign nationals (Matsinhe, 
2011), with regard to mental illness (Pescosolido et al., 2013), for obese people 
(Hansson et al., 2009), due to sexuality (Cunningham & Melton, 2012), and with 
regard to economic affluence (Moss, 2003), was felt by Belinda who was regularly 
told to go look for another job, colleagues who kept a distance between themselves 
and Ranko, and friends shunning Simangele when she lost her job. 
Neal and Wilson (1989) indicate how the American political and social movements of 
black pride in the 1950s and 1960s drew their strength as a revolt against the 
increasing tendency even among black people to associate self-worth, intelligence, 
success, beauty and attractiveness with having a light skin and being white. As their 
aim, they sought to conscientise black people against aligning self-definition and 
pride with whiteness, to a blackness whose standards are itself. 
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In their obsession with physical looks and as dictated by prevailing political 
conditions, black people have been historically known to change their looks. With 
appearance used as a marker of identity for people to be socially identified as 
similarly or differently racialised, many have been known to manipulate it to facilitate 
or avert entry into racial groupings and access to life amenities, and  for redrawing or 
expanding the boundaries of their race definition (Neal & Wilson, 1989), as 
compensatory strategies to avert belonging uncertainty and anxiety (Shapiro & 
Neuberg, 2008). While the target individual or group is seen to pose a threat to the 
other groups or individuals in the form of, for instance, trust/distrust, disease/health, 
safety/fear, thereby serving as the building ground for the latter to hold prejudice 
against the target (Gervais et al., 2011), prejudice targets manage to find ways to 
lessen the extent of prejudice against them. Those who do, develop strategies to 
manipulate the threat effect they are seen to pose. They may develop other ways to 
be seen in a less threatening way (Neel, Neufeld & Neuberg, 2013; Shapiro & 
Neuberg, 2008), for example obese people taking part in weight reduction exercises 
to dispel stereotypes others have about them. 
Motivated by the stigmatising experiences of devaluation, being judged, being 
disrespected and being disapproved of, individuals put high valence on the 
acquisition of requisite normative and race authentic and prototypical educational 
qualifications and work experience to bolster their chances of positive valuation and 
approval in the community, as done by Ranko, Belinda, Magda, Simangele, 
Mokgopo and Stephans. This leads to stereotypes and stigma, feeding back into the 
prejudice loop. Those defined redefine themselves in other, less unfavourable ways, 
for example by resisting the previous labels or asserting themselves differently 
(Hountondji, 1997; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Rockquemore, 1998), e.g. the application of 
skin whitening creams by black people (Neal & Wilson, 1989). They learn how to 
cope with and adjust to prejudice, while defining and redefining themselves as 
different. While they related instances of being treated differently, Ranko, Stephans, 
Mokgopo, Magda and Simangele managed their lives in terms of the same principles 
of prototypicality against non-prototypicality, normativity against non-normativity, 
authenticity against inauthenticity, and intolerance of diversity (Guindon et al., 2003; 
Matsuura, 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011). They used materialism and education as a 
yardstick for success and positive regard. 
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It is generally assumed that the source of prejudice, stereotypes and stigma about 
an individual or a group, is external to it. Prejudice, stereotypes and stigma are rarely 
imagined to come from within the individual or group itself. However, Cox et al. 
(2012) and Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) show that it is possible to be the source 
of stereotypes about the self. Self-hate and its resultant depression emerge due to 
the societal stereotypes an individual believes in and practises. People may be 
prejudiced against their own race because they hold stereotypes similar to those 
others have about them, not because any explicit pressure was applied to them to do 
so. In this way, they become both the source and perpetuator of a prejudice circle 
that feeds back into itself. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) talk of the black sheep 
effect, which is a manifestation of stringent devaluation tendencies towards in-group 
members whose differentness and non-conformity with group norms and values are 
considered a deviation worthy of discrimination. 
People may react emotionally sad and be motivated to improve their financial lot 
after being called names and disrespected for not working, because they too cherish 
stereotypes about not working (as illustrated by Mokgopo in Chapter 6). One 
wonders as to the stereotypes that both Stephans and Mokgopo held about work 
and the stigmatising attitudes they had towards the less educationally qualified and 
the loafers, causing them to be inspired not to fall into such categories.  
Avoidance of those who exclude them, as used by Danie and Thulisile, may serve to 
buffer them against ill-treatment, yet behind it, they may themselves be motivated by 
their cherished stereotypes about looks and nature of work within their races. They 
may subscribe to the values of impression formation and extrinsic goal orientation 
that serve to reduce individuals as commodities of competition (Duriez, 2011; 
Kessler et al., 2010; Kosic et al., 2012; Nonchev et al., 2012; Van Hiel et al., 2010).   
7.3.4 Other prejudice themes emerging from the interviews 
“They do not invite us to their homes. You meet them. I have met lots of them. But 
they never invite us to their homes. So, they are not friendly – that’s what I find” 
(reflection by a migrant returning to Trinidad, on the race sensitivity of the society 
and the denouncement of racial harmony as a mythical ideal, as quoted by Potter et 
al., 2010, p. 810). 
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Stereotypes, which are sets of believed or perceived characteristics attributed to an 
individual or a group, are a predictor of our attitudes, emotions and generalised 
understanding towards ourselves and others (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Eyben, 2007; 
Hooks, 2009; Mallon, 2013; Sampson, 1999). As in the above quotation (Potter et 
al., 2010), they lead to a generalised evaluation (they are not friendly) of a group or 
individuals (Trinidadians) based on perceived attributes (they do not invite us to their 
homes). An association between a group or individuals and a particular attribute, as 
in a stereotype, is the bedrock of prejudice. A prejudice is formed when individuals or 
groups are over-included into having an identified attribute, or over-excluded from 
having that attribute (Kosic et al., 2012). The inconsistent perceived relation between 
the attribute and the group or individuals makes prejudice a “misperception or 
miscategorisation” (Kosic et al., 2012). An antipathy of generalised dislike towards 
those categorised as other (Cramer et al., 2013; Gervais et al., 2011; Kessler et al., 
2010), prejudice may result in the negative targeting of the labelled. 
Magda differentiated between odd and decent people, the former who behave in a 
snobbish way and are without respect, opposed to the preferred latter who “greet 
you properly, look you in the eyes when they talk to you.” Expressing frustration with 
conformity to standard measures of being that do not capture his subjective 
experiences (Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014), Danie expressed feelings of being negatively 
labelled and targeted for ill-treatment when he went shopping, and the fearful 
prospect of being left to die on the side of the road. From being labelled and 
categorised as different (Fiske, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b), his differentness is 
likely to lead to intolerance displayed in dislike and hate (Ahluwalia, 2013; Cox et al., 
2012; Gervais et al., 2011; Higgs & Evans, 2008; Matsinhe, 2011).  For some 
(Ranko), the intolerance of their differentness is enacted through avoidance 
(Cunningham & Melton, 2012; Hansson et al., 2009; Pescosolido et al., 2013). These 
are experiences that the normative and prototypical standards of the race do not 
acknowledge, but categorise as unreal, inferior, inauthentic, aversive and non-
conforming, while subjecting them to social punishment (Hornsey et al., 2003; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). 
I introduce the subsections below with some questions: if varieties of language within 
a language are called dialects and are recognised as valid regional expressions of 
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the practised official language (Wolfram, 2013), what do we call varieties of race 
within a race? Are they recognised and allowed to be? How do the views, values and 
beliefs we hold about ourselves and our race become stereotypes that lead to how 
prejudice is practised within a race?  
7.3.4.1 Work and nature of work   
To be employed is a highly cherished achievement. Even when I initially assumed 
that occupying a petrol attendant work position would be regarded as being of a 
lowly economic status, I was proven wrong. Mokgopo indicated how his sense of self 
improved upon finding a job as compared to when he did not have one, being called 
derogatory names like “umahlalela”, as his unemployed friend was called: “They do 
not treat him well. They do not respect him where he stays. They call him names. 
They say his peers are working, he is not, is just loitering around.” Stephans 
emphasised the importance of work when he described how, in the white community, 
not working or not showing signs of looking for a job is frowned upon. Both Stephans 
and Mokgopo indicated how one earns a sense of inner pride, confidence and 
respect from others by working. 
However, merely working is not enough. The nature of work that one does is 
regarded as important, as shown in the following statement by Thulisile: 
Even the job that I do causes one to be undermined. If people see you do 
work like domestic, they think of themselves being better than you. They 
take you as stupid for doing a domestic like work. Maybe them working in 
the shade, me in the open sun with garbage. If it is a white person, they 
ignore it as compared to being made an issue when you are black, as if it 
is normal for a white person. 
Belinda noted the same, saying that “maybe white people look down at car guards 
because they say go get a better job, you are not supposed to be here. All car 
guards are treated like that.” 
Ranko, a professional nurse at a state-owned enterprise institution, expressed views 
about his career progress shared by those around him. He described himself “as a 
respectable man, man with integrity, as advanced and living a fully-fledged 
developed life,” compared to those he grew up with, who were “rejected because of 
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their level of education, their status – they are not educated,” who were blamed for 
deliberately not going to school like him. 
Attitudes we adopt towards ourselves and others are positively related to what we 
consider to be the normative standards of being, the prototype. A deviation from the 
supposed norm is frowned upon, while what is considered to be in line with the norm 
is encouraged and seen as a positive attribute (Cunningham & Melton, 2013; 
Gervais et al., 2011; Hornsey et al., 2003; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008; Woodford et 
al., 2013). 
As with the status of Ranko’s early school peers, Belinda’s and Thulisile’s jobs were 
considered not decent enough for their races, and as not authentic or race 
prototypical enough to earn them the recognition with which Ranko’s job was viewed 
in the surroundings that they live. Being “umahlalela” earned Mokgopo disrespect as 
opposed to when he was suddenly employed and therefore fitted into the desired 
societal norm. 
In relation to stereotypes, standards and criteria of being are cherished, practised 
and upheld within each living situation as aiding with the handling of inordinate 
amount of information in one’s social life (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Eyben, 
2007; Fiske, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b). Mokgopo spoke with pride about his 
newly found status of being employed, whereas he reflected upon his treatment 
before finding employment with sadness. Ranko also acknowledged the double-
edged sword of discriminating and blaming his peers who were not on his own level, 
yet expressing with delight what the achievements landed him, when he said that: 
It makes me feel two ways. At times I feel good, at times bad because if I 
do something bad they will rejoice over it. A high classification I personally 
never put myself in. But on the other hand, positive, it makes me feel 
proud for the respect I get from people. It comes in two ways. 
Being torn in this way leads to a displaced sense of identity, as described by 
Pucherova’s (2011) depiction of Bessie Head’s predicament of not being white 
enough, black enough or male enough, Wagner et al.’s (2010) thesis of hybrid 
people’s feeling of being devalued, dehumanised, rejected and judged for having a 
blended identity defying essentialism’s categorisation, and Dubois’s depiction of 
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black people’s oppression that results in their split- and double-consciousness of 
unease and anxiety ( Anderson, 1995; Biko, 1978; Mahon, 2004; Sampson, 1999).  
7.3.4.2 Prejudice and what it does to the target 
Out of the eight co-researchers interviewed, Stephans seemed to be the only one 
who saw the positive influence of being categorised as different: 
Like I say it was hard in the beginning. That is exactly the reason why I am 
here today. When somebody is hard on you, it is for your own benefit. I 
reckon it is a good thing. Pushes you hard like to make something of 
yourself, a driving force. 
The rest of the co-researchers viewed it negatively. We categorise individuals and 
groups based on the stereotypes we have about them. Stereotypes lead to stigma, 
the negatively tainting and discrediting attribute assigned to the target individual or 
group, labelling them as deviant, flawed or limited, and different from the self (Cox et 
al., 2012; Neel et al., 2013). Because of its negative impact on those prejudiced 
against, target individuals and groups actively seek ways to ameliorate this in their 
lives (Neel et al., 2013; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). While Magda (co-researcher) 
seemed to prefer to pay no attention to it, others seek different ways of coping. 
Using avoidance as prejudice management strategy, Ranko said that, “even if he 
relates with you and encourages you to pay a visit, he would still make you feel that 
your low status should be kept clearly marked. He would want you to visit them while 
they keep the distance by not visiting you themselves.” Feeling bad, he said, “you 
end up not visiting them, dissociating yourself from those people and prefer to be 
with those of your own level, those who are accepting of you.” 
For Thulisile, it was, “I tried moving on, could not concentrate on their affairs. I made 
myself to accept it, to satisfy myself and not others. Otherwise you will not go 
anywhere in life. Will become fearful to explore life. Helps to have purpose not to be 
distracted,” while Danie said: “me too I also do not go to that guy because I will be 
treated the same way.” 
When he was unemployed, Mokgopo used to be undermined. The treatment he 
received lowered his self-esteem, as was the case with Danie, who felt as though his 
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sense of purpose in life was taken away while he was robbed of a preferred quality 
of life, as reflected upon by Russinova et al. (2011). Danie felt that he could not “go 
forward”, further saying that, “it pushes us back from doing what we love to do, 
because they look at how you dress and say you are not part of them, push you 
away. Judge you,” while appealing that he was “not successful, not where I wanted, I 
know I can be of better use to someone, just give me a chance.” 
Prejudice not only limits and stunts an expression of inner strength and individual 
contentment in life, but also restricts venturing outside to connect with others 
(Pescosolido et al., 2013; Russinova, et al., 2011). In this way, it not only becomes a 
weapon another uses on the self, but extends to being an internalised belief 
destroying the self from within. What appears as an avoidance of prejudice to bolster 
and preserve one’s sense of life purpose and self-esteem, comes from its 
anticipation inadvertently serving to reduce one’s quality of life (Cox et al., 2012; 
Pescosolido et al., 2013; Russinova, et al., 2011). A look at the comments made by 
Ranko, Danie and Thulisile above attests to this. With this, people internalise the 
same stigma others apply to them before enacting it (Cox et al., 2012; Russinova et 
al., 2011). Trying to win back inner agency, they avoid those who avoid them. They 
restrict their movement where they anticipate being restricted. 
7.3.4.3 Prejudice targets and their assumed threat 
For Gervais et al. (2011), the practice of prejudice needs to be understood within the 
context in which it socially serves a purpose, as the sociofunctional approach 
explains. Individuals and groups are prejudiced against as a result of the threat they 
are assumed to pose. The distrust of atheists is seen as a result of their threat to the 
values of the American religious dream. When some will be avoided for assumed 
disease threat (Neel et al., 2013), or for being social, economic and political 
competitors (Brockett & Wicker, 2012; Kessler et al., 2010), others will be least 
embraced for embodying characteristics identified to be antithetical to those 
assumed as the core for society (Hornsey et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 2010; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Woodford et al., 2013).  
When Phathekile Holomisa argued that black South Africans who practise same sex 
sexuality do so against values of their African culture, thereby posing a threat to such 
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values, Gervais et al. (2011) indicate that homosexual practices are viewed with 
disgust. 
Danie said: 
If you are not dressed in Nikes all-over. If I can’t go to the Casino, not 
having enough money to be in their group, not having the looks, they 
classify you. They say you are not a VIP, you are a poor guy, you have got 
nothing we are interested in. 
Such looks, as depicted by Danie, evoke feelings of being undermined because they 
violate the standards set for belonging into certain categories of living (Hornsey et 
al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), of being white. 
Standards of belonging in categories are further negatively tainted by images of the 
work done by Belinda and Thulisile, who were either advised to go look for work 
somewhere or just undermined, respectively. No one would want to associate with 
stigmatised groups and individuals of Danie’s looks, of Belinda and Thulisile’s nature 
of occupation, Ranko’s economic standing, and Simangele’s position when she lost 
everything.   
7.3.4.4 Justified/justifying distance 
No matter how varied their existence is, people’s race and cultural lifestyle are still 
viewed as fundamentally existing from what they are not and should not be. They are 
still viewed as essentially constituted. They are portrayed in fundamental beliefs and 
principles of being (Cunningham & Melton, 2013; Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; 
Wagner et al., 2010; Woodford et al., 2013). These beliefs and principles are used to 
guard a race’s existential territory, to marshal the contours of difference between it 
and the outside. Accentuated race typicality serves as a criterion for inclusion into 
the territory or sought proximity to it.  
The difference between Hispanic people and others serves as a justification for the 
discouragement of intermarriage with the self-incompatible other (Sahl & Batson, 
2001; Weaver, 2011), just as the incompatibility with fundamental sexual relationship 
expectations in American society serve to evoke discomfort and dislike towards 
same-gender sexual practices that are seen to defy such ideals (Woodford et al., 
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2013). In situations like these, one’s stereotypes about the self and other become 
justified. Distance and avoidance are the means to justify differentness.  
One’s occupation expectations and normative standards are used as justifying 
factors to enhance distance between one and a different, non-conforming other who 
has a job atypical to these expectations and standards. Thulisile mentioned that, 
when a black person does a domestic-type job, he/she endures undermining 
attention, yet for a white person it is seen as a norm or can be easily ignored. It is as 
if hers is atypical to occupational destinies for black people. 
As if being a car guard falls outside of the ordinarily expected occupations for white 
people, Belinda spoke of the daily scorn of being told to look for another job. Not 
surprised by the treatment, she considered it a justifiable reaction because all the car 
guards are treated the same way. 
Although it caused personal discomfort for Mokgopo, it appears that being called 
derogatory names while not working is usual for black people. Stephans, who saw it 
as a motivating factor, also indicated that people who are not working may be called 
derogatory names. 
While the above indicate how one justifies the stereotypes that serve to make others 
avoided, the following examples show how one actively distances oneself and avoids 
others  because of the stereotypes one cherishes about the self and others (Cox et 
al., 2012). Ranko stopped visiting others because they did not visit him either, saying 
that you “rather prefer to be with those of your own level, those that are accepting 
you.” He used his anticipation of being avoided and adjusted by distancing himself 
(Russinova et al., 2011). Such an anticipated negative social interaction was used by 
Thulisile, who distanced herself by moving on, and Magda, who just ignored them. 
As the other’s treatment of one is race justified, one also justifies one’s treatment of 
the other. 
In this manifestation, a living space is used as a commodity that allows one to avoid 
and distance oneself from others; however, what one does and the stigmatising 
stereotypes that one believes in are not reflected upon. It is taken as a naturally 
given order of things (Cappicie et al., 2012; Comeaux, 2010; Hawkesworth, 2010; 
Ortiz & Jani, 2010), and not as a result of an attempt to adjust to the pressure of 
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conformity to fundamentalist life principles in which one believes (Hornsey et al., 
2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 
2008).    
7.3.4.5 Material pursuit 
Recognition and respect accorded to people is based on the number of material 
belongings in their possession, encouraging their pursuit and display in an 
overarching, all-or-nothing endeavour. People’s relationships and conduct are 
governed by materialism, which Van Hiel et al. (2010, p. 1037) define as “the 
importance people ascribe to possessions and their acquisition.” 
A competitive yardstick of whom to include or exclude in one’s related living, 
materialism governs the conduct of people in groups and individually. Van Hiel et al. 
(2010, p. 1041) quote Fromm as saying that materialism leads people to develop “a 
‘pseudo-self’ based on a false need for possessions and an endless desire to 
consume while losing focus on fundamental existential questions such as ‘Why am I 
here?’ and ‘Is this all there is?’” While it facilitates belonging, it can also serve to 
disconnect. Simangele indicated that she lost friends when she lost her job and other 
material possessions, and that her friends returned when she found another higher-
paying work position and her material standing improved. Ranko found himself 
admired and avoided by early life peers whose lot did not improve and progress as 
his did. Simultaneously, he was made to feel unwelcome by peers who studied as far 
as or further than he did, but acquired more material possessions than he did.    
As a motivating factor to work hard and better oneself, materialism can also serve to 
discourage. A desire for more inspired Stephans to acquire qualifications in his job, 
thereby earning him societal respect. For Thulisile and Danie, however, the unevenly 
acquired material possessions and low economic status caused them to be 
undermined, not taken seriously and socially excluded. 
Because more is better (Thulisile), how much there is and how much is put on 
display can earn one positive recognition. It serves as compensation for social 
approval (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Belinda’s car-guarding duty was an indication 
of how little she had, causing her to receive comments like “go look for another job.” 
Thulisile’s colleagues displayed their material affluence with hairstyles, the type of 
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food they ate at lunchtime and their clothing accessories, while looks and how he 
dressed kept Danie judged and shut out by distinguishing his non-conformity to 
normative standards of worth, as argued by several authors (Hornsey et al., 2003; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). 
Mokgopo saw life around him as characterised by people bragging about their cars 
and houses, leading to snobbishness, as did Magda, who mentioned people thinking 
that they are better than others based on the amount of material belongings they 
have. The pursuit of materialism leads to a selfish life and less positive regard for 
others except as material competitors. All eight co-researchers defined success as 
having relatively acquired more materially. 
7.3.4.6 Cherishing of traditional societal values 
At the core of this and in line with essentialism (Mahalingam, 2007; Morning, 2011; 
Wagner et al., 2010), conformity to authenticity (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004; 
O’Connor et al., 2007; Ross, 2007; Tate, 2005), and conformity to prototypicality and 
normativity (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Kessler et al., 2010; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), are inflexible personality 
variables that cause people to stringently adhere to practices that exclude others, 
and be intolerant to any infringement of conventional practices. 
Within some religious, cultural and many other kinds of groupings, there are beliefs 
that only one way of being and practice is what defines all that is to be of the group’s 
identity. That would explain race fundamentalism (Cunningham & Melton, 2013). Any 
deviation from their idealised sense of being is viewed as a scornful noncompliance 
(Moss, 2003; O’Connor et al., 2007). Built around such a perception is a tendency to 
uncritically submit to the conventionally defined ways of being while being 
aggressively punitive to those who violate the norms (Hornsey et al., 2003; 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Such an uncritical 
conformity to fundamentalist beliefs, while being insensitive to its violation, is termed 
right-wing authoritarianism (Cramer et al., 2013; Duriez, 2011; Pedersen & Hartley, 
2012).  
The use of a strong language against Brett Murray’s painting and its defendants in 
Chapter 1 indicates how a violation of a fundamental sense of definition can be 
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fiercely fought against. Danie’s looks, Thulisile’s and Belinda’s choice of occupation, 
and Mokgopo’s unemployment status were seen as non-allegiant violators of the 
conventionality of a race. They evoked and received unsavoury stereotypes of 
rejection and exclusion within their respective race groups.  
However, to suggest that fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism take on the 
form of one-way prejudice is to miss a sense of the bigger picture. Prejudice is a 
reciprocal process of jostling for power to define and project attributes on to the other 
within the race(s), as shown by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999). Its positions keep 
shifting and being shifted. When we question the label given to us, we inadvertently 
label the labeller. We take on the role and position of the labeller. In expressing their 
dismay at the labels used to describe and thereby categorise them, Danie, Thulisile, 
Belinda and Mokgopo indicated how they too were using fundamentalist definitions 
to react in resistance to and define others. They did not passively wallow in the 
situation, as Ranko reacted by “also not visiting them.” They were similarly governed 
by subservience to conventionality and aversion to novelty and diversity. They 
reacted inflexibly to inflexibility and intolerably to intolerance. Their dismay at being 
categorised suggests that they were dealt with not only untowardly, but also race 
inappropriately. Through this, they categorised as race inappropriate those who 
defined them as contrary to the dictates of the fundamentals of their race. The 
shifting positions of categorisation turn the stigmatised into the stigmatising, and the 
categorised into the categorising. The prejudice-implicated self always points at the 
other, oblivious of its own prejudice, seeing it with a distant origin, unaware and 
unwilling to see it in its proximity.  
7.3.4.7 A normal way of life  
What is seen as normal gets approved and is made immune from interrogation and 
scrutiny, taken for granted and ignored. It becomes not only life, but also larger and 
beyond the actively lived life. It becomes reified, a tradition imposed and a rule 
followed.  
The first interviews brought about great deal of information, while the second 
interviews seem to have landed so little. The little information coming from the 
second interviews is not only a reflection of fatigue from answering the same 
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question and providing the same answer. It is less about unwillingness to cooperate, 
and more about being content with the essentialist definitions provided in the first 
interviews. The lack of free-flowing information in the second interviews is reflective 
of contentment with the exhaustive definitions provided earlier.  
For the second interviews, Magda said, “no questions, nothing to add.” Stephans 
said, “I am neutral, no questions.” Belinda said, “nothing to add, ask or change,” 
while Simangele said, “nothing, nothing really.”  Mokgopo kept it brief by saying, “no 
change,” while commenting on fights, discrimination, competition, lack of respect and 
other things that he saw around him. Ranko also had nothing more to say. All these 
were responses to an inquiry as to whether they thought of anything to add to the 
responses they gave in the first interviews, any questions to ask or any ideas that 
were evoked by the discussions in those interviews. Thulisile declined to participate 
in the second interviews. 
It should be recalled that, in their first interviews, the co-researchers provided 
descriptions of particular races that they saw as the reality, even if they were not 
happy about it. It never emerged that any of them questioned or wondered about the 
descriptions they gave, be it Magda talking about the “odd people”, Simangele’s 
unhappiness about friends who desert one when one loses positions of power, 
Mokgopo talking about being called “umahlalela”, Thulisile about gossiping and 
rumour-mongering, Ranko about colleagues who did not visit him, Stephans about 
aspiring for educational qualifications and respect, Danie about being locked outside 
for not having the looks, and Belinda about seeing all car guards treated the same. 
Although Danie seemed to sum up the normal way of life by saying that, “you started 
opening my eyes, and also to tell people around, what is wrong, to ask why you 
people are like this? What is the problem you got? You opened my eyes a lot 
because people do not think about the questions you asked me. People don’t think 
about it, don’t make work about that in life,” he too went no further to reflect about his 
own reflection, to question his own question. Like his fellow co-researchers, his 
essentialist descriptions were perched at a moment of righteousness against the 
other that he subjected to scrutiny. That is the hallmark of same-race prejudice, 
jostling for authenticity.   
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CHAPTER 8 
RELEVANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY TO  
HUMAN NEEDS 
8.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW 
This chapter investigates the responsiveness of existing community development 
programmes generally to prejudice and specifically to the same-race prejudice 
issues discussed in this thesis. It emphasises the relevance of phenomenological 
philosophy to human needs. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions: 
• Are there programmes in the country that relate to and address same-race 
prejudice issues as reflected in the interview themes in Chapters 6 and 7 of this 
thesis?  
• Do existing programmes aimed at addressing prejudice take heed of people’s 
subjective experiences, understanding and interpretation of their lived daily 
struggles of racial identity and identification, or are they just attempts externally 
arranged to coerce them out of their suffering without considering their point of 
view (Cann, 2012; Horsford, 2010; Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011)?  
• Given the intractable persistence of practices that oppress people (Kohli, 2012; 
Sonn & Quayle, 2013) and worsening societal, political and economic living 
conditions amidst notable scientific developments (Kourany, 2013), how do 
these programmes encourage Paulo Freire’s critical consciousness (Cann, 2012; 
Kohli, 2012) to acknowledge and respond generally to humanity’s suffering 
(Greer, 2004), and specifically to the experience of same-race prejudice?  
• What are the implications of enshrining reform and development programmes in 
general democratic principles far removed from people’s subjective experiential 
knowledge?  
Subsumed under the broader question of “what is the usefulness or relevance of the 
observations from the interviews in Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis to humanity?”, the 
chapter carries the message that the usefulness is not in the detached practice of 
philosophy’s intelligently styled terms, society’s existing smart programmes and 
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individuals’ advanced training skills, but in the relevance of these to the human life 
as lived rather than as a naturally determined existence. This is in realisation of 
Jarmila Skalkova’s assertion (as cited by Habl, 2015, p. 113) that: 
it appears that science and technology, as they have functioned in the 
resulting society, bring about a number of antihuman symptoms: 
objectification of human beings, one-sided development and neglect of 
spiritual needs. The key problematic motifs are the alienation of 
personality under the pressures of bureaucratic structures, and a mass 
consumerist culture. 
While the efforts made by some community development programmes and 
technological advancements are appreciated, it is necessary to consider the 
relevance of these and the country’s post-apartheid programmes to individually 
experienced challenges of same-race prejudice. It is also necessary to consider what 
value a phenomenological understanding can and does offer regarding race, 
prejudice, humanity and human needs. 
Investigating philosophy’s usefulness to humanity (Kourany, 2013; Vansieleghem & 
Kennedy, 2011), ability to offer an interpretation to troubling human circumstances 
(Heen, 2006; Kohli, 2012; Neville et al., 2014), ability and willingness to respond to 
human curiosity, and ability to attend to pressing human needs in a person’s lived 
world and not to stifle them (Cann, 2012; Horsford, 2010), the chapter further serves 
to inquire about the relevance of the observations made in this research to humanity 
in general, and to actual life situations in South Africa specifically. As a philosophical 
and research window into privately lived experiences, phenomenology in this thesis 
leaned on critical race theory’s caution to unpack the official definitions of the races 
of black and white, and the daily experiences thereto. 
In order to investigate the above, a randomly acquired list of individuals and 
organisations was drafted to find out about existing programmes run in the 
community. The identities of the individuals and organisations have been 
anonymously recorded as permission was not granted to reveal them. 
Twelve interview meetings and discussions were organised and held with individuals 
representing community development organisations, including five national 
organisations, mainly in the Nkangala district of Mpumalanga province from 6 
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October 2014 to 28 October 2014. The purpose of these meetings and discussions 
was to inquire about the relevance and responsiveness to same-race prejudice and 
the themes discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis in the organisations’ 
programmes. As these interviews were conducted not solely for statistical reasons 
but to acquaint one with a vision of the kind of humanity and society that the 
philosophy of phenomenology encourages, the chapter ends with  a reflection on 
what the philosophy has engendered throughout the thesis. Although no absolute 
answers are provided, it hints at myriad possibilities of relating to one another.  
8.2 THE INTERVIEWS 
The interview discussions are grouped here into those who ignored the requests or 
declined to respond and those who offered their time and attempted to respond to 
the inquiry. 
8.2.1 Organisations and individuals who ignored requests for a response or 
responded negatively 
Several individuals and organisations who were contacted with requests declined to 
respond or ignored the requests. These are discussed below. 
8.2.1.1 Emalahleni local Christian black pastor (06/10/2014)  
A visit was made to the pastor’s office to request an appointment with him. After 
being questioned by assistants at his church about the purpose of the appointment, I 
was given his telephone number. Upon contacting him and explaining the reason for 
an appointment request, he indicated his unavailability and promised contact through 
his junior pastor. In a harsh tone, he mentioned that “I am not obligated to him” and 
never provided the junior pastor’s contact details as promised. 
8.2.1.2 Emalahleni local Christian black pastor (06/10/2014) 
A visit to the church to set up an appointment with the pastor resulted in meeting with 
the pastor’s assistants in the pastor’s absence. I never followed up to ascertain 
availability, nor did the assistants contact me again as they had promised. 
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8.2.1.3 National (black) traditional leaders’ organisation (08/10/2014) 
A telephonic conversation was held with and an SMS was sent to the secretary of 
the organisation’s president. Although a response was promised, nothing was heard 
since. An email sent to the organisation’s national office on 6 October 2014 was not 
responded to. 
8.2.1.4 National human rights organisation 
Contact was established with the organisation on 3 October 2014 and carried out 
until 22 October 2014. Emails were sent and telephonic conversations were held in 
this period, leading to an initial promise that I would be sent details of the 
programmes run by the organisation. Contrary to what they promised, no relevant 
information was found on their website to answering the questions about race and 
prejudice. No response was received to the last email communication, sent on 22 
October 2014. 
8.2.1.5 National Christian churches organisation 
This organisation was contacted from 6 October 2014 to 22 October 2014 through 
email, telephone conversations and SMS. Although the organisation indicated that it 
would respond to the written requests, no response was received. 
8.2.1.6 Reflection about the above 
As an investigator seeking information on existing programmes and activities being 
conducted on race and prejudice, and clarity on the successes and challenges faced 
in rendering those programmes, I was confronted with difficulties to navigate the 
terrain. It seemed that, in order to have one’s request listened to, it is necessary to 
humble oneself to the lowest point of begging and being small; alternatively, one 
would have to arrogantly exude confidence and an upper-class status aura to attract 
people’s attention. 
The meetings were emotionally exacting and their conditions made me to feel 
invisible, my request and topic of interest ignored. The repeated contact with the 
human rights organisation and the national Christian organisation, and being ignored 
by the national traditional leaders’ organisation, are a testimony to how one comes to 
 182 
 
conclude that the topic is just generally ignored, and made unimportant and invisible 
in the daily discourses of people of influence. 
Meeting with a local pastor’s assistant, I realised how he cut our conversation and 
limited his answers to fit my assumed nature, while resisting to delve into the 
background of the inquiry itself, leaving me with a feeling not only of being 
undermined and ignored, but also of the topic being seen as insignificant. Arriving at 
their church precinct, I was welcomed by an aura of material affluence, 
unapproachability and distance that further dictated the nature of our conversation. 
The same feeling emerged again from a local Christian pastor’s response when he 
rudely said that “I am not obligated to him.” A bishop of a national Christian 
organisation once responded that “this is really not the time to talk” when I phoned 
him in October 2014. I never received a response from him even after several 
telephone SMS and email. 
8.2.2 Organisations and individuals who made time for a discussion 
In contrast to the above organisations and individuals, other organisations and 
individuals made time for a discussion. These are discussed below. 
8.2.2.1 National race relations organisation 
An email request sent on 3 October 2014 was responded to on 7 October 2014, with 
an explanation that their organisation did not run or engage in programmes of race, 
prejudice, tolerance, unity and related matters. 
8.2.2.2 Local black Christian pastor, Emalahleni (10/10/2014) 
A leading pastor in the district that he served, this pastor gave an overview of the 
work his church has facilitated to correct the racial imbalances faced prior to 1994 by 
the country generally and the church in particular.  
He indicated that the much-cherished racial integration of post-1994 did not yield 
positive results as promised on paper. People continue to be segregated according 
to race within their churches, the churches set apart according to race, and the 
differential allocation of power and resources continue to lie in the hands of most 
white people who have influence on decisions made, with white people not believing 
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in a black person leading while black people are content to be led by anyone who 
has money. 
While their fraternal churches are racially segregated despite the Constitution 
dictating otherwise, within each racial group individuals are being honoured because 
of their status. Competition over status results in everyone wanting to be at the top. If 
one loses one’s position, for example, being a chief, so does one lose the honour 
conferred on one. For both black people and white people, positions of power are 
conferred on those with more money. Considered the order of the day and 
conducted in the name of Ubuntu, these decisions are rarely questioned. 
8.2.2.3 Black Christian pastor and moral regeneration coordinator, Kwandebele  
(21/10/2014)  
A moral regeneration coordinator within his local municipality, this pastor mentioned 
that in both the church and moral regeneration activities and responsibilities, there 
are no activities or programmes carried out relating to the eradication of prejudice 
and intolerance between and within the races, except what has been written, for 
example, in the Constitution. He spoke about the stereotypes that are practised to 
divide people according to race, culture and belief systems in both the general 
society and the churches. He mentioned barriers to unity as embedded in cultural 
customs that do not allow free interaction between people. 
He spoke of the churches as the main impenetrable living spheres using customs to 
perpetuate disunity and intolerance both between and within the races. He called it a 
cold war between designated cultural groupings, calling each other differentiated 
cultural and church names, with divisions resulting in some people and groups being 
more privileged than others. This social arrangement is never questioned or reflected 
upon, but seen as the way things should be. Church politics make it the norm. 
People are designated and divided according to cultural and church names, causing 
them to not feel at one. This, according to him, indicates that people do not need 
each other. It is every man for himself.  
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8.2.2.4 Black youth convener, national traditional organisation (21/10/2014) 
This youth convener mentioned that there is noticeable discrimination within black 
and white people, and among the different chiefs in and outside his organisation. 
While the chiefs occupy their positions because of those they lead, they discriminate 
against those who are not chiefs. 
He commented on the various forms through which same-race prejudice is practised. 
People consider themselves as better than others based on the assumed superior 
status of their cultural practices. Some people are undermined based on what they 
have or do not have, while their cultural practices are overruled. Respect and 
recognition of people and their status are based on what they have or do not have. 
The funerals of the rich are attended by more people.  
Individuals’ surnames and cultural names are signifiers of superiority and inferiority, 
and sow conflict and hatred among individuals and groups. They are used to 
differentiate people and groups according to tribes. The noticed segregation of 
women originates from the families.   
He mentioned that his organisation had no programmes being conducted to address 
same-race prejudice. He lamented the existing moral regeneration programme as 
being spearheaded by religious pastors who discriminate against non-Christians.  
8.2.2.5  White Christian pastor, Emalahleni (22/10/2014) 
A pastor in a fraternal grouping, he mentioned that status is determined by wealth 
and that the level of education creates more problems between people. Pastors with 
educational diplomas and university degrees look down upon those who do not have 
them. Those with bigger churches undermine those with smaller churches. Wealthy 
pastors do not join their fraternity because they think that they do not need it. While 
these practices are present in both black and white communities, they are 
particularly rife among the former.  
He mentioned that the fraternity did not have any programmes which address race, 
prejudice and intolerance. They do not believe in racial discrimination. They focus 
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their functioning on praying and looking past discrimination that is there, while hoping 
that God will change the hearts of those who discriminate against others.  
8.2.2.6  Black local government municipal youth manager (23/10/2014) 
This local government municipal youth manager mentioned that the programmes 
conducted by his local government municipality were geared towards closing the gap 
of youth development created by apartheid’s racial discrimination laws. They 
targeted youths from previously disadvantaged racial groups and those who are 
disabled to empower them economically through skills training and allocation to 
educational opportunities. 
He reflected on how race continues to play a pivotal role in people’s lives. He 
mentioned how people still associate whiteness with being good, perfect and right. 
Some schools which used to be traditionally black have instantly turned into English 
medium schools with the arrival of a few white teachers, and now charge exorbitant 
monthly school fees when they initially charged a meagre annual amount. Some 
schools which were previously not preferred have become overpopulated with the 
arrival of a white principal. He acknowledged that the municipality did not go further 
than what is listed above here. They did not specifically engage in same-race 
prejudice programmes. 
8.2.2.7  Farming organisation, Mpumalanga (28/10/201) 
This white farmer also involved in religious activities expressed lament for cultural 
practices that are used as differentiating criteria for setting the various racial groups 
apart, calling them the “hiding place”. He mentioned practices that are defended and 
covered in the name of culture, with their proponents shielding them from critique.  
The disunity between the races is seen to be maintained by a mind-set that refuses 
to acknowledge that what are considered essential racial characteristics are mere 
cultural adaptations to living conditions. A refusal to interrogate culture as an 
adaptation mechanism allows many ills to continue unabated. To this, he listed the 
degradation of and violence towards women, people thinking they are entitled to 
what they did not work for, and the assumed different attitude towards money 
between the black and white races.   
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He further mentioned that an overemphasis on cultural differences wrongly makes 
people believe in the existence of pure races. His lack of a mention of any 
programmes run by his organisation to address same-race prejudice can be 
understood as emergent from this view. 
8.2.2.8  Reflection about the above 
While, for the group who did not respond or responded negatively, the topic of same-
race prejudice appeared to be ignored, made invisible and rendered insignificant to 
be discussed by being deliberately shut out of any discussion, there was a general 
appreciation and willingness to entertain the subject by those in the group that made 
time for a discussion. 
The mere mention of the subject was like an eye-opener for something they never 
imagined to exist. Those in the second group realised the importance and relevance 
of the subject to a South African life situation. However, similar to those from the first 
group, an impression I got from this group was that of letting it be because “it is the 
way things are”. Their acquiescence with the way things are caused no one to 
imagine any different way of handling the subject.   
8.3  LESSONS FROM PHENOMENOLOGY 
Chapter 1 depicted South Africa’s racially segmented apartheid history, laced with 
intolerance, mistrust, exclusions (Breetzke, 2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011; Higgs & 
Evans, 2008), stigmatisation, fear, anger and hatred (Biko, 1978; Pucherova, 2011). 
Their resultant prejudice infested every sphere of interracial relations in ways both 
supported and normalised by its various laws (Christopher, 1989; Pucherova, 2011; 
Seekings, 2008), for instance in the Bophuthatswana homeland (Higgs & Evans, 
2008), in institutions of higher learning (Pillay & Karlsson, 2013), and with regard to 
sexuality (Shefer, 2010; Stobie, 2003). 
The same chapter reflected on the commendable effort that post-apartheid South 
Africa is putting in to stamp out race-related prejudice and its societal imbalances. 
This is testified by the government and non-government institutions whose tasks 
embody redrawing a racially fair, balanced and human-rights-abiding society, by 
reporting on and legally instituting against racially and prejudicially unfair practices, 
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while legally enforcing practices that are fair and just. These are the South African 
Human Rights Commission (Berger, 2001; Durrheim et al., 2005; Malherbe, 2011), 
the South African Constitution (Du Toit, 2006;  Jones, 2006; Small & Grant, 2005; 
Van Zyl, 2011), and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Gready, 2009; Hamber, 2000; Marschall, 2012). These are summed as the proud 
gains that the country has amassed compared to its intolerant apartheid past replete 
with and consumed by prejudice. 
However, when one looks at the themes that are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of 
this thesis, it emerges that same-race prejudice is a subject that not only still 
negatively impacts on people’s daily lives, but is also largely ignored through both 
mundane parlance and official community development programmes. The latter is 
significantly clear from the interview discussions in this chapter, when one looks at 
the lack of community development programmes that not only communicate about 
the subject, but also entertain the subject as a reality. A paucity of efforts on the 
subject is shown through the interviews in this chapter. This is despite existing state-
assisted and non-state-assisted programmes that are aligned with the ideals of the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Sabourin, 2001). 
The community development programmes that are there serve mainly to address 
race and prejudice, not same-race prejudice as an existing phenomenon, for 
example those that are aimed at giving people employment and training 
opportunities to redraw the economic imbalances of the past. 
Phenomenology’s primacy of a uniquely experienced reality is illuminated by the 
ethical concern that Stieb (2007) raises and to which he hopes all human 
endeavours seeking to better humanity will respond. Stieb (2007) questions the lack 
of ethical interrogation by the well-intentioned community development programmes 
with a pursuit for a better society, to be relevant to the uniquely experienced life of 
the individual. He argues that the assumed general community improvements in both 
science and technology are not always univocally beneficial for the individual. In the 
pursuit for the betterment of society, Stieb (2007) asks how suitably tested the 
products are for the betterment of the individual’s unique life. In the spirit of Stieb’s 
(2007) ethical inquiry, the question asked in this thesis generally and this chapter 
specifically is, with the popular injunction to end human suffering born out of 
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prejudice and intolerance from apartheid, what is the relevance of post-apartheid and 
community development programmes to individually experienced challenges of 
same-race prejudice? 
The argument of the thesis is that individuals’ personally lived experiences and 
concerns, as revealed in Chapters 6 and 7, are not attended to or acknowledged. 
The individual seems to be sacrificed for the benefit of the bigger and wide-ranging 
notions of nationhood. The nation is too busy fighting bigger battles and ignoring 
individually lived experiences and challenges. Like “every man for himself” as the 
pastor and moral regeneration coordinator noted in this chapter, and “being left to die 
next to the road” as mentioned by Danie in Chapter 6, it is a subject nobody is willing 
to notice. It is masked and hushed in a life that is considered normal, as unworthy of 
bothering about and ignored. This indicates ignorance not only of the subject for 
discussion purposes but of the individual whose experiential life revolves around it.  
A befitting question to ask at this point is, given South Africa’s apartheid past, its 
post-apartheid efforts to eradicate prejudice, the themes discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7, and the interview discussions in this chapter, what value does and can a 
phenomenological understanding offer regarding race, prejudice, humanity and 
human needs? The following statements as deduced from a phenomenological 
understanding argued in this thesis are an attempt to respond to this question. 
While acknowledging and not underestimating the social construction of human 
racial identities (as argued through critical race theory in this thesis), phenomenology 
does not deny people’s racial corporeality (Connolly, 1995). However, humanity is 
encouraged to be sensitive to barriers of interaction that create distance between 
people. One is called to be mindful of the labels of racial authority, identity and 
identification that hamper engagement about life as individually lived and render it to 
never be questioned (Connolly, 1995).  
The same sentiment of a tendency by people to take their life situation for granted 
and as naturally given is echoed by Davis’ (2005, p. 563) caution against the 
naturalist attitude danger of humanity getting “lost in the world”. The slavish adoption 
of an uncritical and naive attitude towards one’s life circumstance as naturally given 
is lamented by several authors (Kockelmans, 1994; Kruger, 1988; Natanson; 1969; 
 189 
 
Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983), as it may lead to an acquiescence with 
conditions that result in the proliferation of disease, worsening of quality of life, war 
and prejudice, even if there is high-end technological and scientific advancement in 
the society (Kourany, 2013).  
As Connolly (1995, p. 39) mentions that “the body perceived as an object only is 
drained of its humanity; it is a dead body devoid of its vivifying, expressive, 
intentional qualities,” intervention programmes that treat people primarily as 
corporeal entities and as only racial types rather than individuals with an ability for 
interpretive intentionality (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Flood, 2010; 
Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Simonsen, 2013) and consciousness (Greenfield & 
Jensen, 2012) are critiqued for failing to appreciate a person’s inside experience 
(Macnaughton, 2011). The necessity of situating understanding and efforts to human 
upliftment in people’s experiential knowledge is extended by Armour’s argument (as 
cited by Crowe, 2012, p. 578) that, “if we study ideas apart from their embeddedness 
in the facts and conditions of life we come to absurd conclusions such as that there 
is only one way of looking at the world.” 
When we do away with the hierarchical structuring of the teacher-learner, giver-
receiver relationship interaction in physical education, with less focus on training the 
physical body, and begin to imagine what the experience entails for the learner, 
physical education becomes an invigorating and empowering human encounter for 
both the learner and the teacher (Connolly, 1995).   
For Macnaughton (2011, p. 929) medical practice’s sole concern with treating sick 
bodies loses sight of the real experience that speaks of the patient as an individual 
with feelings, volition and understanding. It ignores a realisation that an “illness 
occurs in the context of an individual life filled with imagination, belief, feelings: 
subjectivities that shape meaning for that patient.” Similarly, community development 
programmes that lack an incorporation of human experience and feelings fail to 
consider what it is to be human (Macnaughton, 2011).  
Racial identities and identification labels of blackness and whiteness happen in the 
context of people’s lives of embracing and not embracing, of being embraced and 
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not being embraced, and in the interpretive understanding of what it is and what it is 
not to be black or white. 
A speech made by Richard Pring (as cited by Heen, 2006) to new teachers at a 
school outside of Boston is of compelling significance to the need to inculcate in our 
interactions a treatment of people as humans (Macnaughton, 2011). In the speech, 
Pring (as quoted by Heen, 2006, p. 197) gives the following warning and admonition: 
I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no one should 
witness: Gas chambers built by learned engineers. Children poisoned by 
educated physicians. Infants killed by trained nurses. Women and babies 
shot and burned by high school and college graduates. So, I am 
suspicious of education. Your efforts must never produce learned 
monsters, skilled psychopaths, educated Eichmanns. Reading, writing, 
arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our children more 
human. I wish to argue that what makes sense of the curriculum in 
educational terms is that it is the forum or the vehicle through which young 
people are enabled to explore seriously (in the light of evidence and 
argument) what it is to be human. And such an exploration has no end. 
That is why teaching should be regarded as a moral practice.  
This is in tandem with  critical race theory’s displeasure with socially and politically 
lopsided and preferential developments that are couched in legalistic fallacies 
(Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013) that widen the gap of inequality between the 
downtrodden and those who are politically, socially and economically advantaged, as 
argued in the work of several authors (Arudou, 2013; Closson, 2010; Odartey-
Wellington, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Powers, 2007).  
8.3.1  Phenomenology, social responsibility and community intervention 
The discussion in Chapter 1 of South Africa’s post-apartheid efforts to eradicate 
prejudice, descriptions of the races of black and white in Chapter 2, interview themes 
and conversations with their leaning on essentialism and the naturalist attitude in 
Chapters 6 and 7, and the interview discussions in this chapter show that same-race 
prejudice is an enduring individually experienced phenomenon whose nature and 
magnitude are not captured and taken heed of in the official discourses and 
intervention programmes in the country. This is supported by an observation by 
Kourany (2013) of the danger incurred in scientific advancements that are detached 
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from appreciating individually experienced human suffering. Kourany (2013) and 
Balogun (2008) opine that philosophy can serve to bridge the gap between science 
and people’s pertinent life issues by engagingly responding to the latter’s dire life 
circumstances. They consider this a socially responsible science.  
However, for some studying human sciences, the priority of a socially responsible 
science is subverted by what Crowe (2012) calls a leaning on being mathematised or 
data oriented. Crowe (2012) warns against the temptation, driven by a pursuit for 
relevance, legitimacy and credibility of research data, to heed the invocation by 
approaches in the humanities to be modelled by quantification and verification, 
thereby losing relevance with the experiential human element.  
The importance of such a socially responsible science is underlined in Richard 
Pring’s (Heen, 2006) warning about the inhumane treatment born from teacher’s 
training, Macnaughton’s (2011) critique of medicine’s atomistic treatment of an 
individual, Connolly’s (1995) observation of physical education solely concerned with 
a human being’s corporeal existence, and Matthew Lipman’s statement (as quoted 
by Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011, p. 174) that teaching should inspire children to 
“be more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate, more responsible 
individuals,” while encouraging them to be critically engaged in their life’s 
assumptions rather than naively considering them as given (Davis, 2005).   
In the same vein, the argument of the thesis considers phenomenology as a socially 
responsible science. In trying to be relevant to the status quo and its established 
modes of conventionality, we lose relevance with people’s humanity. Not only 
philosophy (Crowe, 2012) but also community development and intervention 
programmes that purport to uplift humanity, run the gauntlet of detachment from 
people’s lived reality. 
Neither created nor existing in a social vacuum, philosophy should develop out of the 
prevailing milieu while serving to critically respond to events in the milieu (Balogun, 
2008). In response to the void of ethical responsibility towards the individual 
highlighted by Stieb (2007), philosophy’s benefit to humanity should lie in the critique 
and transformation of dominant perceptions, ideologies and practices that may be 
left intact and considered the norm (Balogun, 2008). 
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Phenomenology qualifies as not a mere science whose philosophy is disconnected 
from people’s lives. It has been adopted in this thesis as a “reflective and conceptual 
analytical engagement with ideas” (Balogun, 2008, p. 114) of racial identity and 
identification prejudice within the races of black and white. It connects with the 
struggles individuals are confronted with daily by not shying away from but reflecting 
on their life circumstances (Cappiccie et al., 2012; Heen, 2006; Kourany, 2013; 
Schieble, 2012; Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011). By wondering and being doubtful 
about the familiarity and congeniality of the races, it helps with an interrogation 
endeavour of exposing the misgiving practices within the races that are ordinarily left 
untouched. According to Vansieleghem and Kennedy (2011, p. 175), it is: 
a philosophy no longer regarded as a theoretical activity separate from the 
world, but rather as a potential that has (and can) be developed in order to 
get a grip on one’s interactions with one’s environment, and to influence 
change. 
It moves away from the mere general terms of racial identity and identification to 
seek an understanding of what meaning these have for the individual and with what 
implication. It wipes off complacency with the general ideals of description of a white 
race and black race whose inclusivity may hide away those they exclude and other. 
Embodying a transformative element (Balogun, 2008), in phenomenology the thesis 
derives Paulo Freire’s critical consciousness (Cann, 2012; Kohli, 2012) and 
interrogation of society’s structures and practices of domination, suppression and 
inequality (Cann, 2012; Greer, 2004; Kohli, 2012; Sonn & Quayle, 2013). Not created 
in a vacuum, it is a medium of conversation and critical interrogation about, and of 
setting a tone for, transformation of people’s lived circumstances (Balogun, 2008). 
It is a philosophy tinged with social responsibility and responsiveness by engaging 
individually pertinent questions embodied in the lived world (Kourany, 2013). It 
resists an allegiance to reifying existence, assumptions that subjugate and 
tendencies that accept life as normal and naturally determined (Vansieleghem & 
Kennedy, 2011).  
Phenomenology encourages a sense of responsibility by seeing humanity’s 
existence as not merely robotic and living by the general script of racial identity and 
identification, but as consciously interpretive, as individually perturbed by and 
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perturbing life. It is beholden to serve a humanity and society that are critical, 
reflective and interpretive of life as lived, and seeks to encourage these ideals. It 
encourages accountability to the self and others as reflective beings. 
It is hoped that what is considered the highest virtue and duty of people to humanity 
(Habl, 2015; Pallikkathayil, 2010) and of realising that every man’s existence should 
extend beyond self-service to  consider the next person (Habl, 2015) can be injected 
within community development programmes by embracing phenomenological 
philosophy. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW 
The chapter forms a reflective detour into the steps followed in the thesis and is not 
used to formulate new findings or ideas. I use it to indicate how the various research 
interviews and chapters were used to form the observations made, and about the 
overall definition and structure of same-race prejudice. 
Reflected upon in the chapter are: 
•  Phenomenology as a philosophy underpinning the thesis and as in opposition to 
the naturalist attitude, as well as how this was helped by looking at critical race 
theory. 
• The phenomenological research and the use of open-ended interview 
conversations. 
• The hypothesis made. 
• The findings made.  
• The overall psychological structure of same-race prejudice. 
9.2  SAME-RACE PREJUDICE HYPOTHESIS 
Same-race prejudice is a subjectively lived and experienced phenomenon. It is made 
up of the flawed, rigid, essentialist and taken-for-granted categorisation and labelling 
of identity and identification masked in notions of authenticity against inauthenticity, 
normativity against non-normativity and prototypicality against non-prototypicality, 
within the race. Informed by a naturalist attitude, it consists of notions that consider 
race as an objective and real marker of identity and identification, blinded to how it is 
constituted in politically and socially formulated and motivated stereotypes of 
categorisation thinking within the race. 
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9.3  KEY FINDINGS 
Linked with the stated hypothesis and based on interrogated observations from 
Chapter 6 and 7, the following key findings about same-race prejudice were arrived 
at. 
Based on observation of the themes in Chapter 6, same-race prejudice is made up 
of objectivist, essentialist and quantifiable virtues of the phenomenon of race. Guided 
by a naturalist attitude, it is displayed through notions that define a race according to 
objective and quantifiable virtues of acceptability against unacceptability, authenticity 
against inauthenticity, normativity against non-normativity and prototypicality against 
non-prototypicality of identity and identification within the race. Those assumed to 
have none or less of the authentic, normative, prototypical and acceptable virtues 
are categorised as different, judged and labelled as inauthentic, non-normative, non-
prototypical and unacceptable to the race. 
For whiteness and white race, the looks of the physical body, nature of work, how 
much one earns at work, educational qualifications, interpersonal manners, work 
experience and material possessions were the virtues that serve as a yardstick for 
categorisation and differential treatment. Intolerant quick assumptions made about 
Danie’s lack of the required looks and Belinda’s less respectable job, as well as 
Magda’s consideration of disrespectful white people to be odd, were some of the 
examples how this was done. 
For blackness and black race, such qualifying virtues were material possessions, 
being employed and economic affluence. Those less or none with these were 
subjects of negative social judgement and grading, for example Mokgopo’s friend, 
who was called “mahlalela”, and Simangele, who was deserted after losing her job.  
An expanded definition of same-race prejudice was offered in Chapter 7, debunking 
the notion that people are victims of same-race prejudice. It is considered as 
reciprocally enacted and sustained by people as victimising victims of stereotypes, 
labelling, categorisation and intolerance. This is done through the use of self-
righteous cultural beliefs to lay a claim to an authoritative power to authenticity, 
normativity, prototypicality and acceptability of defining a race. Both Ranko and 
Danie employed their stereotypes and intolerance of differentness to categorise and 
 196 
 
stigmatise themselves and others, and used isolation and avoidance as a buffer 
against being further discriminated against. The assumed victims of same-race 
prejudice have an ability to competitively define, classify, categorise, label and other 
themselves and others, thereby rendering others as false, illegitimate and unreal. 
Magda’s differentiation between the odd and decent people not only considered the 
former as disliked but categorised them as un-white.  
Same-race prejudice is not merely a natural occurrence. It is actively enacted 
through the use of compensatory strategies to deal with and perpetuate 
stigmatisation and stereotypes for self and other classification. Stereotypes about 
work and the nature of work by Magda, Thulisile, Ranko, Mokgopo and Stephans, 
and the use of space and distance by Ranko, Danie and Thulisile, were applied to 
justify the differentness between themselves and others, to minimise belonging 
anxiety and to boost social approval, thereby causing more differentiation of people. 
Marked by essentialist descriptions, the inability and unwillingness to reflect on one’s 
actions and acknowledge one’s acts of prejudice within a race lead to a tendency to 
uncritically submit to self-righteous and fundamentalist beliefs, and conventionally 
defined ways of being, while being aggressively punitive to those who violate the 
defined norms. This was exemplified by Ranko’s definition of himself as an advanced 
man in relation to the peers who did not study as far as he did, and keeping a 
distance from colleagues who did not visit him, and by Stephans’ arrogant defence of 
trade experience and qualifications as his guarantees of a sense of pride and 
respect in relation to those who did not have or were assumed to not be working 
towards acquiring these. 
9.4  HOW THE INQUIRY OF THE THESIS WAS CARRIED OUT 
Both a phenomenological philosophy debate and a phenomenological research 
project, also incorporating critical race theory, this thesis was arranged as a 
response to the naturalist attitude’s notion of race as a naturally given concept of 
human identity and identification. By using the races of black and white as examples, 
this thesis viewed the naturalist attitude concept of these as masking and 
perpetuating the practice of essentialist, categorising and labelling stereotypes of 
racial identity and racial identification, not only between the purported different racial 
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categories, but also within each categorised racial group. The naturalist attitude is 
considered to mask, cause, sustain and encourage the practice of same-race 
prejudice.  
In both its philosophical debate and the research praxis, this phenomenological 
response considered the human capacity for consciousness, intentionality and 
understanding of the phenomena regarding racial identity and racial identification, as 
opposed to mere corporeality. Primacy was given to the individually lived and 
experienced phenomena of the races of black and white and the accompanying lived 
phenomena of blackness and whiteness to indicate how same-race prejudice is 
practised within the races, as opposed to these as mere objective and quantifiable 
markers of unquestionable natural racial identity and racial identification.  
With conversational open-ended interview discussions as the hallmark of 
phenomenological research and with primacy put on exploring the experiential world 
of human existence, the interviews were a repeated activity and are woven in the 
thesis’s chapters. The three types of interviews conducted are indicative of 
phenomenological philosophy’s prioritisation of a subjectively lived human 
experience. 
A first group of informal interviews were conducted by me in Emalahleni at the 
interviewees’ places of work or daily activity. The appointments with the interviewees 
were not pre-scheduled. None of the interviewees were asked to sign any 
participation consent forms, hence the anonymity of their responses. However, they 
gave verbal consent to my written notes of their responses being kept. This first 
sample of purposively selected interviewees was made up of individuals from 
organisations whose duties revolved around race, intolerance, segregation, justice, 
labour security and community service provision. These individuals were chosen on 
the basis of having a presumed understanding of matters relating to race, racial 
identity and racial identification. The sample was made up of three black men from 
three mostly black national labour unions, one white man and one white woman from 
two mostly white national labour unions, a white woman from a liberal national 
political organisation, a white man from a national extreme right political 
organisation, a black woman from a national government youth institution, a black 
woman from a government labour disputes institution, and a white male car guard.  
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I asked them to define the terms black, blackness, white and whiteness (see section 
3.2). Their responses are not necessarily those of the organisations they represent. 
The second group was also purposively sampled and interviewed by me, not asked 
to sign any participation consent forms, and the appointments, discussions and 
requests for input were not pre-scheduled, while the right to keep written notes of 
their interview response were verbally consented to. The responses from their 
interviews maintained the anonymity of them as individuals and their respective 
organisations as permission to reveal these was never sought. The group consisted 
of two local black male Christian pastors, one district black male Christian pastor, 
one regional white male Christian pastor, one district black male moral regeneration 
coordinator, one black male youth convenor for a national traditional organisation, 
one white male farmer for a provincial farming organisation, one black male manager 
for local government’s youth programmes, a national traditional leaders’ 
organisation, a national human rights organisation, a national Christian churches 
organisation, and a national race relations organisation.  
I asked each individual, sampled from various organisations, to give responses 
representative of their organisations with regard to what the organisation was doing 
generally in society with regard to race, prejudice, intolerance, unity, the successes 
and challenges encountered in such programmes, and specifically with regard to 
same-race prejudice and the successes and challenges thereto (see section 8.2). 
The interview conversations or attempts thereto were conducted in the form of face-
to-face interviews, telephonic interviews, emails and SMSs.  
The responses of the third group of individuals interviewed are the basis upon which 
the crux of the thesis’s key findings, interrogations and themes have been based. 
Details about this group are contained in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Unlike the two sets of 
informally conducted interviews, appointments with these co-researchers were pre-
scheduled, consent for participation in the interviews was sought and granted, and 
the recording and storage of research information was discussed, as was the right to 
withdraw from participation. The sample for these interviews was purposively 
selected using the criteria of race (black and white), gender (male and female) and 
socio-economic status (economic affluence and less economic affluence, as further 
sub-indicated by the nature of one’s work and activities).  
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The interviews were open-ended conversations centred around asking and 
responding to the question, “how do you think people of your race have been treating 
you, and how are they treating you now?” Guided by a phenomenological philosophy 
and a qualitative approach to research, this was intended to draw out responses of 
taken-for-granted subjectively lived experiences of the practice of prejudice within 
one’s race. I employed a phenomenological analysis of explication to extract themes 
from each individual interview in order to arrive at a psychological structure of lived 
same-race prejudice (Chapter 6), and further interpretively interrogated these not as 
essences of a quantifiable and undisputed reality waiting to be objectively discerned 
by the researcher who is not personally involved in the process (Chapter 7). A follow-
up interview with each of the co-researchers was done four months after the first 
one, to solicit a reflective understanding, interrogation and additions to the responses 
given by the co-researchers in the first interviews.  
Further reliant on answering the questions reflected upon in Chapters 6 and 7, the 
interview discussions and the overall study were conducted in three different but 
complementary tasks as follows:  
1. A literature review (Chapter 2) and mundane conversations and descriptions 
(section 3.2) of the races of black and white, blackness and whiteness as 
naturalised, objectivist and essentialist identity and identification markers of 
race guided by the naturalist attitude. Examples of essentialist and objectivist 
natural notions of race in the literature are by authors who say, for example, 
that “I am convinced that there is a black and nonblack view of human 
behaviour, growth and potential for development” (Jones, 1980, p. xi). Several 
others speak of delineated Western psychotherapy, African Christianity, 
African psychology, African philosophy, black psychology, etc. Examples of 
the naturalist attitude about race from the mundane descriptions from the 
informal interviews (section 3.2) asking about the definitions of black, 
blackness, white and whiteness are: “people are culturally different, conduct 
funerals and weddings differently…. Black people are culturally different” (J,  
19/03/2012) and “whites do not go to traditional schools…. Blacks are known 
for greeting whether a person is known to them or not…. Whites are known 
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for being selfish, self-centred and concerned only with their immediate 
families” (H, 15/03/2012). 
2. Phenomenological formal interviews (Chapter 6) with individuals about their 
lived experiences of same-race prejudice and same-race intolerance. This 
was done to indicate how same-race prejudice practices are not personally 
reflected upon, but are merely considered to be what only others do to the self 
and not as what one is capable of, and are considered a natural occurrence. 
Danie spoke of being amazed by a white person that leaves an unfamiliar 
white person on the side of the road, while Thulisile spoke about the culturally 
appropriate black that self-righteously considers the culturally inappropriate 
black circumspectly. In both examples, black or white, the competition for 
authenticity, normativity and prototypicality categorises the other as 
inauthentic, non-normative and non-prototypical, thus rendering it false, 
illegitimate and unreal within the race. 
3. Informal interview discussions about existing community development 
programmes (Chapter 8) on prejudice, intolerance, unity and same-race 
prejudice. As echoing critical race theory’s scepticism of legalised human 
rights reforms to practices of prejudice, this was done to indicate how same-
race prejudice is an ignored subject and not prioritised or considered to be 
relevant, despite post-apartheid South Africa’s liberal laws. Reflections 
included the local pastor and moral regeneration coordinator who 
acknowledged that his organisations have not prioritised same-race prejudice, 
although most of their programmes were aligned with the country’s pro-
human-rights Constitution, and his reflection that some of their activists’ 
actions continued to categorise, label, stigmatise and other differentness 
within their groupings.  
9.5  THE CORE THOUGHT OF THE THESIS  
The literature discussion about race and the races of black and white in Chapter 2 
and the informal interview descriptions of the races of black and white in Chapter 3 
were meant to serve as a springboard for the thesis’s main argument as is summed 
up here. Using the races of black and white as examples, each definition of a race is 
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made with essentialist assertions informed by a naturalist attitude that considers 
each race as a real, objective and quantifiable marker of identity and identification, 
separate and uniquely distinct from the other. 
These assertions help to differentiate a particular race from what it is not, in other 
words, its opposite. A black race, racial identity and identification are clearly 
differentiated from a white race, white racial identity and identification in terms of, for 
example, phenotype, culture, life philosophy, sexuality, family values and norms, and 
ideas about education and educational achievement. Responses from the interviews 
in Chapter 3 have statements like, “one’s race is naturally determined” (C, 
12/03/2012) and “unless you hold some respectable position, some blacks will 
disrespect you…. Whites have no jealousy although they are competitive” (B, 
12/03/2012). The literature included statements such as, “we are raised so that we 
don’t engage in going out with men while we are not married. I do not like them to 
grow up that way, like American girls” (Filipino migrant worker, as quoted by Espiritu, 
2004, p. 197) and that lesbians and gays practise their lifestyle in contravention of 
their African culture (Patekile Holomisa, as cited by Baron, 2012). 
Manifested in a strongly held general perception that there is a pure way of being 
that is unique to a black race and blackness as modes of racial identity and racial 
identification, opposed to a white race and whiteness as modes of racial identity and 
racial identification, each race is viewed in a manner that is prototypical, authentic, 
and compliant with norms and values, as opposed to a manner that is non-
prototypical, inauthentic and noncompliant with norms and values. Embodied in a 
categorisation thinking laid in stereotypes and labelling of what it is and what it is not, 
each race becomes an essentialist focal point for identity and identification, with 
immutable characteristics that are not interchangeable with those of the other race. A 
taken-for-granted naturalist way of thinking that is never reflected upon or 
challenged, this reduces people to merely essentially existing, sharing immutable 
fundamental traits different from those of the assigned other race. It leads to the 
holding of stereotypes and making sweeping statements about “us” and “them” 
between and within a race, setting people apart from those of the different racial kind 
who possess dissimilar traits, and pitting a race against an external other and an 
imagined other within the same race. 
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It has been further argued in this thesis that the categorisation thinking is extended 
to employ the core prototypical, normative and authentic defining criteria of a race 
from an external other, to differentiate it from the non-prototypical, non-normative 
and inauthentic other within the same race. As a result of the stereotypes people 
hold about themselves, others, race, racial identity and racial identification, the 
categorisation thinking pits the ideal race against the other within the same race. An 
example is Mokgopo’s statement that, “they disregard you…. It is not well, it makes 
you think of bad things, and these are family people,” as is a reflection from critical 
race theory literature of a Nigerian foreign national (quoted by Matsinhe, 2011, pp. 
304-305) who recounted that, “once you speak their language they immediately 
know that you are one of them…. I felt so bad because I could not reply in Zulu, 
when he noticed that I am not South African his reaction towards me changed.” 
People are explicitly, implicitly, actively and unwittingly exhorted to live up to the 
stereotyped ideals of a race with its authentic, prototypical, and norms-and-values-
compliant virtues, for example not practising homosexuality or engaging in sex 
before marriage. The race noncompliant are frowned upon, looked at with distrust, 
hatred, dislike, and subjected to ill-treatment, negative labelling, competition and 
stigmatisation.  Feeling judged, Danie said that, “it pushes us back from doing what 
we love doing, because they look at how you dress and say you are not one of 
them.” Through behaviour and attitude, the race noncompliant are treated with 
intolerance based on their distinctive attributes of differentness from the esteemed 
race. They are unwillingly accepted and are disrespected due to their different 
values, cultural beliefs and perspectives. The comments about the injustices befallen 
on America’s Sikh men (Ahluwalia, 2013) are an example from the literature. 
In this way, prejudice of race, racial identity and racial identification is not only 
practised and sustained by categorisation and essentialist notions between the races 
of black and white, but also within the races of black and white in terms of what is 
considered as authentic, normative and prototypical of each particular race. 
Considered as the natural way of being, naturally designed and given, and never 
subjected to scrutiny or an awareness of being socially constructed, each racial 
identity is turned into an objectified existence of a race. Stereotypes, which are 
merely deferred to, abound regarding what it is and what it is not.  
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Apartheid South Africa formalised laws that helped in the veneration of the races and 
their identities as naturally given, thereby instilling more stereotypes and prejudice 
between the races and subtly within the races. Post-apartheid South Africa has 
formalised laws that give equal recognition and dignity to the different races. 
However, these instil a sense of the races as essentialist and categorisation markers 
of real, objective yet different identity and identification, each characterised by 
inherent and invariant essential virtues. One example from the literature is white 
journalists being barred from a black journalists’ forum (Sesanti, 2008, p. 35). Further 
polarising racial identity between and within the races, it is strongly held that there is 
a pure and unique way of being black and being white respectively. It has been 
argued in the thesis that, in profiling who is authentically black and authentically 
white, people practise the prejudiced exclusion and intolerance of those they profile 
and consider as not black, or as not white within each respective race category. 
9.6  PHENOMENOLOGY’S PHILOSOPHICAL  RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE  
The thesis used phenomenology’s philosophical understanding to challenge the 
naturalist attitude’s reliance on essentialist notions of the races of black and white as 
forms of identity and identification existing independent of an experiencing individual. 
A phenomenological understanding argues against taking for granted the subjective 
human experience and ignorance of people’s lived experiences about racial identity 
and identification, by seeing these as phenomena whose appreciation is not always 
amenable to natural laws. It calls for the exploration of the phenomenon of human 
race, people’s subjectively lived experience of their own blackness and whiteness 
identity and identification, and not just acquiescence to their corporeal racial 
definitions and existence.  
Calling upon a revision of the naturalist attitude, it is concerned with how people 
make sense of their racial corporeality by going beyond an understanding that sees 
people as mere racial types defined in smooth universal categories of normativity 
against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity and prototypicality against 
non-prototypicality to racial labels and codes. These labels are considered 
inadequate to capture the experiences of being a human, and fail to embrace the 
totality of lived human circumstance for those experiencing them. 
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9.7  RESPONSE FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
A phenomenological research activity informed by its primacy of the subjectively 
lived human experience and phenomenon of people’s racial identities was embarked 
upon. The research was based on phenomenology’s tenet of a human as a 
conscious being and of race as not merely an objective symbol and standard of 
identity and identification separate from an experiencing human subject. The 
research inquired about race as a phenomenon perceived and experienced by 
individuals, tapping into their subjectively lived experiences of being black and being 
white that are often taken for granted and made implicit. 
It has been argued in the thesis that a taken-for-granted belief in naturally existing 
and essentially categorised racial definitions results in the prejudice of sameness 
and differentness within each of the races. The research therefore sought to ask 
corporeally selected black and white co-researchers to relate their experiences of 
being black and of being white. Using a qualitative research approach, the research 
sought to explore the experiential race challenges of black identity and identification, 
and white identity and identification in open-ended conversational interviews. 
This critique has been extended with critical race theory’s understanding about the 
consequences of the naturalisation habits of race, as entrenching essentialist 
definitions of racial identity and racial identification, causing labelling, stigmatisation, 
intolerance and prejudice of the different within the races, accentuating notions of 
authenticity, normativity and prototypicality, and othering those deemed to be in 
contravention of the races’ ideals. According to critical race theory, this leads to 
intolerance as displayed in racism, racialisation, racial profiling and a refusal to 
inquire as to who gets to define a particular race, who is included or excluded in a 
particular racial identity, who benefits from upholding the ideals of a normative, 
authentic and prototypical race and racial identity, and the human rights violations 
and injustices the naturalist attitude about race brings into people’s lives. 
9.8 THE OBSERVATIONS MADE 
The observations that have been made during this research are discussed below. 
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9.8.1  Descriptions of races 
The literature review in Chapter 2 and elsewhere in the thesis, and the informal 
interview discussions in Chapter 3 about the descriptions of the races of black and 
white, show that descriptions of the races of black and white, racial identity and racial 
identification are states of being that are couched in official objectivist and 
essentialist terms, of a race and within the race, and of normativity against non-
normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity, and prototypicality against non-
prototypicality. This argument has been shown by the discrimination, labelling and 
othering of American black people who submit to education and educational 
achievement by other black Americans, of Filipinos who engage in sex before 
marriage by other Filipinos, and of black South Africans who practise homosexuality 
by other black South Africans. This argument is indicated by the definition and 
affirmation of blackness in terms of, for instance, its core philosophy of life, religion, 
psychology and mental health, and cultural values and norms. It is also indicated by 
the definition of whiteness in terms of, for instance, natural and deserved privilege, 
skin colour, economic affluence, intellectual astuteness, work ethic, and superior 
rationality.  
This is further established from the discussion and themes of the research interview 
conversations with the co-researchers in Chapters 6 and 7. Danie commented about 
the distinction of the whiteness that is not well kempt, poor and without the looks, 
from the preferred whiteness. Magda differentiated the odd white people from the 
preferred white people with good manners, as Belinda differentiated between white 
people who understand her situation and white people who think they are better than 
white car guards. Thulisile identified a discriminated blackness that does a job that is 
not considered respectable and is without accessories, against Mokgopo’s devaluing 
blackness that shows off and wants fame.  
9.8.2  Type of phenomenological research 
Chapters 6 and 7, both of which are dedicated to showing how same-race prejudice, 
stereotypes, intolerance and categorisation emerge, are done or played out, show a 
distinction between descriptive and interpretive phenomenological research. While 
the same phenomenological philosophy informed both, in Chapter 6 this is explicitly 
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expressed and named as unfair treatment when it is done to the self, for example 
Danie being avoided and Thulisile being disrespected or excluded. Not named as 
such by the co-researchers, it is mainly treated as a normal way of being when one 
does it, as shown by Mokgopo who said “ja, that is the way. Their treatment is bad 
as compared to that of the whites”, and by Thulisile who said that: 
I take it life has to be balanced. Some must look poor, do work that 
appears not right. It makes life balanced. We can’t all be the same. They 
happen all over, but it is up to the person how he/she takes it. You have to 
stand the ground and face all that is thrown at you. 
While the gleaned themes are about the understood experiences of subjectively lived 
same-race prejudice and same-race interactions, these are offered as being merely 
out there, as what others do unto the self. While the chapter presents these as 
experiential phenomena and not as taken-for-granted occurrences governed by the 
naturalist attitude, they are offered in an essentialist and objectivist manner that 
excludes the self in the moment and act of defining. They are offered as uncontested 
pure descriptions of the phenomenon existing separately from the inquirer and the 
experiencing individual. They are marked in normalised tendencies provided in 
dichotomies of acceptability against unacceptability, normativity against non-
normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity and prototypicality against non-
prototypicality of a race that does not evaluate the critiquing self in the act of 
critiquing. Assuming to reflect the true meaning of experiential reality, these 
descriptions are similar to the descriptions made in both Chapters 2 and 3. The 
chapter therefore conforms to descriptive phenomenological research. 
Chapter 7 conforms to the tenets of interpretive phenomenological research, whose 
task is not to merely uncover lived experiences, objectify, and take experiences and 
perceptions about same-race prejudice for granted. As critiquing the taken-for-
granted attitude adopted in experiences, perceptions and opinions shown in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 6, it steers clear of objectifying the researcher’s and co-
researchers’ experiences as the final arbiter of objective and unquestionable reality. 
It ushers in a redefined role of the researcher as not passively and naively 
commenting on co-researchers’ obviously existing facts of experienced same-race 
prejudice. Aimed at showing that interpretive analysis of research data begins with 
pitting the researcher’s interpretation against the co-researchers’ interpretive 
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understanding to add a psychological understanding to the latter’s perspective, the 
chapter is on a higher level than Chapter 6. It uses psychological theoretical 
language to interrogate the themes offered in Chapter 6 about how same-race 
prejudice plays out. 
Some of the psychological interpretive theoretical understandings used are the need 
for social domination, self-classification, labelling, stereotypes, devaluation, self-hate,  
self-righteousness and fundamentalism. Against the simplistic display of same-race 
prejudice in Chapter 6, here it is shown that same-race prejudice is a phenomenon 
of multiple emerging and merging realities constantly interrogated by those involved, 
and is not merely out there. It indicates that same-race prejudice is not passively 
experienced but actively brought to be by both those involved, and is not 
experienced along economic indices only, but along culture and other signifiers. This 
point is shown by a challenging renegotiation, reclassification and self-classification 
by the co-researchers beyond my simplistic classification of them into economically 
affluent and less economically affluent groups. Their definitions of themselves and of 
them by others in relation to others, among other factors, challenged how I and 
others viewed them. This was done by Mokgopo, Belinda and Stephans, who 
expressed a sense of contentment with their economic life status different from my 
prior assumption that they were economically not affluent. Ranko, whom I 
considered to be economically affluent, showed how he was regarded with both 
respect and disregard among his peers. 
Seeing others as culturally inappropriate, categorising and othering them, both 
Thulisile and Danie employed fundamentalist cultural signifiers to differentiate a 
pure, authentic, prototypical and normative race from its opposite. Danie did this by 
being appalled by white people who leave other white people, seen as un-white, on 
the road side dying. He too seemed to entertain self-righteous ideas about racial 
identity and identification. Simangele questioned the treatment she received from 
other black people who deserted her when she was not employed by calling them 
un-African, and not acting in line with the African philosophy of togetherness. This 
indicates that definitions of racial identity and identification are not singular but are 
multiple distinctions of both the self and others within a race. On a deeper level of 
reflection, the chapter indicates that same-race prejudice is a reciprocal process of 
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jostling power contestation to define and project attributes on the self and other 
within one’s race. Spurred on by a need for social domination, Stephans’ cherished 
values of hard work, trade and qualifications not only describe a particularly 
preferred whiteness but also shut out others as un-white or uncharacteristic of 
whiteness. 
These show how same-race prejudice is displayed in reacting intolerably to 
intolerance and inflexibly to inflexibility, as governed by subservience to 
conventionality and aversion to novelty and diversity. It is debated in the chapter how 
each of the co-researchers managed him-/herself according to the same principles of 
protypicality against non-prototypicality, normativity against non-normativity, 
authenticity against inauthenticity, and intolerance to diversity with which they 
reckoned others treated them. Not reflected upon, but merely taken as a naturally 
given order, the practices of reciprocal labelling, othering, stigmatisation, 
categorisation and stereotyping lead to and sustain intolerance and prejudice within 
a race, for example self-hate and self-devaluation. As source of prejudice 
themselves through the use of avoidance by Danie and Thulisile, educational 
qualifications by Stephans and the accumulation of material and educational 
qualifications by Ranko and Stephans, each of the co-researchers lived by the 
principles of social domination, self-classification and positive self-regard to assert 
themselves as normative and authentic to their identified races. 
Chapters 6 and 7 are set apart by the use of a theoretical flair in Chapter 7 to 
interrogate and name the interview themes, and the strategies people employ to deal 
with social judgement, stigmatisation, social disapproval and intolerance. In addition, 
Chapter 7 is set apart by the argument about people’s unwillingness or lack of ability 
to reflect on the practices they actively contribute to and are not merely victims of, 
considering these merely as being naturally given. A further distinction is that, by 
merely revealing subjectively lived and experienced same-race prejudice from the 
interviews with the co-researchers, Chapter 6 conforms to a descriptive 
phenomenological research, whereas Chapter 7 takes this further by interpretively 
interrogating how the subjectively lived and experienced phenomenon of same-race 
prejudice is played out and sustained. It goes beyond the taking for granted, silence 
and lack of self-reflective interrogation of played-out and sustained same-race 
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prejudice. The chapter reveals a pattern of reciprocal enactment by the victim of the 
very acts whose origin is considered external to them. 
9.8.3  Responses of the community to same-race prejudice 
Although it is a phenomenon prevalent in people’s lives (Chapter 6), same-race 
prejudice is neither acknowledged in existing community development programmes 
(Chapter 8) or post-apartheid South Africa’s response to the racial intolerance and 
prejudice of apartheid (Chapter 1). This was mentioned by the moral regeneration 
coordinator (section 8.2.2.3). Requests for an interview were ignored by the national 
human rights organisation, the national traditional leaders’ organisation and the 
national Christians organisation’, and responded to in an unfriendly manner by a 
local black pastor. Critical race theory is a reliable recourse for critiquing the 
lacklustre complicity of existing structural and political arrangements that leave the 
perpetuation of prejudice unhindered.  
9.9  FINAL THOUGHTS 
A scourge of incalculable negative effects on people’s quality of life as argued with 
reference to apartheid South Africa and reflection from critical race theory, same-
race prejudice is not considered less troubling than prejudice between races.  A 
dearth of mention thereof in community programmes and lack of reflective 
acknowledgement in the interviews speak of the lack of a concerted effort to 
minimise it and how unlikely people are to take personal responsibility for it. Although 
some literature speaks of instances indicative of intolerance, stigmatisation and 
stereotypes within the races, none refers directly to same-race prejudice as a 
phenomenon. The call for activism by students to align their academic work to speak 
about, expose and address injustices prevalent in people's lives, and not be merely 
inspired by acquiring accolades for themselves (Culkin, 2016; Madeloni, 2014; 
Suzuki & Mayorga, 2014), appears to not be heeded yet with regard to same-race 
prejudice. This is also besides the stated relevance and impact that 
phenomenological philosophy can bring in relation to people’s daily struggles 
(Chapter 8). Some literature speaks of instances indicative of intolerance, 
stigmatisation and stereotypes within the races without directly referring to same-
race prejudice as a phenomenon. 
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW REQUEST 
The request for the interview looked like this: My name is Paul Makena. I am a 
UNISA DLitt et Phil student in the subject of psychology busy with a thesis on 
same-race prejudice (using whiteness and blackness as examples).  
I am interrogating the prevalence of the prejudice of sameness as it impacts or 
may impact on societal unity, human rights, individual and collective 
livelihoods and the quality of life, to mention a few. 
I am making a request for information about your organisation’s programmes 
and activities that are planned and busy implemented to achieve its stated 
mandate, and information (if any is available) about the challenges and 
successes regarding these. 
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APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORM 
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( full name and surname ) am 
willingly taking part in the research project that explores the experiences and 
perceptions of living with and among people of my same race as conducted by Paul 
Makena for the fulfilment of his D lit et Phil degree studies at UNISA. 
My participation is based on the knowledge that my personal identifiable details shall 
be erased from both the recording and storage of information and the write up of the 
finished project. 
Signature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
